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In 2013, a new system for mandatory public disclosure came into effect,
the first since the creation of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in
1934. Today, major banks and certain other entities must make disclosures
mandated not only by the SEC, but also by a new system developed by the
Federal Reserve Board and other U.S. bank regulators acting in the shadow of
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and the Dodd-Frank Act.
Already, this parallel system, which stemmed in large part from a belief that
disclosures as to the complex risks flowing from modern financial innovation
were manifestly inadequate, dwarfs the SEC system in sophistication as to the
quantitative aspects of market risk and the impact of economic stress.
The overall morphology of mandatory public information has changed in
elemental ways, spanning two parallel regulatory universes with divergent ends
and means. The SEC system is directed at the interests of investors and market
efficiency, while the bank regulator system is directed at the well-being of the
entities themselves and the stability of the financial system. The regulatory
means diverge as well, not only as to specific risk-related disclosures, but even
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as to overarching concepts like "materiality" and the availability of private
enforcement.
This Article is the first academic work to consider the new morphology of
public information. Refining the conceptual framework for "information"
introduced in a prior (2012) work ("Too Complex to Depict?'), I set out three
approaches to information. First, the longstanding approach to information is
termed the "descriptive mode, " one that relies on "intermediary depictions" of
objective reality. An intermediary-such as a corporation issuing shares-
stands between objective reality and the investor. The corporation observes
and analyzes the objective reality, crafts a depiction of the pertinent aspects,
and transmits its depiction to investors. With revolutionary advances in
computer- and web-related technologies, investors need no longer rely
exclusively on the descriptive mode and its intermediary depictions. The
"transfer mode" allows "pure information" about the objective reality to be
transmitted directly to investors. The "hybrid mode" draws on elements of both
of the other modes, and investors rely on "moderately pure information."
This Article also offers pathways for reform. In terms of modes, the most
incremental step would be to improve the implementation of the descriptive
mode, especially at the SEC. The key SEC disclosure requirements have been
substantially frozen even as banking and financial innovation have undergone
epochal changes. More fundamentally, regulators have invested almost entirely
in the descriptive mode. Giving full consideration to all three modes-modal
"informational neutrality "-would lead to a more diversified portfolio of
informational strategies, one better suited to the informational challenges of
financial innovation. The Article outlines examples of transfer and hybrid mode
strategies and the need to address longstanding issues associated with
confidential treatment requests and the Freedom ofInformation Act.
Reforms are also necessary at the level of the morphology. In the long
run, the existence of parallel universes with divergent regulatory quests is
unsustainable. The regulatory objectives of the two systems not only diverge,
but sometimes conflict. A disclosure the SEC system deems essential for
investor protection and market efficiency can be contrary to the bank well-
being and financial system stability goals of the bank regulator system (and of
the new Financial Stability Oversight Council). In the short run, boundary-
setting and a modest form of "informational neutrality" across regulatory
systems (including as to judicial review of rule-making) can promote
coordination.
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I. Introduction: Parallel Universes, Innovation, and Modes of Information
A. Overview
In 2013, a new system for mandatory public disclosure came into effect in
the United States, the first such system since the creation of the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) in 1934.1 Today, major banks and certain other
entities must publicly disclose information mandated not only by the SEC, but
also by a new system developed by bank regulators. Motivated in significant
part by the risks posed by financial innovations that began to emerge in the
1980s and severe deficiencies in the associated risk disclosures, the new
system's ends and means differ in manifold respects from classic
1. As to the SEC disclosure system and its core ends and means, see, for example,
Henry T. C. Hu, Efficient Markets and the Law: A Predictable Past and an Uncertain Future, 4 ANN.
REv. FIN. ECON. 179 (2012) [hereinafter Hu, EMH and the Law]. Both of the existing components of the
new bank regulator public disclosure system required specified public disclosures beginning in the
spring of 2013. As to the bank regulator disclosure system in effect in 2013 and 2014, see Risk-Based
Capital Guidelines: Market Risk, 77 Fed. Reg. 53,060, 53,060 (effective date of January 1, 2013),
53,111 (public disclosures on a quarterly basis thereafter) (Aug. 30, 2012) [hereinafter U.S. Basel 2.5
Adopting Release]; and Supervisory and Company-Run Stress Test Requirements for Covered
Companies, 77 Fed. Reg. 62,378, 62,381 (effective date of November 15, 2012 for certain banks),
62,388-89, 62,395 (public disclosures each March and September thereafter) (Oct. 12, 2012) [hereinafter
Dodd-Frank Stress Testing Rule]. As to bank regulator disclosure components that will be added in
future years, see infra Section III.A.
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understandings. The new system is directed not at the regulatory ends of
investor protection and market efficiency but, instead, at the well-being of
individual banks and the stability of the financial system. The informational
mandate of the new system is focused on a single, critically important, subject:
the risks faced by major banks, especially the complex risks that now arise
from derivatives and other financial innovations.
Already, the new bank regulator system dwarfs the SEC system in
sophistication and granularity as to the quantitative aspects of two key subjects:
market risk and the impact of economic stress. The SEC's guide for statistical
disclosure by bank holding companies remains substantially as adopted in 1976
and the SEC's market risk disclosure rule remains exactly as adopted in 1997.
Major banks today are not the traditional loan-centered businesses of the sort
still prevailing in 1976 and the modeling of market risk today is substantially
more advanced than in 1997. As to the quantitative impact of economic stress,
there is nothing to compare: the SEC system has no corresponding
requirements. The SEC regime does not address in a material way the nature,
characteristics, or effectiveness of the models a bank relies on, whether under
the bank industry guide, the market risk rule, or the SEC's overarching risk
disclosure item, the "Management's Discussion and Analysis" (MD&A). The
new bank regulator system reflects modem learning as to the modeling of
market risk and the impact of economic stress as well as an appreciation of the
idiosyncrasies of modeling.
Over the next few years, the new bank regulator system will expand
beyond the subjects of market risk and the impact of economic stress to
comprehend essentially all risk-related matters. As to these risk-related matters,
one distinct possibility is that the SEC disclosure system might become
increasingly peripheral and, with this, the primacy of investors and market
efficiency that the SEC has always championed.
The overall morphology of mandatory public information has become a
curious one. The morphology spans parallel regulatory universes that emerged
independently and that are animated by divergent regulatory quests. All the
while, both of the disclosure systems rely almost exclusively on a traditional
approach to information that is structurally insufficient to address the
informational challenges posed by modern financial innovation.
This Article is the first academic work to analyze either the new
disclosure system or the overall morphology. Fundamental questions arise as to
coherence, effectiveness, and robustness. This Article suggests pathways for
reform both at the level of the two disclosure systems and at the level of the
overall morphology. These suggestions for reforms are compelled by the
divergences between the disclosure systems with respect to ends and means and
by the insufficiency of the traditional approach to information used in both
systems. As to the latter reforms, the Article refines, extends, and uses a
conceptual framework for the nature of "information" published in 2012, a
framework suggesting that, in an era of unprecedented financial and
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technological innovation, a portfolio of approaches to information has become
both essential and possible.
This context-risk disclosures of major banks, especially disclosures
relating to financial innovations-and related issues are critical for at least
three reasons. First, major banks and such activities are crucially important.
Just four banks hold 93% of the $233.9 trillion notional amount of derivatives
held by insured U.S. commercial banks and savings associations. The largest
eight U.S. financial institutions hold $16 trillion of assets under GAAP
accounting (when including the gross fair value of derivatives), an amount
equal to the entire U.S. GDP.3 The September 15, 2008 bankruptcy of Lehman
Brothers was the largest bankruptcy in U.S. history.4 The September 16, 2008
Federal Reserve rescue of American International Group (AIG), the other
seminal event in the near-collapse of the global financial system, proved
necessary in the wake of AIG's credit derivatives-related exposures.s
Second, the actual state of risk disclosures is worrisome. In April 2008, a
report prepared at the request of the Group of Seven Ministers and Central
Bank Governors concluded that weakness in public disclosures by financial
institutions was one of the main causes of the global financial crisis then
unfolding.6 Disclosures as to the institutions' market risk and credit risk
exposures related to structured products were a special problem. In late 2008,
when the crisis peaked, the interbank lending market "froze." 7 Major banks
were reluctant to lend to each other as they became unsure about the
composition and true value of their would-be counterparties' portfolios.
Academics looking at this development have suggested that the relative
transparency of banks appears to decrease during periods of financial crisis and
can lead to runs. Banks with difficult-to-value assets, such as more exotic
financial instruments, are especially vulnerable.9
2. This was as of June 30, 2013. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY,
OCC's QUARTERLY REPORT ON BANK TRADING AND DERIVATIVES ACTIVITIES: SECOND QUARTER
2013, at 11 (2013).
3. Statement on Avoiding Taxpayer Funded Bailouts by Returning to Free Enterprise
and Pro Growth Bank Regulatory Policies: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 1I3th
Cong. 2-3 (2013) (statement of Thomas M. Hoenig, Vice Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation).
4. Frederic S. Mishkin, Over the Clif From the Subprime to the Global Financial
Crisis, 25 J. ECON. PERSP. 49, 52-54 (2011).
5. Id.
6. FIN. STABIUTY FORUM, REPORT OF THE FINANCIAL STABILITY FORUM ON
ENHANCING MARKET AND INSTITUTIONAL RESILIENCE 1, 8 (2008).
7. See, e.g., Mark J. Flannery, Simon H. Kwan & Mahendrarajah Nimalendran, The
2007-2009 Financial Crisis andBank Opaqueness, 22 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 55, 56 (2013).
8. Id. at 82-83.
9. Transparency issues were also important in connection with the second phase of the
global financial crisis, that relating to European sovereign debt. In December 2011, the General
Manager of the Bank for International Settlements attributed the disruptions to bank funding markets in
part to informational asymmetries. Investors and other market participants were skeptical as to the
banks' true exposures to "troubled sovereigns through bond holdings and derivatives." Jaime Caruana,
General Manager of the BIS, Keynote address to the FSB Roundtable on Risk Disclosure: Financial
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Many market participants share these concerns over bank opaqueness. In
December 2012, Paul Singer, a prominent hedge fund manager, was reported to
have said that even with 110 investment professionals, he "cannot . . .
understand the financial condition of any bank [or other] major financial
institution" and that "[investment professionals] have no idea what that
derivatives section means."' 0 Some money managers avoid bank stocks
because of difficulties in understanding how banks will fare under different
economic scenarios, especially banks heavily exposed to derivatives." Some
bankers themselves admit to a major transparency problem.12
Third and most important from the standpoint of the basic engineering of
disclosure systems, there is a pattern that is troubling and perhaps puzzling:
beliefs about the opaqueness of major banks persist even as the banks provide
careful, voluminous information to the public. The Form 10-K for 2012 for the
Bank of America Corporation is 288 pages; Citigroup Inc.'s, 299 pages; The
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.'s, 246 pages; and JPMorgan Chase & Co.'s, 352
pages-not counting exhibits and information incorporated by reference from
proxy statements. 13 The English-language 2012 annual report of Credit Suisse
Group AG is 400 pages, excluding the Appendix.14 This, despite the liberal use
of microscopic font.
These financial institutions' disclosure documents dwarf those of non-
financial companies. The 2012 Form 10-Ks for the two largest U.S. companies
by market capitalization, Apple Inc. and Exxon Mobil Corporation, are 81
pages and 115 pages-roughly one-third and one-half, respectively, of the
above U.S. financial institutions. '5 The English-language 2012 annual report
Stability and Risk Disclosure (Dec. 9, 2011) (transcript available at
www.bis.org/speeches/sp 11 1222.pdf).
10. "The Shape of the Next Crisis" - A Preview by Elliott's Paul Singer, ZEROHEDGE
(Dec. 9, 2012, 4:00 PM), http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2012-12-09/shape-next-crisis-preview-
elliotts-paul-singer; cf James Freedman, The Weekend Interview with Paul Singer: Mega-Banks and the
Next Financial Crisis, WALL ST. J., Mar. 9, 2011,
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SBl0001424052748703899704576204594093772576 (quoting
Singer as stating that "'[w]e have a very large analytical research effort here and we have not found
anybody that can parse' the sensitivity of big banks to changes in interest rates, asset prices, and the
like").
11. See, e.g., Charles Stein, Bank Stocks Shunned by Money Managers over
Derivatives, BLOOMBERG, (May 4, 2011, 12:00 AM) http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-05-
04/bank-stocks-too-fancy-for-money-managers-turned-off-by-use-of-derivatives.html.
12. In September 2013, Sandy Weill, the former Chief Executive Officer of Citigroup,
stated that "[t]he problem with the financial industry is you need more transparency" and that "[i]f you
don't have transparency, people aren't going to understand." Squawk Box (CNBC television broadcast
Sept. 10, 2013), http://video.cnbc.com/gallery/?video=3000197127&play=l.
13. See Bank of America Corporation, Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 28, 2013);
Citigroup Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Mar. 1, 2013); The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., Annual
Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 28, 2013); JPMorgan Chase & Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 28,
2013).
14. Credit Suisse Group AG, Annual Report 2012, available at https://www.credit-
suisse.com/publications/annualreporting/doc/2012/csg_ar_2012_en.pdf.
15. See Apple Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Oct. 31, 2012); Exxon Mobil
Corporation, Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 27, 2013).
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for Nestl6, the world's largest food company, is 56 pages-roughly one-
seventh that of Credit Suisse. 16
In short, the public disclosures of banks have been approaching some
obesity limit. Yet both regulators and market participants believe that
inadequate information is being provided to the public. This unlikely pattern
has even animated light-hearted banter at Davos.17
In part, this pattern can be attributed to the greater complexities of major
financial institutions and of their activities relative to non-financial companies.
Simplification of reality itself, whether at the bank level or at the financial
product level, would make disclosure easier. Simpler realities are simpler to
observe, analyze, and describe.' 8 Simplification would offer an end-run around
the informational challenges posed by complex realities. However, there can
sometimes be major, unacceptable costs in doing so.19 In this Article, I will
leave aside consideration of the simplification of reality or other strategies
directed at the substantive nature of financial institutions or the products and
activities that the institutions are involved in.20 Instead, I will deal with matters
more directly related to the informational side.
16. Nestl6, S.A., Annual Report 2012, available at http://www.nestle.com/asset-
library/documents/library/documents/annual reports/2012-annual-report-en.pdf.
17. At the Davos gathering in January 2013, Paul Singer complained that global banks
made "completely opaque" disclosures and that the unfathomable nature of banks' public accounts made
it impossible to know which were "actually risky or sound." He noted that derivatives positions, in
particular, were difficult for outside investors to parse. Tom Braithwaite & Patrick Jenkins, JPMorgan
and Elliott Chiefs Clash in Davos, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2013, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9977e38c-
6553-l1 e2-8b03-00l44feab49a.html.
Jamie Dimon, the CEO of JPMorgan Chase, replied, "[o]ur 10K is 400 pages long ... [w]hat
would you like to know?" Davos Dispatches: Apologizing-to a Point, WALL ST. J., Jan. 24, 2013, at
A7.
18. This simplification of reality approach was discussed in Henry T. C. Hu, Too
Complex to Depict? Innovation, "Pure Information," and the SEC Disclosure Paradigm, 90 TEX. L.
REV. 1601, 1612, 1647-50, 1678 (2012), http://ssrn.com/abstract-2083708 [hereinafter Hu, Too
Complex to Depict?].
19. Some radical simplifications of reality, such as forcing a break-up of too-big-to-fail
banks, involve extremely large costs not only for banks and their stakeholders but also for the country
and for the overall financial and economic system. It is wholly unclear whether the benefits of breaking
up such banks could be conclusively shown to outweigh such fearsome costs. I continue to refrain from
taking a position on such break-ups. In Too Complex to Depict?, I stated that:
If ... a major bank is indeed "too complex to depict" and pure information-type models are
insufficient, should we consider the question of whether it is also "too complex to exist"? Nat-
urally, any consideration of this and related "too big to fail" matters must appropriately reflect
the full range of social and private benefits (and costs) of major banks, and of financial inno-
vation as to which they play such an important role.
Id. at 1612; cf Gillian Tett, The Banks that are Too Complex to Exist, FIN. TIMES, June 7, 2012,
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/65281562-bOcl-l lel-a2a6-00144feabdcO.html#axzz2xkvSUcDY (the
then-U.S. Managing Editor of the Financial Times stating that "if some banks today are 'too complex to
depict,' then perhaps it is time to recognise that they are also 'too complex to exist,' as Prof Hu says").
20. Although not motivated by concerns over opaqueness, simplification both at the
level of banks and at the level of financial products is already occurring. At the level of banks, this is
occurring in part because of the impact of the Volcker Rule preventing banks from engaging in
proprietary trading. See, e.g., Editorial, Finally, the Volcker Rule, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/13/opinion/finally-the-volcker-rule.html. At the level of financial
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A June 2012 article, Too Complex to Depict?,21 suggested that this
unlikely pattern is also the result of the core approach to information that the
SEC has implicitly relied on since its creation. This approach may be called the
"descriptive mode of information." An intermediary-such as a corporation
issuing shares-stands between the investor and an objective reality. The
intermediary observes that reality, analyzes it, crafts a depiction of the reality's
pertinent aspects, and transmits that depiction to investors. Securities rules
direct that the "intermediary depictions" be accurate and complete, and private
lawsuits and public enforcement efforts seek to ensure compliance with the
rules. "Information" is thought of as, if not equated to, such depictions.
For structural reasons, the descriptive mode of information on which the
SEC disclosure system substantially relies is insufficient to meet the
informational challenges of financial innovation. Under the prior work's
conceptual framework, advances in computer- and web-related technologies
now make possible promising new modes of information. The SEC disclosure
system should move beyond the traditional reliance on the descriptive mode
and begin to also use new modes of information, including a "transfer mode"
rooted in "pure information" about objective reality. A portfolio of
informational approaches is needed to help investors triangulate the truth, one
that relies on both the descriptive mode and the transfer mode-and the full
spectrum of approaches between these opposite extremes. To show the
structural inadequacies of the descriptive mode, and the potential of new modes
of information, the June 2012 work relied in part on the evidence as to the
credit derivatives-related debacle involving JPMorgan Chase (JPM) that had
started coming to light in May 2012.
The new bank regulator system also largely relies on the descriptive mode
of information, and is thus subject to that approach's structural inadequacies.
As a foundational matter, the current Article refines and extends the prior
work's conceptual framework. In connection with this framework, this Article
also considers newly available information as to the JPM derivatives debacle to
determine the viability of the prior work's initial analysis.
This Article is structured as follows. Section I.B offers a brief introduction
to some of the essential terminology of the 2012 conceptual framework, relying
in part on schematic diagrams. In this Article, I set out three "modes" of
information: (1) the "descriptive mode," relying on "intermediary depictions";
(2) the "transfer mode," relying on "pure information"; and (3) the "hybrid
mode," a mode drawing on elements of both of the other modes, and relying on
"moderately pure information." In Section I.B, I refrain from discussing the
respective advantages and disadvantages of the three modes.
Parts II and III examine the core ends and means of the two disclosure
systems, especially as they relate to risk- and financial innovation-related
products, this is occurring in part because of the Dodd-Frank Act requiring the centralized clearing of
most swaps.
21. Hu, Too Complex to Depict?, supra note 18.
573
Yale Journal on Regulation
information pertinent to major banks. Part II covers the SEC disclosure
universe, starting with the SEC's regulatory ends of investor protection and
market efficiency. It then proceeds to discuss the SEC's regulatory means.
First, there are general elements such as the quantum of information and the
nature of enforcement. As to the quantum of information, the essential test is an
investor-oriented notion of "materiality." As to enforcement, public
enforcement is supplemented by private lawsuits, including class actions.
Second, there are specific requirements flowing from the SEC's disclosure
guide for bank holding companies, the MD&A, and the market risk rule.
Part III covers the bank regulator disclosure universe, and starts by
discussing its origins and its regulatory ends of bank well-being and financial
system stability. Part III then proceeds to the regulatory means. The general
quantum of information required in this system is different: the materiality
touchstone here is less focused on the well-being of investors and more on the
well-being of banks. And, in contrast to the SEC system, no private
enforcement is likely to be possible. Currently, the specific requirements flow
from market risk-related mandates set out in the U.S. Basel 2.5 Adopting
Release and the company-run stress test-related mandates set out in the Dodd-
Frank Stress Testing Rule.
Part IV analyzes how the descriptive mode, the approach to information
primarily relied on by both the SEC and the bank regulators, is structurally
inadequate in the face of financial innovation. Newly available evidence on the
JPM derivatives debacle is consistent with the preliminary analysis of the
debacle offered in the 2012 article and confirms the presence of such structural
inadequacies.
Part V suggests some pathways for reform. The first set of pathways
relates to modes of information, considered independently of the overall
morphology of public information. Here, I begin with an analysis of how to
improve the existing implementations of the descriptive mode, especially with
respect to the SEC (Section V.A). The analysis will be relatively brief, since
many of the changes flow directly from the characteristics of the two disclosure
systems discussed in Parts II and III, and from the structural roadblocks
inherent to the descriptive mode discussed in Part IV. I then set out two new
modes of information, the transfer mode and the hybrid mode, and suggest
systematic efforts to incorporate such new modes in public disclosure systems
(Sections V.B and V.C). Resolving uncertainties flowing from the
administrative aspects of confidential treatment requests and the underlying
Freedom of Information Act exemptions is essential to fully realizing the
potential of the transfer mode. Each of the three modes of information has
virtues and faults: I conclude discussion of this first pathway by urging
informational portfolio diversification (Section V.D). Regulators should not
stake their entire disclosure strategy on the descriptive mode of information.
"Informational neutrality" across modes is needed, one in which full
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consideration is given to each of the three modes as a candidate for inclusion in
the regulatory portfolio.
The second set of pathways relates to the multiplicity of disclosure
universes with divergent ends and different resources and expertise. Section
V.D begins by showing the unsustainability of the current morphology of
public information. Section V.E proceeds to show the need for harmonization
of the two disclosure systems. This harmonization would be furthered through
boundary-setting, taking account of the respective strengths of the two sets of
regulators and using a modest form of "informational neutrality" across
disclosure systems.
B. The Conceptual Framework as to Modes ofInformation: Essential
Terminology and Schematics
The conceptual framework as to modes of information centers on the
multiple means a mandatory public disclosure system can rely on to help
market participants become informed about the objective reality of business
entities. This Section I.B is meant only to introduce some of the essential
terminology and does not discuss the respective merits of the different modes.
Under this framework, a public disclosure system can rely on one or more
of three basic approaches to information-what can be termed "modes of
information": the "descriptive mode," the "transfer mode," and the "hybrid
mode." These modes are simplified ways of referring to points along a
spectrum of approaches: the most extreme version of the descriptive mode at
one of end of the spectrum, and the most extreme version of the transfer mode
at the opposite end. The descriptive mode starts shading into the hybrid mode
from one direction while the transfer mode starts shading into the hybrid mode
from the other.
Figure 1 diagrams the descriptive mode, the traditional approach.
"Objective reality" is set out as the rectangle at the left. By "objective reality," I
am referring loosely to the entire universe of virtually infinite, random,
disorganized facts that exist irrespective of the presence of any observer-
whether or not the facts are perceptible by anyone. The loose boundaries of the
rectangle and the binary digits in the rectangle are intended to suggest the
entropy, the "messiness," of objective reality.
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In the context of a major bank, the bank-specific aspects of objective
reality would include such matters as each existing or prospective financial
asset a bank might hold, the debt, tax, or other liabilities the bank might have,
the investment projects it has or might be considering, the human capital it has
or might have, the litigation it is involved in or might be involved in, and so
forth-and the risk-return characteristics of each of the foregoing and all of the
foregoing considered as a whole. Facts that are less bank-specific in nature
might include such matters as industry-wide regulatory, tax, and intellectual
property issues.
A fact need not be perceptible by any observer to be considered part of
objective reality: the fact would be analogous to a sub-atomic particle that
exists but, at least with current technology, cannot yet be seen. Similarly, if a
bank's portfolio of exotic financial products creates exotic risks that are not
detected, much less quantified, by current financial models, those exotic risks
nevertheless exist and are part of objective reality.
In some contexts involving financial innovation, "objective reality" may
be subject to multiple meanings. In Too Complex to Depict?, I showed this in
the context of asset-backed securities, specifically the waterfalls that define
what the respective tranche-holders receive from the total cash flow available
for distribution.22 Figure 1 assumes that objective reality is not subject to
multiple meanings.
The business entity is represented by the oval at the center of Figure 1,
situated between objective reality at the left and the market participants at the
right. Staff at the business entity must observe, analyze, and then describe what
it believes to be the pertinent aspects of the objective reality. The result of this
"observe-analyze-describe" process at the business entity-the description, or
"intermediary depiction"-is diagrammed as a' book labeled as "Disclosure
Document" in Figure 1. In place of the entropy of objective reality is an
organized description-a "story" with a beginning, middle, and end, based on
words, graphs, accounting and risk numbers, and other "depiction tools." The
objective reality has been distilled and organized by the business entity, at
much expense and based on the entity's judgment and expertise. Market
participants are relieved of this costly and demanding task.
Market participants observe and analyze the intermediary depiction. Some
market participants may do so on their own; others, such as the bottom two
22. See Hu, Too Complex to Depict?, supra note 18, at 1636-42 (setting out alternate
conceptions of the pertinent reality as to the waterfalls). At the October 18, 2012 Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board hearing at which the 2012 article was presented, Chairman James Doty
characterized the article as "absolutely terrifying," pointing to, among other things, this concept that
even objective reality can sometimes be subject to alternative meanings. See Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board, Auditor Independence and Audit Firm Rotation, PCAOB Rulemaking
Docket Matter No. 37, Public Meeting (Oct. 18, 2012), at 127-28 (statement by James R. Doty,
chairman) (unofficial transcript by Neal R. Gross),
http://pcaobus.org/Rules/Rulemaking/Docket037/2012-10-18_Transcript_Houston.pdf.
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market participants, may do so on a collaborative basis. Market participants
cannot, however, see for themselves all of the pertinent aspects of the objective
reality that the business entity relied on in generating the depiction. The
business entity's depiction will have to suffice, apart from whatever
information that market participants may have from other sources.
Advances in computer- and web-related technologies now facilitate an
approach more focused on the "transfer" of objective reality itself-or, more
precisely, information that is highly mimetic of objective reality and exists
independently from any observer. This approach can be called the "transfer
mode" and such information can be called "pure information."
As illustrated in Figure 2, with the transfer mode, the business entity no
longer stands between objective reality (on the left) and the market participants
(on the right). The entity is not engaged in the observe-analyze-describe
process that leads to an intermediary depiction for which the entity is legally
responsible. With the transfer mode, the entity is involved only with respect to
the mechanical task of, in effect, transmitting pertinent aspects of objective
reality in the form of pure information. This information can be downloaded,
observed, and analyzed by market participants.
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To illustrate the concept of "pure information," consider Mount Everest as
the objective reality. While Mount Everest itself cannot be transferred to a
person sitting at his computer in Manhattan, pure information in the form of,
for instance, a photo of Mount Everest can be. Such pure information flows
largely from the inherent characteristics of Mount Everest itself and modestly
from the process used to generate that information (e.g., the camera and the
image processing software used by the photographer). So long as the person at
the computer is aware of the full particulars of the specific process used and the
distortions and other limitations of that process, that person can isolate Mount
Everest's inherent characteristics from the artifacts that the process introduces.
In Figure 2, pure information is diagrammed as a photo set in a picture
frame. The differences between the binary digits set out in the picture frame
and those set out in the rectangle representing objective reality are meant to
suggest the distortions and limitations of the process used to generate the pure
information. The rectangle is also a large one, suggesting that the breadth of
information that is captured by the wide angle lens on the camera, only some of
which information might be interesting to market participants.
With the transfer mode, the task of observing and analyzing objective
reality no longer falls on the business entity, but instead on the market
participants themselves. Many of the market participants may have neither
sufficient incentives nor expertise to do so. In Figure 2, this kind of market
participant is shown as an "observe only" market participant. Other market
participants will observe and analyze on their own while yet others may do so
on some form of collaborative basis. These other types of market participants
also appear in Figure 2.
The "hybrid mode" of information draws on elements of the descriptive
mode and the transfer mode, and results in "moderately pure information"
being provided to market participants. There are a number of different ways in
which this can occur
One example of the hybrid mode advanced in Too Complex to Depict?
23was the "common bank models" approach. This example is illustrated in
Figure 3.
Under this common bank models approach, a regulator comes up with a
set of mathematical models intended to gauge the risk-return characteristics of
a variety of trading and derivatives positions and a variety of other assets.
These models are publicly disclosed. With respect to each bank, models
developed by the regulator are applied to the bank's own, idiosyncratic, assets.
The risk numbers that result from using these regulator-developed models are
provided to market participants. Use of the regulator-provided models is
mandatory, irrespective of whether the bank believes the regulator's models are
any good and irrespective of whether the regulator's models are in any way
consistent with the bank's own models.
23. Hu, Too Complex to Depict?, supra note 18, at 1658-63.
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Here, in contrast to the descriptive mode, the business entity is not
required, or even permitted, to rely on its own judgment and expertise to
analyze and then describe the pertinent aspects of objective reality. As
illustrated in Figure 3, with this common bank models approach, the regulator
is intervening at the "analyze" stage of the normal observe-analyze-describe
process.
The regulator is insisting that the analysis not be based on the bank's own
judgment (i.e., the bank's own models) but the regulator's (i.e., the regulator-
developed models). Thus what the market participants see is not a "description"
or "intermediary depiction" of the normal sort. The market participants instead
see risk-related numbers that flow mechanically from the regulator-developed
models.
581




0 - 0 - 0
0o - - - 0
- 0 - 0 - -
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The common bank models' approach also stands in contrast to the
transfer mode. With the transfer mode, the entity's role is limited to
transmitting pure information to market participants. Here, the entity is not
transmitting such information.
This processed information is neither a "description" in the normal sense,
nor is it pure information. For convenience, I have termed it "moderately pure"
information.
Whatever mode or modes of information a public disclosure system uses,
the system has two essential components. The first component relates to
general requirements governing all mandatory disclosures. Key aspects include
the general quantum of information required (e.g., what information should be
considered "material") and the enforcement mechanisms (e.g., whether private
enforcement, especially class actions, should be allowed). The second
component relates to the specific requirements as to what subjects must be
covered (e.g., market risk), how those subjects are to be covered (e.g., the types
of information and their granularity), and the periodicity of disclosure (e.g.,
quarterly, semi-annually, or annually).
The choice of mode of information, when more than one is available, can
have a disparate impact on a disclosure system's effective characteristics.
Assume, for instance, that both descriptive mode information (i.e., intermediary
depictions) and transfer mode information (i.e., pure information) are generally
subject to private enforcement through class actions.
With descriptive mode information, the business entity is responsible for
the depiction's accuracy and completeness. With the transfer mode, the entity's
role would be limited to one of transmission: the entity must transmit the pure
information that is supposed to be transmitted. This transmittal task is more
mechanical than the observe-analyze-describe process leading to the
intermediary depiction. Moreover, deficiencies in transmission might be easier
to detect than misstatements and omissions in a depiction. The likelihood of
liability for the entity is probably reduced under the transfer mode. The
availability of private enforcement will thus have less of an impact on the
provision of pure information.
II. The SEC Disclosure Universe
A. Regulatory Ends: Investor Protection and Market Efficiency
From the SEC's creation in the 1930s, the agency has spearheaded federal
efforts to ensure that corporations provide fulsome information to the public.
Indeed, the SEC's activities have been largely animated by its views on the
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roles that public information can play, views embodied in what is commonly
referred to as its "disclosure philosophy." 24
The SEC's philosophy was grounded not in social science, but in popular
writings of Louis Brandeis published decades prior to the SEC's creation, one
of which famously proclaimed, "[p]ublicity is justly commended as a remedy
for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants;
electric light the most efficient policeman." 25 Brandeis contemplated that
disclosure would not only help deter abusive insider behavior (such as
excessive underwriting fees) but also help investors in their decision-making.
He explicitly rejected the idea that law should go beyond the informational
realm and into substantive decision-making.26
The disclosure philosophy contemplated that the SEC would generally
limit itself to promoting a robust informational predicate. Relying on this
predicate, investors would make their own decisions and market forces would
determine whether corporations undertake securities offerings, what form the
securities would take, and what the offering and trading prices would be. By
1961, one observer stated matter-of-factly that the Securities Act of 1933 (the
"Securities Act") "is essentially a legislative device to obtain certain basic
information essential to an investment analysis." 27
Four decades after the creation of the SEC, a theoretical construct
emerged into general public consciousness: the efficient markets hypothesis
(EMH).2 The EMH offered a social science gloss to both components of the
disclosure philosophy. The EMH emphasized the importance of publicly
available information to decisions by market participants and also suggested
how well the market seemed to process that information, providing additional
rationales for the SEC to refrain from moving beyond its modest informational
confines.
In January 1976, the SEC established an advisory committee of prominent
outside experts for a comprehensive review of the corporate disclosure system
and the role of the SEC,29 partly in response to EMH scholarship.30 The
24. See JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 39-42 (3d ed. 2003)
(explaining the disclosure philosophy and the influence of Louis Brandeis on Roosevelt).
25. LOUis D. BRANDEIS, What Publicity Can Do, in OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND
HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92, 92 (1914).
26. Id. at 103-04.
27. Harry Heller, Disclosure Requirements Under Federal Securities Regulation, 16
Bus. LAWYER 300, 300 (1961).
28. PETER L. BERNSTEIN, CAPITAL IDEAS: THE IMPROBABLE ORIGINS OF MODERN
WALL STREET 132-39 (1992) (describing Eugene Fama's early role in influencing the investment
profession and influencing the academic world with his ideas on market efficiency).
29. H. COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 95TH CONG., REPORT OF THE
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE TO THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
D-3 (Comm. Print 1977) [hereinafter DISCLOSURE ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT]; see also A. A.
Sommer, Jr., The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Disclosure Study, 1 J. COMP. CORP. L. &
SEC. REG. 145, 145-46 (1978).
30. DISCLOSURE ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 29, at I-II.
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Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure ("Disclosure Advisory
Committee") was composed of eight prominent outside experts and chaired by
an SEC Commissioner. With the help of a full-time staff of eight to ten people,
it issued a report after about two years of study. The Disclosure Advisory
Committee found the SEC's disclosure system to be sound and, without
explicitly endorsing the EMH, clearly used it as an intellectual cornerstone.31
The EMH has subsequently influenced federal securities regulation in manifold
ways, including the streamlining of procedural requirements as to corporate
disclosures and, more controversially, as to private securities class actions. 32
(This is notwithstanding the subsequent research challenging the EMH and real
world developments like the stock market crash of 1987, the dot-com bubble of
the late 1990s, the "flash crash" of May 6, 2010, and the easy-money-driven
distortions in asset pricing of today. 33)
The EMH and associated corporate governance developments emphasized
how a robust informational predicate could further proper market pricing and
protect investors-especially shareholders. From a market pricing standpoint,
the SEC, by promoting a robust informational predicate, satisfies one of the
essential conditions to securities prices bearing at least some proximate
relationship to their intrinsic values. Economy-wide, well-informed market
efficiency can contribute to the proper allocation of real resources across firms
and industries.
From an investor protection standpoint, all investors are automatically
protected from absurd bargains as they trade. And those investors who aspire to
outwit the market have readily available much of the informational raw
material necessary for their efforts.
Investors who are shareholders particularly benefit: market efficiency
helps ensure that corporate managements adhere to longstanding state law
fiduciary principles that generally require that corporations be run primarily for
the benefit of shareholders, not bondholders.34 Consistent with such principles,
31. See id. at XXXIII-XXXIV (discussing how market prices reflect both "true
information and false information with equal efficiency"); id. at 620-21 ("competition among analysts
results in security prices that reflect a broad set of information.").
32. See Hu, EMH and the Law, supra note 1, at 179, 183-90; Ronald J. Gilson &
Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms ofMarket Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 549-50 (1984).
33. For an overview of the evidence against market efficiency, see RICHARD A.
BREALEY, STEWART C. MYERS & FRANKLIN ALLEN, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 321-29 (10th
ed. 2011).
34. As to differences in interests between shareholders and bondholders, among
different groups of bondholders and of shareholders, and between shareholders and the company itself,
as well as between the maximization of shareholder wealth and the maximization of shareholder
welfare, see Henry T. C. Hu & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Abolition the Corporate Duty to Creditors,
107 COLUM. L. REv. 1321, 1350-54 (conflicting interests of shareholders, bondholders, and the
company), 1352-54 (conflicting interests among different groups of bondholders and shareholders),
1360-64 (conflicting interests of shareholders and the company), 1367-69 (conflicting interests among
different classes of bondholders) (2007); Henry T. C. Hu, Behind the Corporate Hedge: Information and
the Limits of "Shareholder Wealth Maximization," J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Fall 1996, at 39, 46
(diversified shareholders versus the company in respect of risk as a general matter), 48-49 (conflicts
between shareholder wealth maximization and shareholder welfare maximization, and the special
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boards of directors routinely use stock prices in monitoring executive
performance and use compensation structures rooted in stock prices to align the
interests of executives and shareholders. The market for corporate control is
facilitated by market efficiency: where incumbent management is unable or
unwilling to further the interests of stockholders, stock prices that reflect this
pattern may encourage outsiders to attempt to oust the incumbents. In the
normal corporate governance context, "market discipline" is used to refer to
such market forces pressuring management to act in the best interests of the
shareholders.35
In short, the SEC's disclosure system seeks to promote a robust
informational predicate for the purposes of market efficiency and the protection
of investors (and perhaps especially, shareholders). Under the SEC's disclosure
philosophy, what the market or investors do on the basis of the informational
predicate is outside of the SEC's purview. Such substantive matters as the well-
being of a corporation or its stock price fall in the province of market
participants, not that of the SEC.
B. Regulatory Means: The Descriptive Mode and the SEC's Intermediary
Depiction Model
From the beginning, the SEC has substantially relied on the descriptive
mode of information. At the enactment of the Securities Act, the core
provisions required that the issuer disclose in the registration statement filed
with the Federal Trade Commission36 and in prospectuses available to
investors, the items of data set forth in Schedule A. Schedule A required not
only disclosure of the issuer's financial records, but also "disclosure of
information about the firm's business, need for capital, officers, and the costs
of the securities issuance."38
The substantial reliance on the descriptive mode has continued to this day.
As will be discussed shortly, the "Management's Discussion and Analysis"
("MD&A"), the central item of the SEC's disclosure toolkit, is expressly
"intended to give the investor an opportunity to look at the company through
the eyes of management."39 Changes to the SEC's disclosure system over the
shareholder expectations considerations in connection with corporate hedging) [hereinafter Hu, Behind
the Corporate Hedge]; see also Section III.B and Henry T. C. Hu, Hedging Expectations: "Derivative
Reality" and the Law and Finance of the Corporate Objective, 73 TEX. L. REV. 985 (1995).
35. As to the distinction between the welfare of the (diversified) shareholder and the
welfare of the business entity, see Section III.B and the sources in supra note 34.
36. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, SECOND ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION: FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1936, at 1 (1936) (detailing that the SEC was
not created until 1934, with the enactment of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). Prior to September
1, 1934, the Securities Act was administered by the Federal Trade Commission. Id.
37. SELIGMAN, supra note 24, at 70.
38. Id.
39. Concept Release on Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition
and Operations, Securities Act Release No. 6711, Exchange Act Release No. 24,356, 52 Fed. Reg.
13,715, 13,717 (Apr. 24, 1987) [hereinafter MD&A Concept Release].
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past eight decades have been at the periphery and have not involved departures
from the descriptive mode. These changes include efforts to encourage business
entities to make their disclosures more comprehensible (most notably former
SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt's efforts at requiring the use of "plain English" in
disclosures ), accessible to investors (e.g., by EDGAR-izing filings to
facilitate easy downloading by investorS41), and not unduly burdensome (e.g.,
by integrating the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (the "Exchange Act") disclosures42 in situations likely to be justified by
the EMH).
Past and present, the nature of the information generated under the SEC's
disclosure system flowed primarily from the company's depictions. The
longstanding, omnipresent reliance on the descriptive mode has had the
consequence of "information" being commonly conceived of as, if not equated
to, these intermediary depictions. The SEC's system of mandated public
information is commonly referred to as the SEC "disclosure" system.
Information is implicitly conceptualized as requiring the company's active
involvement in offering a description of the pertinent objective reality.
With respect to banks and the subject matter of risk, the SEC's
intermediary depiction model has two sets of functional elements. The first set
is general in nature (i.e., not industry or subject matter specific) and is
discussed in Subsection II.B.1. The second set relates to banks and the subject
matter of risk and is discussed in Subsection II.B.2. Therein I discuss the bank
holding company "industry guide," the "MD&A" requirements, and the market
risk rule.
1. General Elements: An Investor-Oriented "Materiality" Quantum and
Public and Private Enforcement
As a legal matter, what a business entity needs to disclose depends heavily
on the specific context, most notably the particularities of the pertinent SEC
form. Thus, a company issuing securities to the public would make disclosures
required by the pertinent Securities Act registration statement form (e.g., Form
S-1 in the case of an initial public offering). Similarly, the topics covered in the
company's ongoing Exchange Act filings would depend on the specifications
of the pertinent Exchange Act form (e.g., Forms 10-K, 10-Q, 8-K, or Schedule
14A).
40. See, e.g., Plain English Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 7497, Exchange Act
Release No. 39,593, Investment Company Act Release No. 23,011, 63 Fed. Reg. 6370, 6377 (Feb. 6,
1998).
41. For discussions of EDGAR (Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval),
see, for example, 1 LOUIs Loss, JOEL SELIGMAN & TROY PAREDES, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES
REGULATION 218-21 & n.65, 677-78 (6th ed. 2011); William W. Barker, SEC Registration of Public
Offerings Under the Securities Act of 1933, 52 Bus. LAW. 65, 69-70 (1996).
42. See, e.g., Securities Offering Reform, Securities Act Release No. 8591, Exchange
Act Release No. 52,056, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,933, 70 Fed. Reg. 44,722, 44,724
(Aug. 3, 2005).
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As a general matter, the intent of these various forms considered as a
whole is to ensure that all "material" information about a corporation is
provided to the public. "Materiality" is generally to be determined under
standards prescribed in TSC Industries v. Northway,43 a 1976 Supreme Court
case addressing an allegedly misleading proxy statement used in connection
with a merger. TSC Industries offered three formulations of materiality that the
Court intended to be synonymous, one formulation being that "there must be a
substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been
viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the 'total mix'
of the information made available.""
Thus, in connection with the SEC's 1996 reexamination of some of the
fundamental concepts of the regulatory framework for public offerings,
securities market trading, and corporate reporting, the SEC issued a concept
release stating that "[t]he [Securities Act] and the issuer disclosure provisions
of the [Exchange Act] are premised on the view that investors are best
protected in making investment decisions if they are presented with full and
fair disclosure of all material information about the investments."45 Two
decades earlier, the Disclosure Advisory Committee, in justifying the SEC
disclosure system, had also concluded that "[m]arket forces alone are
insufficient to cause all material information to be disclosed.""
While materiality does not automatically impose a duty to disclose under
anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws,47 the law comes very close.
Thus, the SEC rules pertaining both to the Securities Act registration statements
and the Exchange Act reports explicitly require that filers provide not only the
information specifically prescribed to be included but also "further material
information, if any, as may be necessary to make the required statements, in the
light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading."48
Moreover, all provisions of federal securities laws imposing liability for
misrepresentations or omissions require that the misrepresentation or omission
be material.49
The SEC informational mandate is not merely a matter of "law on the
books." Failures to provide the requisite quantum of information can result in
43. TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
44. Id. at 449.
45. Securities Act Concepts and Their Effects on Capital Formation, Securities Act
Release No. 7314, Exchange Act Release No. 37,480, 61 Fed. Reg. 40,044, 40,046 (July 31, 1996)
(emphasis added).
46. DISCLOSURE ADVISORY COMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 29, at D-6 (emphasis
added).
47. JAMES D. Cox, ROBERT W. HILLMAN & DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SECURITIES
REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 585 (6th ed. 2009).
48. 17 C.F.R. § 230.408 (2013) (imposing additional disclosure requirements on
registration statements under the Securities Act). See also, 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-20 (2013) (using nearly
identical language in imposing additional disclosure requirements on the reports under the Exchange
Act).
49. See, e.g., the Securities Act § 11 and the Exchange Act § 10(b).
588
Vol. 31, 2014
Disclosure Universes and Modes of Information
public enforcement that has generally been more aggressive than in other
countries, at least prior to the global financial crisis, as well as private
enforcement.50  Although the SEC has authority to initiate only civil
proceedings, the U.S. Attorneys have the authority to bring criminal
proceedings and, beginning with the insider trading scandals of the 1980s and
the Enron scandal of 2001, such prosecutions have become increasingly
common.5
The contrast in overall enforcement of securities laws is understated by
simply looking at differences in public enforcement. In the United States,
private enforcement supplements public enforcement and results in greater
financial sanctions; in Europe, on the other hand, private securities class actions
are unknown and contingency fees are not permitted.52 Although private
securities lawsuits as practiced in the United States unquestionably raise a
number of troubling issues and the U.S. Supreme Court is soon to decide
whether to curtail such lawsuits,53 even harsh critics of such lawsuits concede
that such actions help deter fraud.54
2. Specific Elements: Banks and Risk
The elements of the SEC disclosure system most pertinent to banks and
the subject matter of risk arise from three sources, set out below in
chronological order:55
50. See, e.g., Julian R. Franks, Stephen M. Schaefer & Michael D. Staunton, The Direct
and Compliance Costs of Financial Regulation, 21 J. BANK. FIN. 1547 (1997); Howell Jackson,
Variation in the Intensity ofFinancial Regulation: Preliminary Evidence and Potential Implications, 24
YALE J. REG. 253, 281-83 (2007). Differences in the civil and criminal enforcement of insider trading
are probative on the matter of the vigor of public enforcement generally. For a recent discussion of
continuing disparities between U.S. and U.K. authorities as to insider trading, see David Enrich &
Harriet Agnew, Reputational Risk: U.K. Struggles In Fight Against Insider Trading, WALL ST. J., Jan. 4,
2014, at Al.
51. JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & HILLARY A. SALE, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND
MATERIALS 1499-1500 (12th ed. 2012).
52. John C. Coffee, Jr., Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement, 156 U. PA. L.
REv. 229, 266-67 (2007).
53. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., No.
13-317 (2014), http://www.suprenecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument transcripts/13-31 7el 8f.pdf.
The case centers on whether to limit plaintiffs' ability to rely on a presumption that class members in a
securities fraud class action relied on misstatements. Without this "fraud-on-the-market" presumption of
reliance, it would be difficult for plaintiffs to maintain securities class actions.
54. See, e.g., William W. Bratton & Michael J. Wachter, The Political Economy of
Fraud on the Market, 160 U. PA. L. REv. 69, 73 (2011) (stating that the fraud-on-the-market cause of
action, the primary class action vehicle under federal securities laws, "is thought to deliver" on the
promise of deterrence against future fraud, but "only a little").
55. 1 leave aside two other requirements. First, Item 503(c) of Regulation S-K requires
a registrant to provide "where appropriate ... a discussion of the most significant factors that make the
offering speculative or risky." Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.503(c) (2013). I omit discussion of this
because, if included, this discussion is largely subsumed by "MD&A" disclosures. Second, Section 956
of the Dodd-Frank Act requires the SEC and other financial regulators to jointly adopt rules mandating
disclosure of the structures of incentive-based compensation arrangements and prohibiting arrangements
that encourage inappropriate risk-taking. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 956, 124 Stat. 1376, 1903-04 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections
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(1) an industry guide, the "Guides for Statistical Disclosure by Bank Holding
Companies" ("Bank Industry Guide") (adopted by the SEC in 1976);
(2) Item 303 of Regulation S-K, the "Management's Discussion and Analysis of
Financial Condition and Results of Operations" (MD&A), an extremely
comprehensive set of disclosure requirements applicable to all companies, with a
special focus on a company's future prospects (adopted in its current framework
in 1980 and substantially refined later that decade); and
(3) Item 305 of Regulation S-K, a set of disclosure requirements on market risk
inherent in financial instruments, including derivatives, held by companies
("Market Risk Rule") (adopted in 1997). 5
i. Bank Industry Guide
In 1976, the SEC authorized for publication a guide intended to provide
bank holding companies with a convenient reference to the statistical
disclosures sought by the Division of Corporation Finance in the Securities Act
registration statements and the Exchange Act reports.59 This represents the only
effort the SEC has ever taken to comprehensively address the specific context
of banks.
The SEC explicitly premised the creation of the guide on the increasing
difficulty investors had in assessing the prospects of such companies without
"detailed information concerning the company's sources of income and
exposure to risks," in view of the increasingly diverse nature of such banking
of U.S.C. (2006 & Supp. IV 2011)). The version of the proposed rule approved by the SEC on March 2,
2011 is available online. Incentive-based Compensation Arrangements, SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N,
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank/956-proposedrule-draft.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2014). I have
long argued that incentives structures at banks can cause excessive risk-taking, including with respect to
derivatives, and that enhanced disclosure of such structures is needed. See, e.g., Henry T. C. Hu,
Misunderstood Derivatives: The Causes of Informational Failure and the Promise of Regulatory
Incrementalism, 102 YALE L.J. 1457, 1492-93 (1993) [hereinafter Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives];
Henry T. C. Hu, Risk, Time, and Fiduciary Principles in Corporate Investment, 38 UCLA L. REv. 277,
325-26, 378-88 (1990). However, because the issues are so rich and the information generated is
primarily inferential of bank risk-return characteristics, I will leave aside discussion of the forthcoming
rule as well as antecedent substantive bank regulator limitations on compensation structures.
56. Guides for Statistical Disclosure by Bank Holding Companies, Securities Act
Release No. 5735, Exchange Act Release No. 12,748, 41 Fed. Reg. 39,007 (Sept. 14, 1976) [hereinafter
Bank Industry Guide].
57. See Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of
Operations; Certain Investment Company Disclosures, Securities Act Release No. 6835, Exchange Act
Release No. 26,831, Investment Company Act Release No. 16,961, 54 Fed. Reg. 22,427 (May 24, 1989)
[hereinafter MD&A Release].
58. See Disclosure of Accounting Policies for Derivative Financial Instruments and
Derivative Commodity Instruments and Disclosure of Quantitative and Qualitative Information About
Market Risk Inherent in Derivative Financial Instruments, Other Financial Instruments, and Derivative
Commodity Instruments, Securities Act Release No. 7386, Exchange Act Release No. 38,223,
Investment Company Act Release No. 22,487, 62 Fed. Reg. 6044 (Feb. 10, 1997) [hereinafter Market
Risk Rule Adopting Release].
59. Bank Industry Guide, supra note 56.
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entities. "[M]any of the disclosures ... are intended to provide information to
facilitate analysis and comparison of sources of income and exposure to risks,"
which would help investors assess the ability of the entity to move into or out
of situations "with favorable or unfavorable risk/return characteristics."6 1
In particular, the focus was on the loans the banks extended and the risks
and uncertainties associated with such loans. The guide called for
straightforward information on such matters as the types of loans, their
maturities, interest rate characteristics (fixed or floating), loan loss experience,
and breakdowns of loans into nonaccrual, past due, and restructured
nonperforming categories. 62 The required information was to be reported in
terms of dollars and percentages. Only simple algebra, not formal mathematical
modeling, was called for.
It has been nearly four decades since the adoption of the Bank Industry
Guide. At its adoption, Apple was operating in a garage, the last U.S. troops
had just left Thailand, and the first Rocky movie was about to be released in
New York.
The guide has remained largely unchanged? even as epochal changes in
the nature of banking have occurred. The focus on loans remains even as the
role of loans at major banks has declined precipitously. There has been no
effort to update the guide to reflect the financial innovations and related issues
that did not exist in 1976.
At the time the Bank Industry Guide was adopted, the traditional role of
banks as financial intermediaries prevailed: "to make long-term loans and to
fund them by issuing short-term deposits."65 Commercial banks now are a far
less important source of funds for borrowers, and their assets only accounted
for 18% of total financial intermediary assets at the end of 2008, compared to
60. Id. at 39,008.
61. Id.
62. Bank Industry Guide, supra note 56.
63. See Adario Strange, Garage Where Steve Jobs Started Apple Designated as
Historic Site, MASHABLE (Oct. 29, 2013), http://mashable.com/2013/10/29/steve-jobs-apple-garage-
landmark/; Historical Events for 1976 (Part 3), HISTORYORB,
http://www.historyorb.com/events/date/1976?p=3; Rocky (1976) - Release Info, IMDB,
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0075148/releaseinfo (last visited May 20, 2014).
64. The current Securities Act and Exchange Act industry guides for bank holding
companies are set out at Industry Guides, SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N,
https://www.sec.gov/about/forms/industryguides.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2014) (pages 6-14 for the
Securities Act Industry Guide for statistical disclosure by bank holding companies and page 37 for the
Exchange Act Industry Guide for statistical disclosure by bank holding companies). The primary
changes to the original 1976 version of the guide are in the areas of problem loans (1983) and problem
foreign loans (1986). See Revision of Industry Guide Disclosures for Bank Holding Companies,
Securities Act Release No. 6478, Exchange Act Release No. 20068, 48 Fed. Reg. 37609 (Aug. 19, 1983)
(amendments related to disclosures as to problem loans, foreign outstandings, and loan concentrations)
and Amendments to Industry Guide Disclosures by Bank Holding Companies, Securities Act Release
No. 6677, Exchange Act Release No. 23846, 51 Fed. Reg. 43594 (Dec. 3, 1986) (amendments related to
disclosures of outstandings to certain borrowers in certain foreign countries).
65. FREDERIC S. MISKIN, THE EcoNOMICS OF MONEY, BANKING & FINANCIAL
MARKETS 292-93 (9th ed. 2010).
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6640% in the 1960-1980 period. Trading and fee income as a percentage of
assets has nearly doubled since 1980.67
The Bank Industry Guide has failed to consider the modern process of
financial innovation that began around the time of its adoption and that has
come to pose the most risk challenges for banks. This process began with the
Fischer Black and Myron Scholes option pricing papers of 1972 and 1973.68
Banks created the first over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives in the late 1970s,
apparently in secret.69 By the 1980s, OTC derivatives had become an important
feature of corporate and international finance, and the risks they were perceived
to have created for banks led to the first attempt at the international
coordination of bank capital adequacy levels-the 1988 Basel agreement that
will be discussed in Section III.A. 70 As of June 30, 2013, the world market for
over-the-counter derivatives amounted to $20 trillion in gross market value and
$668 trillion in notional value.7
The Bank Industry Guide, apart from failing to recognize the drastically
different asset-liability structures of banks, also fails to recognize that in the
late 1970s and 1980s, some financial institutions had already started working
on sophisticated mathematical models for institutional risk management. 72 With
such models, including Value-at-Risk (VaR) models, banks could better
allocate their capital when facing trade-offs between reward and risk.
Rip Van Winkle slept through the American Revolution and, when he
woke up, was surprised about the reactions when he proclaimed himself a loyal
subject of King George III. A revolution has occurred in banking and financial
science: according to Merton Miller, the spate of financial innovation that
occurred from 1970 to 1990 is unprecedented.
The Bank Industry Guide has not woken up to the new realities. Far more
useful information flows from the MD&A and the Market Risk Rule next
discussed, both of which rely overwhelmingly on the descriptive mode.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 247.
68. See Fischer Black and Myron Scholes, The Valuation of Option Contracts and a
Test of Market Efficiency, 27 J. FIN. 399 (1972); Fischer Black and Myron Scholes, The Pricing of
Options and Corporate Liabilities, 81 J. POL. ECON. 637 (1973). As to the significance of these papers,
see, for example, BERNSTEIN, supra note 28, at 203-30.
69. Henry T. C. Hu, Swaps, the Modern Process of Financial Innovation, and the
Vulnerability ofa Regulatory Paradigm, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 333, 363 (1989) [hereinafter Hu, Swaps].
70. Id. at 377-79.
71. BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS - MONETARY AND ECONOMIC
DEPARTMENT, STATISTICAL RELEASE: OTC DERIVATIVES STATISTICS AT END-JUNE 2013, at 2 (2013).
72. Olivier Scaillet, The Origin and Development of Value-at-Risk, in MODERN RISK
MANAGEMENT: A HISTORY 151, 154-55 (Risk Books, 2003).
73. Merton H. Miller, Financial Innovation: Achievements and Prospects, J. APPLIED
CORP. FIN., Winter 1992, at 4,4.
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ii. MD&A
Until the 1970s, the SEC largely limited corporate disclosure in filings to
historical or "hard" information. 74 Disclosure of projections, opinions, analyses,
and other "soft" information was prohibited. Such information could be
extremely useful to investors, and corporate management would be in a
stronger position to dissect historical patterns and assess future prospects, as
76Homer Kripke and other critics of the traditional approach noted. But
concerns that such information would receive undue credence from investors or
be vulnerable to manipulation by companies prevailed .
The SEC moved slowly from precluding soft information, to permitting it,
and then to mandating it. Most importantly, in 1987, the SEC moved to
enhance the "Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition
and Results of Operations" (MD&A) disclosure required in both the Securities
Act registration statements and the Exchange Act Forms 10-Q and 10-K.78
Thus, corporations would be required to offer an MD&A at least quarterly.
In a 1987 concept release, the SEC stated the purpose of the enhanced
MD&A as follows:
The Commission has long recognized the need for a narrative explanation of the
financial statements, because a numerical presentation and brief accompanying
footnotes alone may be insufficient for an investor to judge the quality of
earnings and the likelihood that past performance is indicative of future
performance. MD&A is intended to give the investor an opportunity to look at
the company through the eyes of management by providing both a short and
long-term analysis of the business of the company. The Item [Regulation S-K,
Item 303] asks management to discuss the dynamics of the business and to
analyze the financials.
The MD&A embodies three features emphasizing the use of the
descriptive mode of information. First, the MD&A calls for the business entity
to observe and analyze objective reality and then offer its description of that
reality to investors. As noted in the concept release, the MD&A seeks to "give
the investor an opportunity to look at the company through the eyes of
management." 80 "It is the responsibility of management to identify and address
74. DISCLOSURE ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 29, at D-14.
75. Id.
76. See, e.g., Homer Kripke, The Myth of the Informed Layman, 28 BUS. LAW. 631, 637
(1973); Homer Kripke, The SEC, the Accountants, Some Myths and Some Realities, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1151, 1198 (1970) (claiming that management is in a better position to make forecasts about their own
companies than the general public).
77. SELIGMAN, supra note 24, at 610.
78. MD&A Release, supra note 57, at 22,427 (May 24, 1989). See, e.g., Form S-1, SEC
870 (02-08), at Part I, Item 11(h); Form 1O-Q, SEC 1296 (01-12), at Part I, Item 2; Form 10-K, SEC
1673 (01-12), at Part II, Item 7.
79. MD&A Concept Release, supra note 39, at 3,717 (emphasis added).
80. Id.
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those key variables and other qualitative and quantitative factors which are
peculiar to and necessary for an understanding and evaluation of the individual
company."
Second, the entirety of the objective reality, including the prospective
aspects, must be the foundation of any such descriptions by the business entity.
In a 1989 interpretive release, the SEC stated:
The MD&A requirements are intended to provide, in one section of a filing,
material historical and prospective textual disclosure enabling investors and
other users to assess the financial condition and results of operations of the
registrant, with particular emphasis on the registrant's prospects for the future.82
Noting the comprehensiveness of the MD&A and the focus on the
company's crafting of a description, a leading securities law treatise
summarized the MD&A as follows: "In short, Item 303 disclosures provide
management's view of the company."83 One lawyer offers a more colloquial
summary: "Disclose . . . all material information, historical or prospective, that
has impacted or might foreseeably impact on the financial affairs of the
registrant."4 Today, the MD&A is widely considered to be the primary form of
narrative disclosure that is reviewed, together with financial statements, for
investment decision making.85
Third, the business entity's description of the objective reality must
include the entity's views on the variety of possible future objective realities,
including qualitative information on the associated risks and uncertainties.
Company financial statements are historical in nature, and show the company's
past performance. But the past is not necessarily prologue, and the MD&A
requirements help fill the gap by requiring the business entity to outline its
view on the possible future scenarios.
The MD&A thus requires disclosure of, for instance, "known trends or
any known demands, commitments, events or uncertainties" relating to any
material change in the company's liquidity and "known trends or uncertainties
that have had or that the registrant reasonably expect will have" a material
impact on net sales or revenues or income from continuing operations. More
generally, the Instructions provide that the MD&A "shall focus specifically on
81. Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of
Operations, Securities Act Release No. 6349, Exchange Act Release No. 18,120, 23 SEC Docket 962,
964 (Sep. 28, 1981).
82. MD&A Release, supra note 57, at 22,428.
83. LouIs Loss, JOEL SELIGMAN & TROY PAREDES, II SECURITIES REGULATION 187
(4th ed. 2007).
84. Carl W. Schneider, MD&A Disclosure, 22 REv. SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 149,
150 (1989) (emphasis added).
85. See Orie E. Barron et al., MD&A Quality as Measured by the SEC and Analysts'
Earnings Forecasts, 16 CONTEMP. AccT. RES. 75, 80 (1999) ("we focus on MD&A because a growing
body of evidence suggests that the SEC and users of financial reports view MD&A as particularly
important, despite the fact that MD&A is only a small part of each firm's total disclosure.").
86. Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(1), (a)(3)(ii) (2013).
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material events and uncertainties known to management that would cause
reported financial information not to be necessarily indicative of future
operating results or of future financial condition."87 In February 2003, in the
wake of Enron's collapse amidst a raft of bizarre off-balance-sheet
arrangements, the SEC adopted changes to the MD&A explicitly requiring
88
specified disclosures about such arrangements.
From the beginning, the MD&A's focus has been on qualitative
information. This has begun to change. However, efforts to use the MD&A as a
vehicle for requiring quantitative information have not been comprehensive in
nature. Moreover, efforts roughly coinciding with the global financial crisis
have been spasmodic and targeted at specific issues of the moment, relatively
informal in nature, and innocent of modem financial science.
The underlying premise appears to be that numbers are to be handled in
financial statements: as the 1987 concept release noted, the MD&A was
designed to be a "narrative explanation of the financial statements," and was to
be distinguished from the "numerical presentation and brief accompanying
footnotes."89 Similarly, the 1989 interpretive release stated that the MD&A
requirements are intended to provide "historical and prospective textual
disclosure . . . .,,0
Subsequently, the SEC moved slightly away from this exclusively
qualitative focus; in a 2003 interpretive release, the SEC stated, almost
grudgingly, "[q]uantification of the material effects of known material trends
and uncertainties can promote understanding. Quantitative disclosure should be
considered and may be required to the extent material if quantitative disclosure
is reasonably available." 91
From the onset of the global financial crisis, efforts of varying degrees of
formality and legal import were undertaken at the SEC to use the MD&A as a
vehicle for encouraging more disclosure of risk-related quantitative
information. At the most informal level, beginning in 2008, staff at the SEC's
Division of Corporation Finance ("Corp Fin") began sending selected
companies so-called "Dear CFO" letters, illustrative versions of which were
posted on the web. In these letters, Corp Fin reminded addressees of their
obligations under the MD&A requirements with respect to matters as diverse as
the application of "fair value" measurements of difficult-to-value financial
87. Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a) (Instruction 3 to paragraph 303(a)) (2013)).
88. Disclosure in Management's Discussion and Analysis about Off-Balance Sheet
Arrangements and Aggregate Contractual Obligations, Securities Act Release No. 8182, Exchange Act
Release No. 47,264, 62 Fed. Reg. 5982 (Feb. 5, 2003).
89. Because the MD&A uses a test of a materiality that is different from that under
governing U.S. Supreme Court precedent, some courts have resisted private antifraud actions grounded
on asserted violations of the MD&A requirements. COFFEE & SALE, supra note 51, at 198.
90. MD&A Release, supra note 57, at 22,438 (emphasis added).
91. Commission Guidance Regarding Management's Discussion and Analysis of
Financial Condition and Results of Operations, Securities Act Release No. 8350, Exchange Act Release
No. 48,960, 68 Fed. Reg. 75,056, 75,062 (Dec. 29, 2003).
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instruments, allowances for loan losses, and potential risks associated with
mortgage and foreclosure-related activities or exposures.92
Acting somewhat more formally, Corp Fin issued "CF Disclosure
Guidance: Topic 4" with the onset of the European sovereign debt phase of the
global financial crisis. 93 This guidance offered Corp Fin's views as to how
financial institutions should make pertinent disclosures under the MD&A
requirements and the Bank Industry Guide on matters relating to the crisis. This
guidance specifically acknowledged that the statements therein "represent the
views of the Division of Corporation Finance" and that it "is not a rule,
regulation or statement of the Securities and Exchange Commission," and that
the SEC has "neither approved nor disapproved its content." 94
In September 2010, partly in response to Lehman Brothers' window-
dressing activities to mask liquidity problems before its collapse, the SEC acted
to enhance the MD&A disclosures relating to liquidity and capital resources.
First and most importantly, the SEC issued an "Interpretive Guidance." The
guidance stated that, for instance, where an entity includes leverage ratios in its
filings, the ratio must meet certain standards and must be accompanied by a
"clear explanation of the calculation methodology." 95 Second, simultaneously
with issuance of the "Interpretive Guidance," the SEC proposed a formal rule
with respect to short-term borrowings, 96 a rule that would require some fairly
straightforward quantitative information. However, the SEC has yet to move
beyond the proposal stage.
iii. Market Risk Rule
In 1997, the SEC began recognizing the derivatives revolution in its
informational mandates. These mandates also implicitly recognized the work of
financial institutions in developing formal models for assessing risk. This
development was reflected not in the Bank Industry Guide or the MD&A, but
instead in a Regulation S-K disclosure item applicable to all companies.
92. Div. of Corp. Fin., Sample Letter Sent to Public Companies on MD&A Disclosure
Regarding the Application of SFAS 157 (Fair Value Measurements), SEC. & ExCH. COMM'N (Sep. 16,
2008), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/fairvalueltrO908.htm; Div. of Corp. Fin., Sample
Letter Sent to Public Companies on MD&A Disclosure Regarding Provisions and Allowances for Loan
Losses, SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N (Aug. 18, 2009),
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/loanlossesitrO8O9.htm; Div. of Corp. Fin., Sample Letter
Sent to Public Companies on Accounting and Disclosure Issues Related to Potential Risks and Costs
Associated with Mortgage and Foreclosure-Related Activities or Exposures, SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N
(Oct. 29, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/cfoforeclosure 101 0.htm.
93. Div. of Corp. Fin., CF Disclosure Guidance: Topic No. 4: European Sovereign
Debt Exposures, SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N (Jan. 8, 2012),
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/cfguidance-topic4.htm.
94. Id. at "Supplementary Information."
95. Commission Guidance on Presentation of Liquidity and Capital Resources
Disclosures in Management's Discussion and Analysis, Securities Act Release No. 9144, Exchange Act
Release No. 62,934, 75 Fed. Reg. 59,894, 59,895-96 (Sep. 28, 2010).
96. Short-Term Borrowings Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 9143, Exchange
Act Release No. 62,932, 75 Fed. Reg. 59,866 (Sep. 28, 2010).
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Several years earlier, the SEC had reviewed the annual reports of about 500
companies and found, among other things, that "it often is difficult to determine
the impact of derivatives on . . . [the companies'] statements of financial
position, cash flows, and results of operations."97
In adopting Item 305, the Market Risk Rule, the SEC stated:
During the last several years, the use of derivative financial instruments, other
financial instruments, and derivative commodity instruments increased
substantially. The Commission recognizes that these instruments can be
effective tools for managing exposures to market risk. However, in using market
risk sensitive instruments some registrants experienced significant, and
sometimes unexpected, losses. Those losses resulted from changes in interest
rates, foreign currency exchange rates, and commodity prices, among other
things. In light of those losses and the substantial growth in the use of market
risk sensitive instruments, the adequacy of existin; disclosures about market risk
emerged as an important financial reporting issue.
Both the qualitative and quantitative risk information about the business
entity's market risk sensitive instruments would be disclosed outside the
financial statements and related notes, in both the Securities Act registration
statements and the Exchange Act Form 10-Q and Form 10-K.99 The Market
Risk Rule disclosures thus have to be made at least quarterly.
In the Market Risk Rule Adopting Release, the SEC noted, "[a] primary
objective of the quantitative disclosure requirements is to provide investors
with forward looking information about a registrant's potential exposures to
market risk."' 00 The qualitative information would focus on such matters as the
business entity's primary market risk exposures and how those exposures are
managed.
In preparing the quantitative information, companies would categorize
market risk sensitive instruments as those for trading purposes and those for
other purposes. 01 The quantitative information could be provided using one or
more of the following three methods:
i. Tabular presentation of fair value information and contract terms relevant to
determining future cash flows, categorized by expected maturity dates;
97. Proposed Amendments to Require Disclosure of Accounting Policies for Derivative
Financial Instruments and Derivative Commodity Instruments and Disclosure of Qualitative and
Quantitative Information About Market Risk Inherent in Derivative Financial Instruments, Other
Financial Instruments, and Derivative Commodity Instruments, Securities Act Release No. 7250,
Exchange Act Release No. 36,643, Investment Company Act Release No. 21,625, 61 Fed. Reg. 578
(Jan. 8, 1996).
98. Market Risk Rule Adopting Release, supra note 58, at 6044-45.
99. See, e.g., Form S-1, SEC 870 (02-08), at Item 11(); Form 10-Q, SEC 1296 (01-12),
at Part I, Item 2; Form 10-K, SEC 1673 (01-12), at Part I, Item 7A.
100. Market Risk Rule Adopting Release, supra note 58, at 6048.
101. Id. at 6045.
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ii. Sensitivity analysis expressing the potential loss in future earnings, fair
values, or cash flows from selected hypothetical changes in market rates and
prices; or
iii. Value-at-Risk disclosures expressing the potential loss in future earnings, fair
values, or cash flows of market risk-sensitive instruments over a selected period
of time, with a selected likelihood of occurrence, from changes in market rates
or prices.10 2
The Value-at-Risk (VaR) alternative is the most sophisticated of the three.
Before turning to the SEC's requirements in this respect, some brief
background on VaR may be helpful.
VaR is a method often used to gauge the possible losses on a portfolio of
financial assets under relatively normal circumstances.103 A bank may have a
portfolio of stocks, bonds, derivatives, and other assets, each of which will
fluctuate in price over time. Under various assumptions and using various
parameters, a mathematical model could be developed to ask what sum might
be lost on the portfolio over a specified time horizon at a given probability.
That is, VaR is the "maximum loss over a target horizon such that there is a
low, prespecified probability that the actual loss will be larger." 10 Thus, if the
model used asserts that the VaR is $100 million over a horizon of one day
using a 95% confidence level-and the model happens to have perfect
foresight-then the actual losses can be expected to exceed $100 million only
five days out of a hundred (i.e., 5% of the time). Not surprisingly, if the
identical model is asked to specify the VaR at a higher confidence level (e.g.,
99% instead of 95%), the VaR number generated will be higher. Similarly, if
the identical model is asked to specify the VaR over a longer time horizon (e.g.,
10 days instead of 1 day), the VaR number generated will also be higher. And,
of course, no model has perfect foresight: the assumptions used or the model
design itself may be flawed-or the world may have changed in ways that have
made the model obsolete.
There are three basic problems with the quantitative aspects of the SEC's
Market Risk Rule. I will discuss them briefly here and return to these issues
when I discuss the bank regulator's public disclosure requirements in relation
to the bank regulators' analogue to the market risk rule (Subsection III.C.2.i)
and company-run "stress test" results (Subsection III.C.2.ii).
First, regarding VaRs, the SEC gives reporting entities very wide latitude
as to (a) the models, assumptions, and parameters used, as well as (b) the
confidence level and time horizon they choose to report at. Second, the SEC
does not require the reporting entity to provide any evidence as to the quality of
102. Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.305(a) (2013).
103. For introductions to VaR, see, for example, JORL BESSIS, RISK MANAGEMENT IN
BANKING 200-17 (3d ed. 2010); PHILIPPE JORION, FINANCIAL RISK MANAGER HANDBOOK 250-64 (5th
ed. 2009); ROBERT L. MCDONALD, DERIVATIVES MARKETS 813-40 (2d ed. 2006).
104. JORION, supra note 103, at 250.
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the bank's VaR modeling, such as results reflecting how their models have
historically performed. Third, the VaR is not even intended to gauge possible
losses in times of high economic stress.
With respect to the first problem, the SEC does not set out any specific
mathematical model or models that reporting entities may use. Since there is no
uniform way of measuring VaR, cross-entity comparisons can be difficult. 05
The entity is free to use any model, assumptions, or parameters that it wishes so
long as it provides descriptions of the model.106 Such descriptions must include,
for instance, "how loss is defined by the model (e.g., loss in earnings, fair
values, or cash flows), the type of model used ( ... and a description as to how
optionality is addressed by the model), the types of instruments covered by the
model . . . and other relevant information about the model's assumptions and
parameters ... ."107
By design, VaR numbers must be reported in terms of confidence levels
and time horizons. The SEC provides little guidance on the confidence level
and time horizon companies must use for SEC reporting purposes.1os As a
general rule, the confidence level used must be 95% or higher. Thus, even
though VaRs reported at the 95% level are quite different from VaRs reported
at the 99% level, both are acceptable. Moreover, when there is "economic
justification," a business entity is not even required to meet this 95% or higher
requirement. 109 JPMorgan Chase currently uses a 95% confidence level in its
public reporting while Bank of America uses a 99% level of confidence. In
terms of time horizon, periods of up to one year are permitted.
In short, the wide latitude given by the SEC to business entities allows
tremendous heterogeneity in terms of models and in terms of the confidence
levels and time horizons. Comparing VaR numbers across entities is extremely
difficult. And because only descriptions of models, not the models themselves,
are required, deciphering the real significance and reliability of the reported
VaRs can be challenging.
The second basic problem with the Market Risk Rule is that the entity is
not required to provide any evidence as to quality of its model, such as the
results of "backtesting" the model's predictions against actual fact. The Market
Risk Rule allows entities to avoid reporting the percentage or number of times
the actual changes exceeded the VaR amounts during the reporting period, by,
for instance, setting out the average, high, and low amounts or the distributions
of the VaR amounts for the reporting period."o
Even the best-designed models are sensitive to the assumptions, historical
data, and parameters used. "Model risk" is omnipresent and especially likely to
105. Hu, Behind the Corporate Hedge, supra note 34, at 39, 47-48.
106. Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.305(a)(4) (2013).
107. Id. § 229.305(a) (Instruction 4(E) to paragraph 305(a)).
108. Id. § 229.305(a)(4).
109. Id. § 229.305(a) (Instruction 4(A) to paragraph 305(a)).
110. Id. § 229.305(a)(1)(iii)(B) (2013).
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be manifest in times of crisis, when many of the models' assumptions (such as
the assumption that markets are continuously traded) may be violated or bizarre
market prices may occur.
The third basic problem is that, leaving aside model risk, VaRs are not
even intended to generate the kind of information that some investors assume
they provide. VaR is a dollar amount that summarizes downside risk under
relatively normal circumstances. VaR is not designed to determine losses in
highly stressed conditions. Assuming that the model is perfect in every possible
way, if the 95% confidence level is chosen, the actual losses can be expected to
exceed the VaR five days out of a hundred. Second, the VaR would not say
anything about the distribution of losses on those five days: indeed, for the
same VaR number, we could have very differently sized losses. II
Effectively, the VaR is designed to tell how much you will be hurt in the
normal rough-and-tumble of market and economic fluctuations. It is not
designed to tell you how much you will be hurt because of a crash-when it
might really matter.
So-called "stress tests" are designed to better reflect "worst case"
scenarios. But the SEC has not modified its Market Risk Rule to reflect this. In
contrast, in the bank regulator universe, companies are now required to publicly
disclose certain stress test results, a matter Subsection III.C.2.ii discusses.
The foregoing has focused on disclosures of a quantitative nature required
by the Market Risk Rule. Qualitative information is required as well, but is
relatively limited. "To the extent material," the company must describe its
"primary market risk exposures," "how those measures are managed," and
"changes in either [the company's] primary market risk exposures or how such
exposures are managed."1 12 The information must be presented separately for
market risk-sensitive instruments entered into for trading purposes and those
entered into for other purposes.113
The failure to update the SEC's Market Risk Rule is especially
disappointing because the SEC acknowledged that such updating would be
needed. At its adoption in 1997, the SEC recognized that the flexibility in
modeling the rule offered was "likely to reduce the comparability of
disclosures." 1 4 It justified this on the grounds that "at this time . . . such
flexibility is necessary and important to allow risk measurement and reporting
practices to evolve." However, the SEC also promised, "as more standard
risk measurement practices and methods of reporting market risk are
111. As to this issue, see, for example, BESSIS, supra note 103, at 474-75; Hu, Behind
the Corporate Hedge, supra note 34, at 47-48; JORION, supra note 103, at 254-55.
112. Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.305(b)(1) (2013).
113. Id. § 229.305(b)(2) (2013).
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developed, the [SEC] anticipates reviewing the disclosure requirements with
the view to enhancing comparability."'
16
Nearly two decades have passed, and no substantive changes have been
made to the market risk rule. The SEC has yet to act on its promise.
III. Major Banks and The Emergence of a Parallel Disclosure Universe: 2013
In 2013, a parallel universe for public disclosure emerged: major banking
entities would now, in addition, be required to meet the public disclosure
requirements set out in rules jointly adopted by the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation." 7 Flowing in large part from bank
regulatory efforts centered in Basel that go back to a 1988 accord on capital
adequacy and, more immediately, a 2004 framework recognizing the potential
value of market discipline, this new public disclosure system is directed at the
soundness of individual banks and the financial system as a whole. The
regulatory ends of this new disclosure system are thus distinct from those of the
SEC's system.
The current U.S. bank regulator universe for public disclosure consists of
two components. First, and by far the more important, is the United States
implementation of the public disclosure aspects of these Basel-related efforts,
the first stage of which came into effect on January 1, 2013 and which requires
disclosures on a quarterly basis thereafter." In this first stage, the public
disclosure requirements center on market risks and, specifically, the market
risks of the trading activities of major banks.
The second component is an artifact not of the Basel-related efforts, but of
the Dodd-Frank Act. The component focuses on the public disclosure of certain
company-run stress testing results-specifically, requiring certain large
financial institutions to disclose their own estimates as to how the institutions
may fare in a "severely adverse" scenario, based on the institutions' own
methodologies.119 For the largest banks, the public disclosures are to be made
in March and September of every year, beginning in March 2013.120
Beginning in 2015, the second stage of the Basel-related public disclosure
requirements will come into effect. Public disclosure will be required as to a
broad range of matters relating to the capital adequacy of the institution,
including credit risk.121 Later still, these Basel-related requirements will extend
to liquidity.122 Thus, at the end of the three-stage process, the Basel-related
116. Id.
117. See U.S. Basel 2.5 Adopting Release, supra note 1.
118. See id.
119. Id. at 53,060, 53,111.
120. Id.
121. See infra Section III.A.
122. See infra Section III.A.
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requirements will apply to each of market risk, credit risk, and liquidity-i.e.,
substantially all of the major risks facing banks. This is a vast and important
domain that is currently-and prospectively-also fully subject to the SEC
disclosure system.
In terms of regulatory means, both the bank regulator disclosure system
and the SEC system largely rely on the descriptive mode. However, in
implementation, the general and specific functional elements are significantly
different. In terms of general elements, both the required quantum of
information and enforcement mechanisms differ. The bank regulator system's
quantum is rooted, in effect, in a version of the investor-oriented "materiality"
standard used by the SEC that has been diluted to more accommodate the
interests of the bank itself. Private enforcement of the bank regulator system is
not likely to be possible. In terms of specific elements, the bank regulators'
intermediary depiction model reflects far more sophistication about financial
modeling and its limits than does the SEC's. As a result, bank regulators call
for intermediary depictions that are more advanced and standardized.
This Part starts with the origins of the bank regulator disclosure system
and its regulatory ends (Sections III.A-III.B). For the purposes of this Article, I
will consider the bank regulator disclosure regime as it is currently in effect.
Then I turn to issues of regulatory means (Section III.C).
A. Basel, U.S. Bank Regulators, and the Path to a New and Expanding
Disclosure Universe
The tortuous, multi-decade path to the emergence of this parallel
disclosure universe started not in Washington, but in Basel, Switzerland, and
not in the informational realm, but in the substantive context of minimum bank
capital levels. This international element and focus on bank capital adequacy
are critical in understanding this new and expanding disclosure regime.
In 1974, the central bank governors of eleven major industrialized
countries established a committee under the auspices of the Bank for
International Settlements (headquartered in Basel) to promote international
cooperation in monitoring and supervision of international banking activities. 123
This committee, now known as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
("Basel Committee"), became the epicenter of international regulation of
banks. 124
By the mid-1980s, bank regulators in the United States and the U.K.
began to worry over the threat that certain new financial products-including
derivatives known as "interest rate swaps" and "currency swaps" -would
123. Hu, Swaps, supra note 69, at 372-73.
124. In 2009, the Financial Stability Board was established to, among other things,
coordinate the activities of national authorities responsible for financial stability in significant
international financial centers. The Secretariat is located in Basel. See Overview, FIN. STABILITY BD.,
https://www.financialstabilityboard.org/about/overview.htm (last visited May 4, 2014).
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cause banks to take on too much risk. 12 Rather than developing a regulatory
system specifically addressing the dangers caused by these products, the
regulators took advantage of and contributed to the momentum that had been
building since the 1970s for internationally coordinated efforts at enhancing the
safety and soundness of major banks in general. Three themes were central: (1)
regulation would be on an international basis; (2) capital adequacy standards
would be the primary solution to perceived problems in the safety and
soundness of banks; and (3) the distinctive risk characteristics of swaps and
related products would be reflected in this international capital adequacy
system.
Largely through the efforts of the Basel Committee, the Bank of England,
the Federal Reserve Board, and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency,
the "Basel Accord" ("Basel I") was adopted in July 1988. Basel I imposed
minimum levels of capital for internationally active banks, with implementation
to occur through actions at the national level. National authorities were
permitted to set ratios which were higher than the minimums prescribed in
Basel I, but were not permitted to set lower ratios. For the purposes of
determining how much capital a bank would be required to have, Basel I's
credit risk rules required the "risk-weighting" of assets. Broad categories of
assets were established: the more assets a bank had in categories deemed to
have higher credit risk, the more capital the bank was required to have. In the
United States, regulators implemented Basel I in 1989 with general risk-based
capital rules. 126
In 1996, the Basel Committee amended Basel I to require banks to
measure and hold capital based on their exposure to market risk. In the United
States, regulators implemented this market risk amendment with new rules
effective 1997. 127
Basel I was focused on minimum bank capital requirements. Bank
regulators did not address the matter of public disclosures by banks. This
changed with the Basel Committee's adoption in June 2004 of what is now
referred to as "Basel II," also intended as the basis for consultation and
implementation at the national level. 128 Basel II set forth a framework
consisting of three "pillars": (1) minimum capital requirements (Pillar 1), (2)
supervisory review of capital adequacy (Pillar 2), and (3) market discipline
through enhanced public disclosures (Pillar 3).
According to the Basel Committee, "[t]he purpose of Pillar 3 [market
discipline] . . . is to complement the minimum capital requirements (Pillar 1)
125. Hu, Swaps, supra note 69, at 369-70.
126. U.S. Basel 2.5 Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 53,060.
127. Risk-Based Capital Standards: Market Risk, 61 Fed. Reg. 47,358 (Sept. 6, 1996).
128. International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards - A
Revised Framework (Comprehensive Version), BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION (June 2006),
https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl28.pdf [hereinafter BASEL II FRAMEWORK].
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and the supervisory review process (Pillar 2)."l 29 To encourage market
discipline, the Basel Committee developed a set of disclosure requirements
which would allow market participants to assess "key pieces of information" on
such matters as "capital," "risk exposures," and "risk assessment processes." 30
Under Basel II, the regulatory ends were different from those under the
SEC's disclosure philosophy. The bank regulators hoped that Pillar 3 could
"produce significant benefits in helping banks and supervisors to manage risk
and improve stability."131
Subsequent to Basel II's 2004 issuance, the Basel Committee made
significant changes, culminating in its 2009 "Revisions to the Basel II Market
Risk Framework, Guidelines for Computing Capital for Incremental Risk in the
Trading Book and Enhancements to the Basel II Framework" (commonly
referred to as "Basel 2.5").132 "Basel III," the latest generation of international
capital standards, was issued by the Basel Committee in December 2010, and
then revised in June 2011.133
The Pillar 3 public disclosure mandate arrived in the United States as a
component of the U.S. version of Basel 2.5's market risk framework that came
into effect on January 1, 2013.134 The federal bank regulators stated that the
market risk capital rule (the "U.S. Basel 2.5 Rule") would supplement their
risk-based capital rules and advanced capital adequacy guidelines by requiring
any subject bank to adjust its risk-based capital ratios to reflect the market risk
in its trading activities.' 35 In addition, the new rule adopted requirements for
public disclosure designed to increase transparency and improve market
*136discipline.
In particular, the U.S. Basel 2.5 Rule is focused on the market risk in
trading activities faced by major banks. Generally speaking, the rule applies
only to banking entities with aggregate trading assets and trading liabilities
equal to $1 billion or more or 10 percent or more of total assets.137 As of
August 2012, this meant that only 14 national bank holding companies would
be subject to the new public disclosure requirements. 38
129. Id. at 226.
130. Id.
131. Consultative Document - Overview of The New Basel Capital Accord, BASEL
Comm. ON BANKING SUPERVISION 10 (April 2003), https://www.bis.org/bcbs/cp3ov.pdf.
132. U.S. Basel III Capital Proposed Rules and Market Risk Final Rule: Out with the
Old, In with the New, DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP 1 (Jun. 12, 2012),
http://www.davispolk.com/files/uploads/Basel3.pdf.
133. Basel III: A Global Regulatory Framework for More Resilient Banks and Banking
Systems, BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION (June 2011), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl89.pdf.
134. U.S. Basel 2.5 Adopting Release, supra note 1.
135. Id. at 53,063.
136. Id. at 53,091-92. The corresponding discussion of the public disclosure
requirement in the proposing release is at Risk-Based Capital Guidelines: Market Risk, 76 Fed. Reg.
1890, 1907-08 (Jan. 11, 2011) [hereinafter U.S. Basel 2.5 Proposing Release].
137. U.S. Basel 2.5 Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 53,063, 53,100.
138. Id. at 53,096.
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The scope of the bank regulator universe will be expanding beyond the
area of market risks associated with bank trading. First, on October 11, 2013,
the federal bank regulators published final rules establishing a comprehensive
capital framework for U.S. banking organizations that would implement Basel
III and certain provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act.139 A massive endeavor with
both substantive and disclosure elements, the adopting release comes to
approximately 272,000 words.
Effective the first quarter of 2015, banking organizations with total
consolidated assets of $50 billion or more will be subject to an extensive array
of new public disclosure requirements.' The overarching theme in this respect
is to provide highly granular information on the capital adequacy of the
institution.141 This includes information as to such matters as the banks' credit
risk exposures, risk assessment processes, and the quality and quantity of
different kinds of capital they hold.
Second, on November 29, 2013, the U.S. bank regulators published for
comment a proposed rule that would for the first time implement minimum
liquidity (i.e., as opposed to capital) requirements for large and internationally
active banks and non-bank systemically important financial institutions. 142
Under the proposal, these entities would be required to hold minimum amounts
of high-quality, liquid assets such as government and corporate debt that can be
converted easily and quickly to cash. If the proposed rule is adopted, public
disclosure relating to bank liquidity will be required.
Considering the current U.S. Basel 2.5 Rule directed at market risk and
the forthcoming rules that cover, among other things, capital adequacy, credit
exposures, risk assessment procedures, and liquidity, it would be fair to say that
the bank regulator public disclosure universe would essentially cover all risks
facing major banks.
B. Regulatory Ends: Bank Well-Being and Financial System Stability
As just discussed, the bank regulator disclosure system arose in the
context of international efforts to ensure capital adequacy to promote the
139. For the version as published in the Federal Register, see Regulatory Capital Rules:
Regulatory Capital, Implementation of Basel III, Capital Adequacy, Transition Provisions, Prompt
Corrective Action, Standardized Approach for Risk-weighted Assets, Market Discipline and Disclosure
Requirements, Advanced Approaches Risk-Based Capital Rule, and Market Risk Capital Rule, 78 Fed.
Reg. 62,018 (Oct. 11, 2013) [hereinafter, U.S. Basel III Adopting Release].
140. Id. at 62,018, 62,021, 62,129. This is the same asset threshold established by
Section 165 of the Dodd-Frank Act relating to enhanced supervision and prudential standards for
"Systemically Important Financial Institutions" (SIFIs), what are commonly referred to as "too big to
fail" or "TBTF" financial institutions.
141. See id. at 62,130.
142. See Liquidity Coverage Ratio; Liquidity Risk Measurement, Standards, and
Monitoring, 78 Fed. Reg. 71,818 (Nov. 29, 2013); Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve
Sys., Federal Reserve Board Proposes Rule to Strengthen Liquidity Positions of Large Financial
Institutions (Oct. 24, 2013), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20131024a.htm.
605
Yale Journal on Regulation
stability of individual banks and the financial system as a whole. The disclosure
system's regulatory ends reflect these origins.
Basel II's first two "pillars"-risk-based capital requirements for credit,
market, and operational risk (Pillar 1) and supervisory review of capital
adequacy (Pillar 2) -are intended to ensure the soundness of banks. Basel II
expressly states that the purpose of Pillar 3-market discipline-is to
"complement the minimal capital requirements (Pillar 1) and the supervisory
review process (Pillar 2)."l43 More broadly, as noted earlier, the bank regulators
hoped that Pillar 3 could "produce significant benefits in helping banks and
supervisors manage risk and improve stability." 1 "
Basel II uses the term "market discipline," but its conception of market
discipline and the goals of market discipline depart from the common
understanding on the part of those interested in corporate governance or
securities law. Basel II's use of the term reflects its instrumental value in
furthering two goals-the welfare of the business entity itself and overall
financial system stability. Under the common understanding, public disclosure
is directed at neither such goal.
As touched on in Section II.A, the term "market discipline" is instead
commonly used to refer to the market pressures causing corporate
managements to further the well-being of shareholders. The well-being of the
business entity itself is not relevant, except in so far as the entity's well-being
would further the interests of shareholders. Moreover, Basel's conception that
the second goal of market discipline is to further the stability of the financial
system is even more alien to the common understanding.
This distinction between the welfare of shareholders and the welfare of
the business entity in which they are invested is significant. In the usual case of
diversified shareholders, the welfare of the shareholder is not identical to, and
can be contrary to, the welfare of the corporate entity. 145 A diversified
shareholder may not benefit from, for instance, a corporation having a "AAA"
credit rating or diversifying at the corporate level by becoming a conglomerate.
In the Basel II world, regulators seek "market discipline" to further a form of
conservatism that shareholders-one key type of market participant-may
actually find unpalatable. Other market participants, such as certain classes of
debtholders, may feel differently.
Federal bank regulators view "market discipline" and the regulatory ends
of public disclosure similarly to the Basel Committee. In the January 11, 2011
proposing release for U.S. Basel 2.5, they stated:
143. BASEL II FRAMEWORK, supra note 128, at 226.
144. Consultative Document, BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note
131, at 10.
145. For a more extended discussion of this conflict, as well as discussions of the
interests of different classes of bondholders in relation to the interests of shareholders and the business
entity, see the sources set out in supra note 34.
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The proposed rule imposes disclosure requirements designed to increase
transparency and improve market discipline . . . The agencies recognize the
importance of market discipline in encouraging sound risk management
practices and fostering financial stability. 14
The foregoing has focused on the regulatory ends under Basel 2.5 and the
U.S. implementation. With respect to the separate public disclosure
requirements attending to company-run stress tests, the philosophy appears to
be identical. In its release adopting the stress test rule required under the Dodd-
Frank Act, the Federal Reserve characterized the statute's stress testing
requirements as a means of "mitigat[ing] the threat to financial stability"
caused by Covered Companies.147 Speaking of the public disclosure aspects of
the company-run stress tests, the Federal Reserve stated that public disclosure
"helps to provide valuable information to market participants, enhance
transparency, and facilitate market discipline." 48
C. Regulatory Means: The Descriptive Mode and the Bank Regulators'
Distinctive Intermediary Depiction Model
1. General Elements: A Diluted "Materiality" Quantum and Public
Enforcement
Nominally, the general standard for the quantum of information required
to be disclosed publicly is the same in the bank regulator universe as it is in the
SEC's: "materiality." In setting out Pillar 3, Basel II stated:
A bank should decide which disclosures are relevant for it based on the
materiality concept. Information would be regarded as material if its omission
or misstatement could change or influence the assessment or decision of a user
relying on that information for the purpose of economic decisions . . . . The
[Basel] Committee is not setting specific thresholds for disclosure as these can
be open to manipulation and are difficult to determine, and it believes that the
user test is a useful benchmark for achieving sufficient disclosure.149
Similarly, U.S. bank regulators stated:
A banking organization must decide the relevant disclosures based on a
materiality concept. Information is regarded as material for purposes of the
disclosure requirements in the final rule if the information's omission or
146. U.S. Basel 2.5 Proposing Release, supra note 136, at 1907.
147. Dodd-Frank Stress Testing Rule, supra note 1, at 62,379.
148. Id. at 62,388.
149. BASEL II FRAMEwoRK, supra note 128, at 227.
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misstatement could change or influence the assessment or decision of a user
relying on that information for the purpose of making investment decisions.150
The foregoing statements are restatements of the previously discussed
TSC v. Northway standard under federal securities law. s5 There seems to be
symmetry between the general quantum of information required by
international and U.S. banking regulators and that required by the SEC.
However, this may not be so. In effect, the bank regulators' conception of
materiality is less investor-oriented than the SEC's, and more accommodative
of the interests of the business entity. Also, there is a statutory difference that
arguably might allow bank regulators to better insulate bank information from
public disclosure. Finally, there are differences in enforcement and officer
certification that could also lead to less information being provided as a
practical matter.
Basel II states:
In exceptional cases, disclosure of certain items of information required by Pillar
3 may prejudice seriously the position of the bank by making public information
that is either proprietary or confidential in nature. In such cases, a bank need not
disclose those specific items, but must disclose more general information about
the subject matter of the requirement, together with the fact that and the reason
why, the specific items of information have not been disclosed. 15
Similarly, the U.S. Basel 2.5 Rule states:
If a [bank] believes that disclosure of specific commercial or financial
information would prejudice seriously its position by making public certain
information that is either proprietary or confidential in nature, the [bank] will not
be required to disclose these specific items, but must disclose more general
information about the subject matter of the requirement, together with the fact
that, and the reason why, the specific items of information have not been
disclosed. In implementing this requirement, the agencies will work with banks
on a case-by-case basis to address any questions about the types of more general
information that would satisfy the . . . rule.
153
This is different, both procedurally and substantively, from the SEC's
approach to claims of confidential or proprietary information. Under the federal
banking procedures, the bank can, on its own, make a decision not to disclose
information it deems either proprietary or confidential in nature. After a bank
150. U.S. Basel III Adopting Release, supra note 139, at 62,130.
151. See supra Subsection II.B.1.
152. BASEL II FRAMEWORK, supra note 128, at 228.
153. U.S. Basel 2.5 Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 53,111. There is similar
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has made such a decision, bank regulators would then work with the bank as to
the "more general information" that would substitute for the required
disclosure.
Under the SEC's procedures, a bank (or any other corporation) cannot
make such a determination on its own. It would instead have to request that the
SEC grant confidential treatment of information required to be filed under the
Securities Act and the Exchange Act pursuant to the strict requirements of Rule
406 and Rule 24b-2, respectively.154
Substantively, the SEC system explicitly considers investor interests in
assessing whether material information should be disclosed. SEC staff has
stated that "confidential treatment is generally not appropriate for information
that is material to investors."155 The same bulletin noted that "[e]xcept in
unusual circumstances, disclosure required by Regulation S-K or any other
applicable disclosure requirement is not an appropriate subject for confidential
treatment . . . ."156 The foregoing quote from the U.S. Basel 2.5 Rule does not
explicitly mention investors.
There is also a statutory difference that may give more leeway to banks
seeking to shield information from public disclosure. Under the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA), firms are entitled to seek exemptions from public
disclosure on a variety of grounds.157 Companies seeking confidential treatment
requests from the SEC most often rely on the exemption that covers "trade
secret and commercial or financial innovation obtained from a person and
privileged or confidential," referred to as "the (b)(4) exemption."' 58 This (b)(4)
exemption would also be available for companies seeking such treatment from
bank regulators.
The statutory difference comes with FOIA's "(b)(8)" exemption.159 This
provision states that matters that are "contained in or related to examination,
operating, or condition reports prepared by, or on behalf of, or for the use of an
agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions" is
exempt from FOIA. Although the applicability of this exemption is far from
clear with respect in the context of public disclosures, there is a colorable
argument that it would apply. First, the exemption has been construed very
broadly by courts.'60 Second, courts have construed the purposes of (b)(8) to
154. 17 C.F.R. § 230.406; (2013); 17 C.F.R. § 240.24b-2 (2013).
155. Div. of Corp. Fin., Staff Legal Bulletin No. I (with Addendum): "Confidential
Treatment Requests," SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N (Feb. 28, 1997) (with July 11, 2001 addendum),
http://www.sec.gov/interps/legal/slbcflr.htm. [hereinafter StaffLegal Bulletin].
156. Id.
157. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2012).
158. StaffLegal Bulletin, supra note 155, at n.13.
159. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(8) (2012).
160. JAMES T. O'REILLY, FEDERAL INFORMATION DISCLOSURE DATABASE UPDATED
DECEMBER 2013 - CHAPTER 18: EXEMPTIONS FOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND GEOLOGICAL
EXPLORATIONS, 2 Fed. Info. Discl. § 18:2.
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include the protection of public confidence in banksi16 and the security of the
banking system.162
Such differences in attitude and perhaps statutory regime can result in
significant differences in the actual quantum of information made publicly
available. The AIG example to be discussed in Subsection VI.E.1 is consistent
with this hypothesis.
Enforcement operates differently in this bank regulator universe as well.
In particular, there are unlikely to be private class actions for violations of bank
regulator disclosure rules. In the SEC disclosure regime, an implied private
cause of action under the most important antifraud provision-Rule 1Ob-5 of
the Exchange Act-has long been established. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, by
essentially eliminating Rule lOb-5's reliance requirement, has facilitated class
actions.1" In contrast, "courts have been reluctant to imply a private cause of
action under federal banking laws," usually on grounds that "since Congress
specifically gave federal bank regulators wide-ranging enforcement rights, its
failure to give private parties similar rights could not have been inadvertent."l 65
In terms of public enforcement, it remains to be seen what resources will
be devoted by bank regulators to the enforcement of public disclosure
requirements. Because bank regulators had never previously involved
themselves in mandatory public disclosure, the future is particularly difficult to
handicap. Reading tea leaves is necessary. In analyzing the anticipated costs of
adopting the new disclosure requirements, the bank regulators stated that they
expected such costs would be "de minimis."166 In contrast, public disclosure is
the primary reason for the SEC's existence, and the SEC is requesting 1,481
full-time positions for its Division of Enforcement for Fiscal Year 2014.167
That said, in contrast to the SEC, federal bank regulators have their own
employees (bank examiners) who are effectively officed at the reporting entity.
There are certainly issues involving the training and sophistication of
examiners, and concerns over the sway the banks may have over some
161. Id.
162. Id. at § 18:1.
163. Kardon v. Nat'1 Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
164. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988). As discussed in Subsection II.B.1,
the Supreme Court is reconsidering Basic's "fraud on the market" theory.
165. See Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Private Enforcement of Systemic Risk Regulation,
43 CREIGHTON L. REv. 993, 1008-1009 (quoting RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL, JONATHAN R. MACEY &
GEOFFREY P. MILLER, THE LAW OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (4th ed. 2009)).
166. U.S. Basel 2.5 Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 53,096; cf id. at 53096 n.36
(stating that Director of the Division of Market Analysis did not foresee any changes in the current
staffing levels to be needed).
167. The Division of Enforcement is by far the largest of the SEC's five Divisions.
Under the Fiscal Year 2014 request, the SEC is seeking 1,481 positions for Division of Enforcement, in
contrast to 540, 332, 205, and 146 for the Divisions of Corporation Finance, Trading and Markets,
Investment Management, and Risk, Strategy, and Financial Innovation (now called the Division of
Economic and Risk Analysis), respectively. See SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N., FY 2014 CONGRESSIONAL
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examiners. For example, at the time of the JPMorgan Chase credit-
derivatives debacle, roughly 40 examiners from the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York and 70 staff members from the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency were stationed inside JPMorgan's Manhattan headquarters.169
Nevertheless, the "local knowledge" of the embedded bank regulators should
make public enforcement easier, especially with improvements in the
examination process motivated by real or perceived failures during the global
financial crisis.170
It is worth briefly mentioning one other difference in the general elements
of the two disclosure systems: the officer certification requirements. Under
Section 302(a) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the SEC is directed to require that
the CEO and the CFO certify in each periodic report under the Exchange Act
that, among other things, the signing officers have reviewed the report, that,
based on the officer's knowledge, the report does not contain any material
misstatement or omission, and that the financial information included in the
report "fairly present[s] in all material respects the financial condition and
results of operations of the issuer . . . ."171 Moreover, the signing officers must
certify that they are responsible for the internal controls, have evaluated the
effectiveness of their internal controls, and have presented in the Exchange Act
report their conclusions about the effectiveness of their internal controls.172
Under the U.S. Basel 2.5 Rule, there is a diluted version of the foregoing
requirements. "[O]ne or more senior officers"-not necessarily the CEO or
CFO-"must attest that the disclosures" meet the pertinent market risk
disclosure requirements.173 In terms of internal controls, such senior officer or
officers must attest that the board and senior management "are responsible for
establishing and maintaining an effective internal control structure over
financial reporting" including the requisite market risk disclosures. 174 However,
unlike the SEC, the bank regulators do not require conclusions as to the
effectiveness of such controls with respect to market risk disclosures.
168. See, e.g., Susanne Craig & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Suit Revives Goldman
Conflict Issue, N.Y. TIMES Oct. 10, 2013, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/10/1 0bank-examiner-was-
told-to-back-off-goldman-suit-says (reporting that two former regulators have stated that banks hold
sway over their regulators, particularly those positioned at a bank's headquarters). In October 2013, a
former examiner at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York filed a lawsuit alleging that she was fired
after she refused to change her findings that Goldman Sachs had inadequate procedures to guard against
conflicts of interest. Id.
169. Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Ben Protess, Bank Regulators Under Scrutiny in
JPMorgan Loss, N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/26/business/regulators-
role-at-jpmorgan-scrutinized.html.
170. As to the changes that are occurring, see, for example, Michael R. Crittenden,
Bank Examiners to Face Rigorous Reviews: New Program From Comptroller Reflects Criticism of
Regulators for Lax Oversight Before and After Financial Crisis, WALL ST. J., Sept. 30, 2013, at C5.
171. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 302(a)(3), 116 Stat. 745
(2002).
172. Id. at § 302(a)(4)(B)).
173. U.S. Basel 2.5 Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 53,111.
174. Id. at 53,091.
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2. Specific Elements: More Advanced and Standardized Intermediary
Depiction Requirements
i. Market Risk: The U.S. Basel 2.5 Rule
The U.S. Basel 2.5 Rule component of the bank regulator disclosure
system is focused on the market risk of bank trading activities. Quantitative
information is to be provided regularly on a quarterly basis. Qualitative
disclosures that "typically do not change each quarter" may generally be
disclosed annually." 175 "Banks are encouraged, but not required," to provide
the information to the public "in a central location on their Web sites."l 76
The market risk information required to be disclosed under the U.S. Basel
2.5 Rule can be most directly compared to the information required under the
SEC's Market Risk Rule. Information of a quantitative nature is at the core of
both these market risk rules. The SEC's MD&A is primarily intended to
generate information of a qualitative nature, and supplements the SEC's Market
Risk Rule on the qualitative side. The SEC's Bank Industry Guide is not
focused on market risk information.
The bank regulators' market risk provisions are far more financially
sophisticated and demanding. Part of this may be explained by the fact that
bank regulators were focused on major banks, entities that have especially
complex risks and deep reservoirs of personnel familiar with the analysis of
such risks. The SEC's provisions are intended for business entities generally,
and a very demanding market risk rule may be inappropriate in that context.
However, this is only a partial explanation. Some of the differences flow
from bank regulators being more cognizant of the dangers of giving subject
entities too much latitude in their models, assumptions, and parameters. The
bank regulators' market risk rule also reflects a deeper appreciation of the
limits of VaR specifically and of financial modeling in general.
There are three essential differences between the market risk information
required by the SEC and that required under the bank regulator system. First,
the bank regulator system requires the use of a far richer set of metrics. Second,
bank regulators effectively require much more standardization as to modeling.
Third, relying on both quantitative and qualitative disclosures, the bank
regulator system demands that far more information be provided on the quality
of the modeling. I discuss these three differences in sequence.
Under the U.S. Basel 2.5 Rule, a bank must provide figures for, among
other things:
175. U.S. Basel 2.5 Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 53,111.
176. Id. at 53,092. See, e.g., Regulatory Capital Disclosures - Market Risk: Pillar 3
Report For the Quarterly Period Ended September 30, 2013, J.P. MORGAN CHASE & Co.,
http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/ONE/0x0x702622/BA22AF32-6B204065-A509-
C62FCD8EECBF/JPMorgan ChaseCo._3Q13 Basel_2.5_Market Risk Pillar_3_Report_-_Final.pdf
(last visited Feb. 16, 2014).
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- a "VaR-based measure,,177
- a "stressed VaR-based measure"
178
- an "incremental risk" chargel 79
- a "comprehensive risk" measurel80
Let us focus on the VaR-based measure, the pertinent measure used in the
SEC's Regulation S-K Item 305, and contrast the SEC's approach with bank
regulators' approach.
Bank regulators define VaR in a customary way: the "estimate of the
maximum amount that the value of one or more positions could decline due to
market price or rate movements during a fixed holding period within a stated
confidence interval."181 Banks are to use their own models, as with the SEC's
Market Risk Rule. However, the models must not only meet quality standards
specified in the rule (for instance, the VaR model must take into account the
"nonlinear" price characteristics of options positionsl 82) but must also be
approved by the regulator.' Moreover, the subject entities are required to
periodically review their models in light of developments in financial markets
and modeling technologies.1 84 The SEC does not specify quality standards,
does not get involved in the approval of models, and does not require
companies to undertake such periodic review of models.
In terms of confidence levels and time horizons, the U.S. Basel 2.5 Rule
requires that the VaRs be calculated using a 99% confidence level and a ten-
business-day holding period. The SEC gives discretion to the reporting entity to
use any confidence level above 95% (and even more latitude when there is
"economic justification") and any time horizon up to one year. Bank regulators
require that the VaR calculation be based on a historical observation of at least
one year.'85 The SEC has no such requirement.
The U.S. Basel 2.5 Rule, in contrast to the SEC Market Risk Rule, was
also concerned with risk during times of stress. With the U.S. Basel 2.5 Rule,
both quantitative and qualitative information must be provided publicly on
what happens in periods of financial stress. The "stressed VaR" measure is
177. U.S. Basel 2.5 Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 53,104, 53,112.
178. Id.
179. Id. For example, Goldman Sachs summarizes incremental risk as the "potential
loss in value of non-securitized inventory positions due to the default or credit migration of issuers of
financial instruments over a one-year time horizon." THE GOLDMAN SACHS GRP., REGULATORY
CAPITAL DISCLOSURES FOR THE QUARTERLY PERIOD ENDED MARCH 31, 2013, at 7 (2013).
180. U.S. Basel 2.5 Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 53,106, 53112. For example,
Goldman Sachs summarizes comprehensive risk as "the potential loss in value, due to price risk and
defaults, within the firm's credit correlation positions." THE GOLDMAN SACHS GRP., supra note 136, at
7.
181. Id. at 53,102.
182. Id. at 53,104.
183. Id. at 53,067.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 53,104.
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intended to be reflective of potential losses during a period of significant
market stress. Thus, this stressed VaR is calculated at a 99% confidence level
over a 10-day holding period using historical data from a continuous 12-month
period that reflects a period of significant financial stress.' 86 Annually, the bank
provides a description of the stress tests applied to the bank's positions for each
market risk category-e.g., interest rate risk, equity price risk, and so forth.187
The SEC's Market Risk Rule does not attempt to deal with stressed situations.
In contrast to the SEC's Market Risk Rule, the U.S. Basel 2.5 Rule
requires extensive quantitative and qualitative information on the quality of the
entity's modeling. From a quantitative standpoint, a bank is required to provide
"a comparison of VaR-based estimates with actual gains or losses experienced"
and "an analysis of important outliers."188 From a qualitative standpoint, the
bank is required to disclose the approaches it used for validating and evaluating
the accuracy of modeling.' 89
ii. Severely Adverse Scenario: Company-Run Stress Tests
As mentioned in Subsection II.B.2.iii, VaRs are not designed to gauge
how much a company can suffer in the event of "outlier" events, such as a
stock market crash or a collapse in housing prices. "Stress testing" involves
making quantitative estimates as to company performance involving
hypothetical scenarios involving extreme moves in market variables.190
The SEC has not been involved with respect to either the substantive or
disclosure aspects of stress testing. On the substantive side, the SEC has neither
sought to itself assess how companies would fare in such hypothetical scenarios
(i.e., SEC stress tests) nor required companies themselves to make their own
assessments (i.e., company-run stress tests). If companies elect to undertake
such stress tests, none of the SEC risk-related rules specifically require public
disclosure of the results. Such company-run stress test numbers are outside of
the reach of the SEC's Bank Industry Guide and Market Risk Rule. Such
company-run stress test numbers relate to the trends and uncertainties at the
core of the SEC's MD&A. However, the MD&A is primarily intended to
generate information of a qualitative nature and it would be difficult to argue
that the MD&A requires the public disclosure of stress test numbers on a
routine basis.
On the bank regulator side, involvement in stress-testing matters began
with the onset of the global financial crisis. As part of its effort to stabilize the
U.S. financial system, bank regulators conducted stress tests of large, complex
186. Id. at 53,105, 53,112.
187. Id. at 53,112.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. See GOLDMAN, SACHS & CO. AND SBC WARBURG DILLON READ, THE PRACTICE
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bank holding companies, estimating revenue, losses, and capital needs under an
adverse economic and financial market scenario.191
And, beginning in late 2010, the Federal Reserve initiated annual
Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR) for such companies, and
incorporated stress testing as part of the Federal Reserve's supervisory
program.192 Each company is required to provide highly detailed data on its
loan and securities portfolios, including information on the estimated sensitivity
of their trading and derivatives positions to changes in a wide range of market
rates and asset prices, and volatilities and correlations of those rates and
prices.193 With these supervisory stress tests, the data were provided by the
companies themselves. However, whether a company was deemed to pass the
stress test (i.e., had sufficient capital to weather the hypothesized scenario)
depended on how the company fared when all its data were input into a series
of models that had been largely developed or used by the Federal Reserve, not
those of any individual company.
In 2010, the Dodd-Frank Act directed the Federal Reserve to establish a
new, additional stress-testing program. 194 The Federal Reserve's CCAR
program applies only to the largest bank holding companies: as of September
30, 2013, 30 companies participate.195  Dodd-Frank's stress-testing
requirements applied to a broader range of companies, including savings and
loans and certain nonbank financial firms.'96
Section 165(i)(1) of the Dodd-Frank Act contemplates that the Federal
Reserve conduct an annual stress test of each covered company to evaluate
whether the covered company has sufficient capital . . . to absorb losses" in
"baseline, adverse, and severely adverse conditions."197 As with CCAR, the
modeling techniques and assumptions used in the Dodd-Frank annual stress
testing are those adopted by the Federal Reserve, not the individual
company.198 The hypothetical scenarios to be used are those prescribed by the
Federal Reserve. 199 As of November 1, 2013, the Federal Reserve contemplated
that it would publicly disclose a summary of results of this supervisory stress
test under the Dodd-Frank Act as well as a summary of the certain stress test
191. Dodd-Frank Stress Testing Rule, supra note 1, at 62,378.
192. See id.; Daniel K. Tarullo, Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
Speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Annual Risk Conference: Developing Tools for
Dynamic Capital Supervision 3-5 (Apr. 10, 2012),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo20120410a.pdf.
193. A description of the 2012 CCAR stress tests is set out at Hu, Too Complex to
Depict?, supra note 18, at 1659.
194. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. §
5365(i) (2012).
195. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE Sys., STRESS TESTS AND CAPITAL
PLANNING (November 1, 2013), http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/stress-tests-capital-
planning.htm.
196. Id.
197. Dodd Frank Stress Testing Rule, supra note 1, at 62,379.
198. Id. at 62,385.
199. Id. at 62,387.
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results under CCAR by March 31, 2014.200 In both cases, the Federal Reserve
anticipated that the results disclosed "will be those resulting from the stress
tests under both the supervisory adverse and the supervisory severely adverse
scenarios."201
The foregoing discussion of CCAR and Dodd-Frank Section 164(i)(1) has
focused on supervisory stress tests. These tests are "supervisory" in at least two
senses: First, the regulator's models are used in assessing how a company is
likely to fare in stressed conditions. Second, the hypothetical scenarios to be
used are specified by regulators.
Section 165(i)(2) of the Dodd-Frank Act focuses, in contrast, on
202company-run stress tests. The largest financial institutions (i.e., bank holding
companies with total consolidated assets of $50 billion or more and nonbank
financial companies designated by the Financial Stability Oversight Council)
are required to not only undergo the annual supervisory stress tests but also
semi-annual company run tests.203 These firms were required to make
summaries of the results of the company-run stress tests to the public beginning
in March 2013.204
With these Dodd-Frank company-run stress tests, the regulator's
methodologies are not applied to the bank-supplied data in estimating the
results. Thus, each company is free to use its own methodologies, subject to
certain general expectations and principles adopted by bank regulators in
2012.205
What hypothetical scenarios are used for company-run stress tests
depends on whether it is the "annual" test using data as of September 30 of
each year or the "mid-cycle" test using data as of March 31 of each year.206
200. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., COMPREHENSIVE CAPITAL
ANALYSIS AND REVIEW 2014: SUMMARY INSTRUCTIONS AND GUIDANCE (November 1, 2013) at 3.
Under the Dodd-Frank Act stress test rules, the company is also required to publish a summary of the
stress test results under the supervisory severely adverse scenario. See id.; 12 C.F.R. § 252.148(a)
(2013).
201. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., COMPREHENSIVE CAPITAL
ANALYSIS AND REVIEW 2014: SUMMARY INSTRUCTIONS AND GUIDANCE (November 1, 2013) at 3.
202. Under the Federal Reserve's CCAR program, company-run stress tests are
mandated. However, under the CCAR program, in contrast to the Dodd Frank regime, only results from
the supervisory stress tests are disclosed. See id. at 3, 28-29.
203. See Dodd-Frank Stress Testing Rule, supra note 1; BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE
FED. RESERVE SYS., STRESS TESTS AND CAPITAL PLANNING: DODD-FRANK ACT STRESS TESTS (March
21, 2014), http://ww.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/dfa-stress-tests.htm.
204. Id. Other financial institutions covered by the Dodd-Frank Act are subject to
annual company-run stress testing, with the summaries of the results disclosed to the public beginning in
June 2015. Id.
205. See Supervisory Guidance on Stress Testing for Banking Organizations with More
than $10 Billion in Total Consolidated Assets, 77 Fed. Reg. 29,458 (May 17, 2012); cf BD. OF
GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., DODD-FRANK ACT MID-CYCLE STRESS TESTS 2013:
SUMMARY INSTRUCTIONS (May 2013) at 1 n.2 [hereinafter DODD-FRANK MID-CYCLE STRESS TEST
SUMMARY INSTRUCTIONS] (noting the applicability of said expectations and principles to company-run
stress tests).
206. See 12 C.F.R. § 252.144(a)-(b) (2013) ("annual" company-run stress test); 12
C.F.R. § 252.145(a)-(b) (2013) ("mid-cycle" company-run stress test).
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With the "annual" test, the scenarios are specified by the Federal Reserve. With
the "mid-cycle" company-run stress tests, the Federal Reserve will not provide
scenarios to the covered companies. Instead, the company is required to
develop and use a minimum of three sets of its own scenarios of varying
degrees of stress-a baseline, adverse, and severely adverse scenario.207 The
scenarios must be tailored to the specific circumstances of a company. The
Federal Reserve states that adverse and severely adverse scenarios "should
reflect a company's unique vulnerabilities to factors that affect its firm-wide
activities and risk exposures" and that companies "should consider their own
risk profiles and operations in designing specific elements" of both
208scenarios.
The Federal Reserve requires the public disclosures to be granular. The
disclosures would occur by posting the required information on the company's
website or "in any other forum that is reasonably accessible to the public." 209 In
terms of content, the focus is on a summary of the company-run stress tests
results only under the "severely adverse scenario."
In terms of quantitative disclosure, the Federal Reserve mandates that the
company disclose, "at a minimum," such information as estimates for such
items as provisions for trading and counterparty losses, other losses and gains,
net income before taxes, and pro forma regulatory capital ratios.210
In terms of qualitative disclosure, the Federal Reserve focuses especially
on the specifics of the stress tests used, including much information on the
limitations of such tests and the associated methodologies. 211 In terms of
methodologies, for example, the company must include a "general description
of the methodologies used in the stress test" and provide clear descriptions of
the methodology used to produce its projections for losses, revenues, changes
in capital positions and other matters.212 Moreover, "[w]here judgment is an
essential part of the . .. projections," the company must describe:
the rationale and magnitude of the judgment, as well as the process it used to
ensure consistency of projections with the conditions of the severely adverse
.213
scenario.
The key assumptions used in the company's models used to project loss
214and revenue estimates must be disclosed. If the models rely on historical
207. Dodd-Frank Stress Testing Rule, supra note 1, at 62,389. These scenarios are
defined at 12 C.F.R. § 252.132 (2013).
208. DODD-FRANK MID-CYCLE STRESS TEST SUMMARY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note
205, at 5.
209. Id. at 6.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 6-7.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 7.
214. Id.
617
Yale Journal on Regulation
relationships, the company needs to describe why these relationships are
expected to hold in the severely adverse scenario. The company also needs to
justify the company's severely adverse scenario, such as by describing the
rationale for the selection of variables and the process for projecting variables.
IV. The Descriptive Mode and the Complex Objective Realities of Major
Banks
As noted in the Introduction, there is a troubling pattern: even as major
banks are providing careful, voluminous information, many believe that major
banks are opaque, especially with respect to the risks to banks flowing from
derivatives and other financial innovations. As first suggested in the June 2012
Too Complex to Depict? article, this puzzling pattern partially stems from the
structural limitations to the core approach to information that the SEC has
always relied on. As we have just seen, the U.S. Basel 2.5 Rule and the Federal
Reserve's company-run stress testing rule largely relied on the same
approach-the descriptive mode illustrated in Figure 1.
The prior work showed the insufficiency of the descriptive mode and the
need to tap the potential of other modes in three contexts, two of which were
related to financial innovation: asset-backed securities and major banks.215 As
that work was in the final stages of editing, the JPM Chief Investment Office
credit derivatives debacle started unfolding. An afterword was included based
on information publicly available as of May 2012.216
In this Section IV.A, I offer an overview of the two basic roadblocks to
the effectiveness of the descriptive mode in the major bank context, extending
the conceptual framework advanced in the prior work and using the more
refined terminology set out in Section I.B. In Section IV.B, I re-consider the
JPM scandal in light of undisputed evidence that came to light after May 2012.
A. Structural Roadblocks
There are two basic structural roadblocks that financial innovation poses
to the descriptive mode, even assuming completely well-intentioned and
sophisticated intermediaries. First, the depiction tools needed to generate the
descriptions are too crude relative to the complex objective realities created by
the modem process of financial innovation. Second, the intermediary might
suffer from "true" and "functional" misunderstandings of the objective
reality.217 If the intermediary does not understand or acts as if it does not
215. The non-financial innovation-related context was that of multiemployer pension
plans. See Hu, Too Complex to Depict?, supra note 18, at 1638-47 (asset-backed securities), 1651-65
(major banks), 1665-66 (multiemployer pension plans), 1667-78 (major banks), 1679-87 (all contexts).
216. Id. at 1667-78.
217. Id. at 1653-55 and 1671-76 (citing Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives, supra note 55)
(discussing true and functional misunderstandings by major banks).
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understand the objective reality, any descriptions the intermediary offers are
necessarily flawed.
1. Depiction Tools
The first roadblock centers on the current state of depiction tools needed
by the business entity to craft the description. It is difficult to capture the highly
complex objective realities flowing from modem financial innovation with the
rudimentary linguistic, accounting, and visual tools of description on which the
entity must rely. As we have seen, even the more modem depiction tools used
to measure risk such as VaR have serious problems.
Figure 1 shows how the business entity must engage in an "observe-
analyze-describe" process to generate the intermediary depiction being
provided to market participants. This depiction tools roadblock is situated at the
"describe" phase of the process.
Accounting standards and the specific accounting judgments a corporation
and its outside auditor make directly affect the descriptions found in the
corporation's financial statements. If such standards and judgments result in
descriptions that fail to correctly capture the true economic state of affairs with
sufficient granularity, a serious disclosure problem arises. This is especially so
if the investor is unable to "reverse engineer" the descriptions into the objective
reality. In addition, if companies vary widely as to the standards used and
judgments made, cross-company comparisons become difficult.
Surprisingly, accounting-related matters were largely a regulatory
backwater in the early years of the SEC.218 A 1939 study of the balance sheets
and income statements of seventy large companies concluded that "[o]n vital
counts, investors are left conjecturing" on such critical matters as sales, costs of
sales, and inventories and that an investor "does not have a minimum of
information upon which to form an intelligent opinion on buying or
selling. . ."219
Accounting issues certainly have not gone away. Most fundamentally,
accounting standards often lead to depictions far removed from economic
220reality. When Enron, WorldCom, and other companies either game or depart
from accounting standards, the descriptions are farther removed still.
But far more accounting information is now required than in the past. And
the malleability of accounting depictions has decreased for several reasons.
First, there is now far greater standardization of accounting information,
allowing for cross-company comparisons of performance. Unless the more
"principles-based" International Financial Reporting Standards approach is
218. See SELIGMAN, supra note 24, at 116-17.
219. Maurice C. Kaplan & Daniel M. Reaugh, Accounting, Reports to Stockholders,
and the SEC, 48 YALE L.J. 935, 978 (1939).
220. See, e.g., Glenn H. Greenberg, The Quest for Rational Investing, in SECURITY
ANALYSIS 395, 400 (Benjamin Graham & David L. Dodd eds., 6th ed. 2009) (offering examples).
619
Yale Journal on Regulation
incorporated into the financial reporting system for U.S. issuers, U.S.
companies are all subject to the tighter "rules-based" Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles.221 Second, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, enacted in 2002 in
the wake of Enron, WorldCom, and other scandals of that era, adopted a variety
of measures to enhance auditor independence and created the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board ("PCAOB") to oversee audits "in order to protect
the interests of investors and further the public interest in the preparation of
informative, accurate, and independent audit reports."222
Good accounting information is, of course, useful to investors in gauging
the risk characteristics of any business. Many longstanding measures of
profitability (e.g., rates of return on assets and earnings per share), short-term
liquidity risk (e.g., current ratios and quick ratios) and long-term liquidity risk
(e.g., liabilities-to-asset ratios and debt-to-equity ratios) rely on accounting
numbers as inputs.223 Additionally, accountants have devoted substantial
amounts of time to difficult issues associated with the reporting of derivatives
and other new financial products, such as in connection with "hedge
accounting" principles. 224
However, although such accounting information is useful for assessing the
risk characteristics of all businesses, there are real limitations to its usefulness
in gauging the true risk characteristics of modem-day major banks.
Even the calculation of fair value has proven difficult with respect to
certain complex financial products, some of which are thinly traded or not
traded. And at the height of the global financial crisis, the markets for certain
complex securities froze, making it especially difficult to determine what prices
the products might fetch if they were sold. Colloquially, issues arose as to
whether products were being "marked to market," "marked to model," or
simply "marked to myth.". In other words, precisely when transparency
regarding bank solvency may be most important in terms of avoiding bank
"runs," achieving transparency may be most difficult. Inspection reports on the
part of the PCAOB released in 2011 and 2012 showed a threefold increase in
221. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ACCOUNTANT, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N,
wORK PLAN FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF INCORPORATING INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REPORTING
STANDARDS INTO THE FINANCIAL REPORTING SYSTEM FOR U.S. ISSUERS: FINAL STAFF REPORT (July
13, 2012). The "Introductory Note" of this report states that the SEC "believes it is important to make
clear" that the SEC has not "made any policy decision as to whether International Financial Reporting
Standards should be incorporated into the financial reporting system for U.S. issuers, or how any such
incorporation, if it were to occur, should be implemented." As to differences between U.S. GAAP and
the International Financial Reporting Standards, see, for example, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ACCOUNTANT,
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, WORK PLAN FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF INCORPORATING
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REPORTING STANDARDS INTO THE FINANCIAL REPORTING SYSTEM FOR
U.S. ISSUERS (Nov. 16, 2011).
222. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 101(a), 15 U.S.C. § 7211(a) (2006). The PCAOB
chairman offered an overview of the PCAOB's role and activities in James R. Doty, The Relevance,
Role, and Reliability ofAudits in the Global Economy, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1891 (2012).
223. CLYDE P. STICKNEY ET AL., FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING: AN INTRODUCTION TO
CONCEPTS, METHODS, AND USES 241-73 (2010).
224. See id. at 580-93.
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valuation-related audit problems.225 Moreover, during the global financial
crisis, many bank regulators and bank managements came to believe that fair
value accounting exacerbated the problems, and certain accounting practices
changed accordingly. 226
Even assuming that it is possible to do fair value accounting in an
effective and impartial way, there is the basic problem of the quick
obsolescence of quarterly or annual reports in the banking context. There is
some preliminary evidence that the speed with which banks trade in and out of
their assets contributes materially to bank opacity.227
The limitations of the accounting tools run far deeper than such valuation
issues. Accounting is generally directed at providing historical, not prospective,
numbers and is not explicitly directed at generating risk information. Even
modem accounting efforts relating to new financial products primarily involve
the reporting of their valuation at instants in time or the description of how past
changes in their value should affect (or not affect) reported income over past
periods.
Longstanding accounting measures relating to risk are oriented to the past
and provide guides to the future only inferentially. Profitability measures
related to past periods of time and the liquidity and insolvency risk ratios rely
on historically-based accounting inputs. Moreover, even with respect to those
historical periods or points in time, such longstanding measures suffer from a
variety of well-known defects.228
In the era in which the SEC's Bank Industry Guide was adopted, banks
served primarily to provide simple loans. Therefore, the failure to directly
quantify future risks did not matter as much. With sufficient granularity of
information about a simple loan-e.g., principal amount, the category of buyer
in terms of industry or creditworthiness, interest rate, and maturity-an outside
observer can, without Greek-letter laden mathematical models, broadly gauge
the likely and maximum returns and risks associated with the loan. Changing
market conditions would not affect the contracted-for payoff structure of the
loan: the principal amount remained.the same and, in the case of a fixed interest
rate loan, even the interest remained the same as well. Moreover, with such
simple products, rules of thumb relating to past loan delinquencies and so forth
sufficed.
225. Emily Chasan, Delving Into the Value Riddle: Firms Take a Deeper Look Into the
Figures They Use to Value Hard-to-Price Assets, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 2013, at B4.
226. For academic views on the validity of the belief, see, for example, Christian Laux
& Christian Leuz, Did Fair-Value Accounting Contribute to the Financial Crisis?, 24 J. ECON. PERSP.
93 (2010); Jannis Bischof, Ulf Broggemann & Holger Daske, Fair Value Reclassifications of Financial
Assets During the Financial Crisis (July 29, 2011) (unpublished manuscript),
http://ssm.com/abstract-1628843.
227. Tanvir Ansari, Complexity or Transparency: What Makes Banks Opaque? (June 9,
2013) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssm.com/abstract-2307787.
228. See, e.g., STICKNEY ET AL., supra note 223, at 244-45, 254, 272.
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With derivatives, the contracted payoffs vary substantially with market
conditions, and the different future states of the world could significantly affect
such payoffs. Consider, for instance, a simple fixed-for-floating interest rate
swap in which a bank is the floating rate payor.229 Even assuming no chance of
default on the part of the bank's counterparty, it is not clear whether the bank
will be receiving cash from the counterparty (which would occur if interest
rates dropped) or paying cash to the counterparty (which would occur if interest
rates increased). If interest rates rise, the maximum amount the bank may owe
in the worst case is unknowable: theoretically, interest rates can approach
infinity. In contrast, with a simple loan, interest rate issues aside, the most a
bank can lose is easy to identify and immutable: the principal amount of the
loan. A formal model is necessary to guess at likely and "maximum" exposures
on the swap, even when excluding any consideration of credit risk. And this is
with a simple fixed-for-floating interest rate swap. What if the swap were more
exotic? For example, what if the maturity date were extendable at the option of
the bank's customer?
Furthermore, a bank may simultaneously enter into multiple interest rate
swap transactions-in some of which it may be a fixed rate payor. Moreover,
the bank may enter into other types of interest rate derivatives (such as interest
rate options), currency derivatives, commodity derivatives, and so forth. In
addition, the bank may be engaged in foreign exchange trading, securitizations,
and other activities.
How will these individual transactions, in a wide range of products, be
correlated with each other in the future? Is historical data likely to be helpful
and, if so, what historical periods should be looked at? To what extent are
certain historical data, such as those relating to the violent moves associated
with the May 6, 2010 "flash crash"230-when blue chip stocks fell to a penny or
increased to $100,000 in a matter of minutes on no news-suggestive? How
should models deal with such extreme events?
Modern risk measurement tools, such as VaR, all suffer from model risk
to some degree. This is one reason why, as we have seen, the U.S. Basel 2.5
Rule requires information relating to the historical performance of the VaR
models, and also requires that such models have certain characteristics and be
based on specified historical periods. Moreover, VaR models are subject to
bank regulator approval. In contrast, the SEC's Market Risk Rule makes only a
very limited attempt at dealing with model risk.
Also, as we have discussed, some tools (such as VaR) are not even
intended to generate the kind of information that some investors assume they
provide. Moreover, the models used by banks, and the ways in which the
229. For a discussion of the risks to a bank from entering into a simple interest rate
swap, and how such risks influenced the initial 1988 Basel accord, see Hu, Swaps, supra note 69, at 363-
70.
230. As to this flash crash, see, for example, Hu, EM1H and the Law, supra note 1, at
186-90; Hu, Too Complex to Depict?, supra note 18, at 1701-07.
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results are reported, vary widely. While some efforts to improve modeling and
to facilitate cross-bank comparisons-including comparisons on the part of the
Basel Committee and bank regulators-have been very helpful, there is nothing
analogous to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. "Risk accounting"
standards, in this sense, have yet to arise.
This Article is centered on mandated public information more explicitly
directed at providing risk information, especially future-oriented risk
information of a quantitative nature. The SEC and bank regulators have already
moved in this direction but, at least in the U.S., the accounting profession is
23 232
only starting to do so and in a limited way.231 For these and other reasons,
the activities of accounting bodies are beyond the scope of this Article, and the
discussion will be largely limited to the activities in the two universes the SEC
and bank regulators have created.
2. Banks and "True" and "Functional" Misunderstandings of Objective
Reality
In the context of modem financial innovation, the descriptive mode can
suffer from a roadblock more fundamental than the crudeness of existing
depiction tools. If the entity providing the description itself does not understand
the objective reality, how can the description it offers correctly convey the
objective reality to investors?
231. On June 27, 2012, the Financial Accounting Standards Board proposed enhancing
disclosures relating to liquidity risk and interest rate risk, including interest rate disclosures that would
incorporate a sensitivity analysis of net income and shareholders' equity. See Financial Instruments
(Topic 825) Disclosures about Liquidity Risk and Interest Rate Risk, FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BD. (June






The discussion relating to accounting rules and principles throughout this Article centers on those
applicable to U.S. entities. Overseas, the International Accounting Standards Board has taken a more
comprehensive approach with respect to qualitative and quantitative disclosures relating to risk. See,
e.g., IFRS 7 - Financial Instruments; Disclosure, DELOITTE,
http://www.iasplus.com/en/standards/ifrs/ifrs7 (last visited Feb. 17, 2014) (providing qualitative and
quantitative information relating to financial instruments).
232. Although the formulation of "Generally Accepted Accounting Principles" is the
responsibility of the Financial Accounting Standards Board, the SEC's Office of Chief Accountant,
through Regulation S-X and its Accounting Series Releases and Financial Reporting Releases,
establishes the financial reporting requirements applicable to the federal securities laws. Moreover, all
accounting firms that prepare audits for public companies must register with the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board, which body has broad authority over such matters as auditing and quality
standards. The SEC is responsible for appointing all members of the PCAOB, including the Chair. See
Procedures for Appointment of a Member or Chairperson of the Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board, SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N (Aug. 9, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oca/pcaob-
appointments.htm; COFFEE & SALE, supra note 51, at 56, 70.
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In terms of the "observe-analyze-describe" process set out in Figure 1, this
misunderstanding roadblock is situated at the "observe" phase or "analyze"
phase, or both, depending on the circumstances.
Misunderstandings of modem financial innovation were manifest during
the global financial crisis. AIG's troubles stemmed in material part from its
mistaken beliefs about the risks posed by its credit derivatives activities.2 33
Through December 4, 2013, the SEC had brought enforcement actions against
166 entities and individuals addressing misconduct that led to or arose from the
crisis. Many involved misleading disclosures to investors about the banks' risk
exposures to complex financial products or about the risk characteristics of the
products themselves.234
Misunderstandings at major financial institutions can flow from two
sources, as initially (and more fully) discussed in a 1993 article (hereinafter,
235Misunderstood Derivatives). One source can lead to what can be referred to
as "true" misunderstanding: no one at a bank may understand the true risk-
return characteristics of a new financial product. Another source can lead to
what can be referred to as "functional" misunderstanding: there may be one or
more people at a bank who understand the true risk-return characteristics of a
new product, but the bank acts as if it does not understand it. 236
The highly peculiar nature of the modem process of financial innovation
can result in true misunderstandings. On the one hand, the process has some
characteristics redolent of physics, chemistry, and other traditional sciences.
The people involved have advanced quantitative skills, often with Ph.D.s in
physics and math, routinely deal with complex models, and rely on computer
processing of massive amounts of data.237 New ideas for how to value or how
to hedge positions, be they from advances in theory or from empirical findings,
are prized, as are new product ideas. The process of innovation is
233. See, e.g., Hearing to Review the Role of Credit Derivatives in the U.S. Economy:
Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Agriculture, 1l0th Cong. 41-46 (2008) [hereinafter Hearing to
Review the Role of Credit Derivatives] (statement of Henry T. C. Hu). See also International Swaps and
Derivatives Association, AIG and Credit Default Swaps (November 2009) (a derivatives trade
association's account emphasizing the fact that while the common perception regarding the near-
collapse of AIG is that the company's financial problems were largely due to its credit default swaps,
AIG's financial difficulties can be traced to a broader set of reasons).
234. See SEC Enforcement Actions Addressing Misconduct That Led to or Arose From
the Financial Crisis, SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/enf-actions-fc.shtml (last
visited Feb. 17, 2014). The above paragraph focuses on misunderstandings on the part of financial
institutions. Some academics believe that investor misunderstandings of the risk characteristics of
certain asset-backed securities were at the core of the crisis. E.g. Joshua Coval, Jakub Jurek & Erik
Stafford, The Economics ofStructured Finance, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 3 (2009).
235. Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives, supra note 55, at 102.
236. Hu, Too Complex to Depict?, supra note 18, at 1609, 1653-58.
237. For a discussion of the highly quantitative nature of the modem process of
financial innovation, see, for example, Darrell Duffie & Henry T. C. Hu, Competing for a Share of
Global Derivatives Markets: Trends and Policy Choices for the United States (Rock Ctr. for Corporate
Governance, Stanford Univ. Working Paper Series No. 50, Univ. of Tex. Law Law & Econ. Research
Paper No. 145, 2008), http://ssm.com/abstract-1 140869.
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institutionalized and central to the competition among the major financial
institutions.
As with traditional sciences, truth is ephemeral. And paradigm shifts
occur, upending existing valuation and hedging methodologies. Some financial
institutions will recognize the need for a paradigm shift earlier than others and
will start using the better valuation techniques and methodologies faster. From
the standpoint of the descriptive mode, some "true" misunderstandings-the
faulty valuations and statements about hedging-may simply be an artifact of
the diffusion process of the sort found in the traditional sciences.
Differences between financial products risk analysis and the traditional
sciences can also create "true" misunderstandings. To take one example,
departures from the scientific norm of "universalism" could pose especial
descriptive problems for financial institutions dominant in any particular
financial product. The sociologist Robert K. Merton's canon of "universalism"
centers on the truth of claims being determined through application of objective
criteria without regard to the source's personal, social, or other attributes: "The
Haber process cannot be invalidated by a Nuremberg decree nor can an
Anglophone repeal the law of gravitation." 238
This universalism theme, readily visible in the traditional sciences, does
not entirely apply to the OTC derivatives market. Misunderstood Derivatives
argued that the identity of the thinker matters and that a particularly dangerous
situation arises if the thinker happens to be dominant in the market for a
particular financial product.239 That is, even if the model that a dominant dealer
uses is seriously flawed, the dealer's importance alone makes the model at least
temporarily relevant. Moreover, should the dealer decide to withdraw from the
market for that derivative, liquidity may dry up and the value arising from that
dealer's idiosyncratic theoretical model may be particularly irrelevant. There is
no Mertonian universalism here. The impact of this is likely to be especially
severe with respect to the more arcane instruments and products dominated by
a few dealers in chaotic market conditions.
True misunderstandings on the part of the derivatives dealer can also
result from other factors. The 1993 article showed how, for instance, the
process of financial innovation may be undermined by cognitive biases, such as
the tendency to ignore low probability catastrophic events. The article provided
evidence that this was occurring in derivatives modeling.240 Such cognitive
biases appear to have contributed to the AIG's misunderstanding of the risk-
return characteristics of credit derivatives activities.241
238. ROBERT K. MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 607 (rev. ed.
1968).
239. Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives, supra note 55, at 1500-1501.
240. Id. at 1487-91.
241. Hearing to Review the Role of Credit Derivatives, supra note 233, at 41-47
(statement of Henry T. C. Hu).
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Misunderstood Derivatives also suggested that a basic externalities
problem exists that could result in misunderstandings. 242 With many new
financial products, the innovator is unable to obtain intellectual property
protection allowing him to capture the full benefits of the innovation. Given
this "inappropriability" problem associated with financial research and
development, dealers may fail to invest enough in fully understanding the true
characteristics of their complex products. This "just-enough" information
standard may lead to valuations or hedging strategies that are seriously flawed.
The foregoing "true" misunderstandings assume that no one at a bank
knows the actual objective reality and that no one understands how this can
undermine the quality of the bank's descriptions. But there can be another kind
of misunderstanding that has a similar impact on descriptions: there may be one
or more individuals at the bank who do comprehend the objective reality, but
the bank as an organization acts as if it does not understand that reality. The
descriptions that the organization offers reflect the flawed perceptions, rather
than the true perceptions of those "in the know." This "as if" or "functional"
misunderstanding has the same impact on descriptions as true
misunderstandings.
There are several sources of such functional misunderstandings, including
the nature of financial science as practiced in banks and the banks'
organizational complexities. The 1993 article showed how the highly
asymmetric incentive structures found in the derivatives world, coupled with
such factors as senior managers who may not be as numerate as their quant
traders and the hidden and long-term nature of some derivatives risks, provide
243fertile ground for principal-agent problems within the bank. In this context,
an ethically-challenged trader may find it tempting to do what he believes
might be individually rational from an economic standpoint: to engage in
exceptional risk-taking, exploiting the difficulty his seniors may have in
correctly perceiving the actual risks of his activity, especially those risks that
are subtler and longer-term and thus less likely to be captured by the bank's
internal risk measurement tools. The particular trader may understand the true
risk characteristics of his complex trading strategies, but the bank as an
organization is functioning as if it does not and the depictions reflect this
functional ignorance. The ramifications of functional ignorance go beyond
depictions. Indeed, had the bank as an organization understood the strategy's
true characteristics, the bank may not have even permitted those strategies in
the first place.
Functional misunderstandings may also flow from sources more innocent
than principal-agent problems. Major money center banks are large, complex
organizations that span the globe. In all such organizations, private or
governmental, some "siloing" of information is inevitable.
242. Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives, supra note 55, at 1481-86.
243. See id. at 1492-93.
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That is, information may be found in pockets of the organization or up and
down a particular line of control, as with a stove pipe. Sometimes siloing
occurs because there are institutional reasons for engaging in this kind of
behavior, such as the desire to keep certain sensitive information from leaking
out. Sometimes it is simply because of the sprawling, complex nature of many
banks and the difficulty of fostering open communication across the empire.
One or more individuals at one unit, perhaps in some foreign city, may truly
understand the objective reality, but siloing problems may result in those at
headquarters- those responsible for the disclosure documents -not
understanding the objective reality. The challenges posed by the size and
complexity of the organization and a desire to keep certain information
proprietary, rather than any intentional attempt to hide information from
headquarters (much less any intentional attempt for headquarters to hide
information from investors), may result in flawed intermediary depictions.
B. Structural Roadblocks: An Updated Analysis of the 2012 JPMorgan Chase
Chiefinvestment Office Debacle
1. The Debacle as of May 2012
Too Complex to Depict? was first presented at an academic symposium in
February 2012. In early May 2012, as the paper was in final editing for the
associated symposium issue in June, major derivatives-related problems
involving JPM and its Chief Investment Office (CIO) started coming to light.
Because this JPM CIO situation appeared to so well illustrate the paper's core
thesis, an 11-page afterword was included at the last minute based on
244information available as of late May 2012. In the interest of fairness, the
afterword explicitly assumed that not a single individual associated with JPM
had acted in any way inappropriately.245
The discussion in this current Article reflects certain developments
subsequent to late May 2012 and newly available information from JPM itself
or explicitly admitted by JPM. The new information is consistent with the
afterword's analysis of the depiction tools roadblock as well as both the true
and functional misunderstanding roadblocks. Certain situations appear to
reflect a hybrid of true and functional misunderstandings and, for convenience,
are discussed as a whole rather than in a segmented fashion.
The evening of April 5, 2012, Bloomberg and the Wall Street Journal ran
stories about a London-based trader at JPM's CIO having amassed credit
derivatives positions so large that the trader in London was disrupting prices in
the $10 trillion market.246 The stories reported that they believed that the trader,
244. Hu, Too Complex to Depict?, supra note 18, at 1667-78.
245. Id. at 1675.
246. See Stephanie Ruhle, Bradley Keoun & Mary Childs, JPMorgan Trader's
Positions Said to Distort Credit Indexes, BLOOMBERG, Apr. 6, 2012, 9:43 AM,
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Bruno Iksil, had been selling so much protection on credit derivatives linked to
the "CDX IG 9" index that unusual prices and price volatility were occurring-
some referred to him as the "London whale." The net notional amount in the
CDX IG 9 jumped from $92.6 billion at year-end to $144.6 billion on March
30. The Wall Street Journal story reported that "[o]ne person familiar with the
matter said the bank has run tests that show Mr. Iksil's positions likely will be
profitable in any economic or market downturn." 247 Ina Drew, the head of the
CIO, declined to comment when contacted by Bloomberg.
On April 13, JPM released its earnings for the first quarter of 2012.
During the earnings call with analysts, both Jamie Dimon, JPM's CEO, and
Douglas Braunstein, JPM's CFO, dismissed the significance of the media
accounts. Dimon referred to the issue as a "complete tempest in a teapot." 248
Neither the 15-page press release nor the 21-page earnings release that day
even saw fit to mention the CIO.249 The closest JPM came to disclosing risk
exposures related to the CIO appeared on three lines on page 42 of a 51-page
"Supplement to First Quarter 2012 Earnings Release." 250 On that page, JPM
reports the VaR for its CIO as $67 million, calculated at a 95% confidence
level. To put that $67 million in perspective, JPM's total net income and net
revenue for the first quarter were $5.4 billion and $26.7 billion, respectively. 251
Shortly after the earnings call, losses of roughly $100 million a day began
showing up on the CIO's books. As the losses kept on growing, JPM was
working to prepare the Form 10-Q set for release on April 27. Dimon decided
to postpone the 10-Q until he could better understand the trades and their
impact. On April 30, dissatisfied with the granularity of the daily reports he
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-04-05/jpmorgan-trader-iksil-s-heft-is-said-to-distort-credit-
indexes.html; Joe Weisenthal, Strange: Multiple Reports Of a JPMorgan Trader With an Epic Position
in Credit Default Swaps, BUS. INSIDER (April 5, 2012, 9:44 PM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/bruno-michel-iksil-2012-4; Gregory Zuckerman & Katy Burne,
'London Whale' Rattles Debt Market, WALL ST. J., Apr. 6, 2012,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303299604577326031119412436.html.
247. Zuckerman & Burne, supra note 246.
248. JPMorgan Chase & Co.'s CEO Discusses Q1 2012 Results: Earnings Call
Transcript, SEEKING ALPHA (Apr. 13, 2012, 3:30 PM), http://seekingalpha.com/articec/505581-
jpmorgan-chase-co-s-ceo-discusses-ql-2012-results-earnings-call-transcript.
249. JPMorgan Chase Reports First-Quarter 2012 Net Income of $5.4 Billion, or $1.31
Per Share, JPMORGAN CHASE & Co. (2012),
http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/ONE/1893281334x0x559618/75bac823-bb81-4570-bac4-
fa626174e389/JPMC 1Q12 Earnings PressRelease.pdf; Financial Results 1Q12, JPMORGAN CHASE
& Co. (2012), http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/ONE/1893281334x0x559619/979e9e75-5046-
49b7-bl9f-6e362bf367fal
JPMC_1Ql2_EarningsPresentation.pdf.
250. JPMorgan Chase & Co., Earnings Release Financial Supplement: First Quarter
2012, JPMORGAN CHASE & Co. (2012),
http://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/19617/000119312512161533/d332188dex992.htm [hereinafter JPM
4-13-2012 Earnings Release Supplement].
251. Id. at 2.
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was getting, Dimon stated: "I want to see the positions! . . . Now! I want to see
everything!" When Dimon saw the numbers, he "couldn't breathe." 252
On May 10, 2012, JPM filed its 1O-Q. Dimon began a conference call that
same day by highlighting problems at the CIO and stepping back from the VaR
that JPM had reported on April 13. As for the problems, Dimon revealed
"slightly more than $2 billion trading loss on [JPM's] synthetic credit
positions" and said that further losses could amount to "as much as $1 billion or
more."253 In explaining this, Dimon stated:
Regarding what happened, the synthetic credit portfolio was a strategy to hedge
the Firm's overall credit exposure . . . . [I]n hindsight, the new strategy was
flawed, complex, poorly reviewed, poorly executed and poorly monitored. The
portfolio has proven to be riskier more volatile and less effective than [the]
economic hedge that we thought.254
As for the VaR, Dimon stated:
We are also amending a disclosure . . . about CIO's VAR, Value-at-Risk. We'd
shown average VAR at 67. It will now be 129. In the first quarter, we
implemented a new VAR model, which we now deem inadequate. And we went
back to the old one, which had been used for the prior several years, which we
deemed to be more adequate. The numbers I just gave are effective March 30 1,
255
the first quarter.
The Form 10-Q did not detail the change in the reported March 31 VaR
numbers, the change in the methodology, and the source of the CIO's
problems. It reported its March 31 VaR (at the 95% confidence level) as $129
million, stating simply that:
CIO VaR presented above for the period ended March 31, 2012 supersedes the
Firm's VaR disclosures included in its Form 8-K filed on April 13, 2012 and
was calculated using a methodology consistent with the methodology used to
calculate CIO's VaR in 2011, including the first quarter of 2011 reflected
above. 256
In the two-week period between the close of exchange trading on May 10
and on May 25, JPM's market capitalization dropped over $27 billion.
252. Monica Langley, Inside J.P. Morgan's Blunder: CEO Dimon Blessed the Concept
Behind Disastrous Trades; 'Blood in the Water,' WALL ST. J., May 18, 2012, at Al.
253. Raw Transcript, 10-May-2012 JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPM): Business Update
Call, JPMORGAN CHASE & Co. 2-3 (2012), http://i.mktw.net/_newsimages/pdf/jpm-conference-call.pdf
[hereinafter JPM May 10 Conference Call].
254. Id. at 2.
255. Id.
256. Earnings Release Financial Supplement: First Quarter 2012, JPMORGAN CHASE
& Co. 73, http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/ONE/1898789271x0x568607/530d9a03-89dd-4123-
b57e-094e47a4f842/IQ12_ERF SupplementFINAL_5.10.12.pdf (Last revised Aug. 9, 2012)
[hereinafter JPM 5-10-2012 Earnings Release Supplement].
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2. Depiction Tools
JPM's central depiction of its CIO risk exposures lay in its VaR
disclosures. The VaR reported on April 13 was $67 million while that reported
on May 10 was $129 million, nearly double that earlier reported. JPM changed
its methodology: the one used in its April 13 disclosure was deemed inadequate
by JPM. So JPM went back to an older methodology, which was "more
adequate," which generated the $129 million figure.
JPM did not describe what the differences between the "inadequate" and
the "more adequate" methodologies were at that time. Even though the changes
were material enough to cause a near-doubling in the reported CIO VaR
number, outsiders were left guessing as to the methodological changes that
would account for this.
Developments subsequent to the afterword of Too Complex to Depict?
emphasized further the fluidity and limitations of the VaR depiction tool.
During the third quarter of 2012, JPM applied a new VaR model to calculate
VaR for its synthetic credit portfolio.257 Prior period VaR results, including
those for the CIO, were not recalculated using the new model, making it
difficult for outsiders to gauge risk-taking across time. And, again, the
disclosures regarding this third VaR model did not allow outsiders to reverse-
engineer the calculation in order to understand the objective reality underlying
the depiction. JPM stated that "[t]he new model uses data that references actual
underlying indices, rather than being constructed through single name and
index basis. ... "258
3. "True and "Functional" Misunderstandings
The afterword suggested that in the area of misunderstandings, JPM was
mistaken as to at least three issues: first, the core model that JPM used in
measuring risk exposures; second, the general methodology for gauging
possible risk exposures; and third, its hedging strategy and the portfolio
associated with that strategy. As to the first: in Dimon's words of May 10, the
VaR model it had used for the purposes of its April 13 disclosure was
"inadequate."259 The May 10 model was not only "more adequate," but
generated a risk exposure number ($129 million) nearly double that under the
earlier VaR model ($67 million). As to the second: in its April 6 story, the Wall
Street Journal reported that the bank's own tests showed Mr. Iksil's position
"likely will be profitable in any economic or market downtum."260 Only a
month later, on May 10, Dimon noted a trading loss of more than $2 billion.
261
257. JPMorgan Chase & Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 166 (Feb. 28, 2013)
[hereinafter JPM Annual Report].
258. Id.
259. JPM May 10 Conference Call, supra note 253, at 2.
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As to the third: in terms of the hedging strategy, Dimon stated the same day
that, "in hindsight," its new hedging strategy was "flawed," and that the
portfolio associated with that strategy was "riskier, more volatile, and less
effective" as an "economic hedge than we thought."262 Dimon explicitly
attributed the mistakes to the fact that the CIO's trading strategy had become
"more complex." 263
New information since the publication of Too Complex to Depict? offers
perspectives on the initial analysis of JPM's misunderstanding of the objective
reality of its portfolio. To give the benefit of every possible doubt to JPM and
its current and former officers and employees, the below discussion limits itself
to the three following sources:
(1) JPM's own admissions in settling the SEC's enforcement action, attached as
"Annex A" to the SEC's cease and desist order of September 19, 2013 ("JPM
Admissions").264
(2) The "Report of JPMorgan Chase & Co. Management Task Force Rearding
2012 CIO Losses" dated January 16, 2013 ("JPM Task Force Report"). JPM
established a management task force led by the co-Chief Executive Officer of
JPM's Corporate and Investment Bank to review losses incurred in 2012 by the
Chief Investment Office. The review was conducted by the task force and its
legal advisors and included a significant number of interviews of current and
former JPM employees and an examination of millions of documents and tens of
thousands of audio files.
(3) The "Report of the Review Committee of the Board of Directors of
JPMorgan Chase & Co. Relating to the Board's Oversight Function With
Respect to Risk Management" dated January 15, 2013 ("JPM Board Review
Committee Report"). On May 23, 2012, the Board of Directors established a
Review Committee to oversee the investigation by the management task force.
This report was based on the Review Committee's independent investigation and
analysis of the Chief Investment Office trading losses and its review of the JPM
Task Force Report. The Review Committee and its outside counsel examined
262. Id.
263. Id. at 10.
264. JPMorgan Chase & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 70,458, Accounting and
Auditing Enforcement Release No. 3490, Annex A, at 14 (ALJ Sept. 19, 2013) (order instituting cease-
and-desist proceedings), http://www.law.du.edu/documents/corporate-govemance/sec-and-
govemance/press-jp-morgan/JP-Morgan-Chase-Co-Exchange-Act-Release-No-70458-Release-No-3490-
2013-WL-5275772-Sept-29-2013.pdf [hereinafter Annex A].
265. Report of JPMorgan Chase & Co. Management Task Force Regarding 2012 CIO
Losses, JPMORGAN CHASE & CO. (Jan 16, 2013),
http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/ONE/2272984969x0x628656/4cb574a0-bf5-4728-9582-
625e4519b5ab/TaskForceReport.pdf [hereinafter JPM Task Force Report].
266. Report of the Review Committee of the Board of Directors of JPMorgan Chase &
Co. Relating to the Board's Oversight Function With Respect to Risk Management, JPMORGAN CHASE
& CO. (Jan. 15, 2013), http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/ONE/2272961119x0x628655/752f9610-
b815-428c-8b22-d35d936e2ed8/BoardReviewCommittee Report.pdf.
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records of the Board and its committees and other JPM internal records and
interviewed Board members and members of management.
I leave aside other information that subsequently emerged, including the
majority and minority staff reports of the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee
on Investigations released on March 15, 2013.267
i. VaR
JPM appears to have repeatedly suffered from what can be categorized as
true misunderstanding regarding its VaR, based on the detailed information
disclosed in the JPM Task Force Report. Prior to the end of January 2012, the
CIO used what was known within the firm as the "Basel I model" for
calculating VaR.268 But the VaR calculations that this Basel I model was
generating were considered too high. Efforts were made to develop a better
model throughout the fall of 2011. The result was a new model-what was
referred to internally as the "Basel 11.5 model"269-that was "thought to be a
substantial improvement that would more accurately capture the risks in the
portfolio.",
270
On January 30, JPM's "Model Review Group" authorized the use of the
Basel 11.5 model for purposes of calculating the VaR for the synthetic credit
portfolio beginning the previous trading day (January 27).271 Formal approval
of the model followed on February 1, and from February to April, the new VaR
model was in operation.
However, in early May 2012, because of losses in the synthetic credit
portfolio, reviews of the Basel 11.5 model were undertaken, and problems were
272
found. A decision was made to stop using the Basel 11.5 model and not to
rely on it for purposes of reporting the CIO VaR in JPM's first-quarter Form
10-Q. Following the decision to abandon the Basel 11.5 model, yet more
problems were found.
The JPM Task Force found that the process surrounding the approval and
implementation of the Basel 11.5 model was inadequate in several respects
273
directly related to the true misunderstanding issue. First, the resources
dedicated to the development of the model were "inadequate." 274 The
individual responsible for developing the model had not previously developed
267. STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 113TH CONG.,
JPMORGAN CHASE WHALE TRADES: A CASE HISTORY OF DERIVATIVES RISKS AND ABUSES (2013).
268. JPM Task Force Report, supra note 265, at 121, 126-27.
269. As opposed to the "Basel 2.5" revisions to the Basel II framework discussed in
Section III.A or the associated U.S. rule that came into effect on January 1, 2013.
270. JPM Task Force Report, supra note 265, at 79 n.98.
271. Id. at 126-27.
272. Id. at 128-29.
273. Id. at 104-105.
274. Id. at 104.
632
Vol. 31, 2014
Disclosure Universes and Modes of Information
or implemented a VaR model and was not given the support he needed and
requested to develop the model. Second, the Model Review Group's review of
the new model was not as rigorous as it should have been. For instance, it did
not compare the results under the existing Basel I model to the results under the
new Basel 11.5 model.
Cast in terms of Jamie Dimon's statements, the initial Basel I model,
flawed as it was, was "more adequate" than the one used for the April 13
earnings call.275
Apparently, while "more adequate," it ultimately proved not good enough.
According to JPM's Form 10-K for 2012, during the third quarter of 2012, JPM
applied a new VaR model for the synthetic credit portfolio, because it "more
appropriately captured the risks of the portfolio." 276 The information provided
as to this new model consisted of the following: "The new model uses data that
references actual underlying indices, rather than being constructed through
single name and index basis, which [JPM] believes is a more direct
representation of the risks that were in the portfolio." 277
ii. Overall Risk and Hedging Strategy
The JPM Task Force confirmed that the Chief Investment Office failed to
understand how to hedge the risks of the synthetic trading strategies.278 The
division also failed to understand the magnitude of potential losses.279 This
involved both true misunderstandings and functional misunderstandings.
As for true misunderstandings, the task force stated that "[t]he trading
strategies that were put in place in early 2012 were poorly conceived and
vetted."280 Moreover, neither the trading nor its impact on risk-weighted assets
"were fully understood by CIO management or the traders." Instead of
subjecting the trading strategies to rigorous analysis and questioning prior to
implementation, they "put in place the trading strategy without fully
understanding what risks were being taken on, particularly in light of the size of
the positions being built over the course of the first quarter of 2012.",281 The
trading strategies were "not fully understood" by CIO personnel "who might
have been in a position to manage the risks of the Synthetic Credit Portfolio
effectively." 282
As for functional misunderstandings, in early April-i.e., prior to
Dimon's April 13 "tempest in a teapot" characterization-the CIO delivered
"what in hindsight were overly optimistic and inaccurate analyses regarding the
275. JPM May 10 Conference Call, supra note 253, at 2.
276. JPM Annual Report, supra note 257, at 166.
277. Id.
278. JPM Task Force Report, supra note 265, at 83-84.
279. Id. at 89.
280. Id. at 85.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 84.
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potential losses to which the Synthetic Credit Portfolio was exposed." 283
Specifically, the CIO advised senior management that the synthetic credit
portfolio was "overall risk balanced," and for the second quarter, showed "a
P&L range of -150MM to +250MM," with a "significantly positive" upside
potential in the event of defaults.284 This profit-and-loss estimate turned out to
be significantly off-the-mark. The estimate was based on a "Monte Carlo"
analysis in which the person performing the analysis did not have confidence
and which appears to have been selected by his supervisor specifically because
it generated more positive profit-and-loss estimates.2 8 5
iii. The Siloing of Information
The siloing of information was a major source of JPM's
misunderstandings of the objective reality. JPM admitted that this contributed
to JPM's "incomplete understanding of deficiencies" relating to the valuation
problems occurring at the CIO.286 The pattern was pervasive, occurring among
employees below the senior management level, between employees and senior
management, and between senior management and committees of the Board of
Directors.
Concerning employees below the senior management level, JPM admitted
that:
JPMorgan Senior Management's emphasis on confidentiality and sharing
information on a need-to-know basis contributed to this incomplete
understanding. JPMorgan Senior Management was concerned about sensitive
information relating to CIO's positions being widely distributed and imposed
restrictions on the creation and sharing of work product relating to those
positions. These instructions affected the ability of those conducting the reviews
to share, learn from, and build upon each other's work.287
As for information sharing between employees and senior management,
JPM admitted that "a number of significant facts" learned in the course of
various internal reviews "were not . . . escalated to JPMorgan Senior
Management."288 This contributed to "JPMorgan's incomplete understanding of
deficiencies" related to the Chief Investment Office internal controls. 2 89
Perhaps most strikingly, there was even stove piping of information
between senior management and the two key committees of the Board of
Directors: the Risk Policy Committee and the Audit Committee. The Board has
283. Id. at 89-90.
284. Id. at 62.
285. Id. at 90.
286. Annex A, supra note 264.
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the responsibility of overseeing management in its performance of risk
management functions and, at JPM, "discharges those responsibilities in the
first instance by assigning primary responsibility to the Risk Policy
Committee." 290
The information communicated by management to the Risk Policy
Committee, at least until late April or early May 2012, "did not suggest any
significant problems in the CIO which required close attention from the
Committee." 291 At the Risk Policy Committee's meeting on March 20, the head
of the CIO presented a report. There was a one-page summary of various
metrics for the CIO's investments and activities as of March 6, 2012, including
a VaR calculation for the synthetic credit portfolio of $50.5 million. According
to the JPM Board Review Committee Report:
These metrics did not effectively convey the risks of the portfolio, and they were
not discussed at the meeting or explained in the written materials. This material
did not meaningfully convey information useful to the Committee and did not
flag the issues of increasing concern at CIO regarding the synthetic credit
portfolio. Indeed, the synthetic credit portfolio was not raised by either the CIO
CEO or CRO as a subject for discussion at the March 20, 2012 meeting.
292
Following the April 6, 2012 publication of the Wall Street Journal story,
the Risk Policy Committee asked that the subject be addressed at the next
meeting on April 17, 2012. The Chief Risk Officer of the CIO said that the
recent news reports were "based on an inaccurate market perception that the
portfolio was unhedged and that the risk was in fact balanced. No written
materials were provided. Subsequently, some members of the Risk Policy
Committee came under criticism for the lack of strong backgrounds in risk
management, especially a particular member who was president of the
American Museum of Natural History.294
The siloing of information extended to the Audit Committee of the Board
of Directors, the committee charged with overseeing JPM's internal controls, a
matter central to the integrity of the firm's financial reports. 295 For example, on
May 2, 2012, the Audit Committee met with some members of JPM senior
management with a focus on the mounting losses in the synthetic credit
296portfolio. There was no discussion of either of the two internal reviews
related to the traders' marks or the internal controls at the CIO, even though the
290. JPMORGAN CHASE & Co., REPORT OF THE REVIEW COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF
DIRECTORS OF JPMORGAN CHASE & Co. RELATING TO THE BOARD'S OVERSIGHT FUNCTION WITH
RESPECT TO RISK MANAGEMENT 1 (Jan. 15, 2013).
291. Id. at 1.
292. Id. at 7-8.
293. Id. at 8.
294. See, e.g., Susanne Craig & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, A Call for New Blood On the
JPMorgan Board, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2013, at Bl.
295. Annex A, supra note 264, at 13-15.
296. Id. at 14.
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work was underway. There was also no mention of the fact that an outside law
firm had been retained to advise on disclosures to be made in the first quarter
Form 10-Q related to the CIO. It was not until hours before the filing of JPM's
Form 10-Q on May 10 that JPM senior management informed the board that
reviews of what occurred in the CIO were underway, including reviews by
Internal Audit, legal, the Controller's staff, and risk management. And, even
then, JPM senior management did not discuss the details of or facts learned
from three internal reviews.
V. Pathways to Reform: The Multiplicity of Modes and Disclosure Universes
Recognition of the challenges and potential of multiplicity, in terms of
parallel disclosure universes and multiple modes of information, is at the core
of pathways to reform. The new bank disclosure system was created in material
part to address longstanding deficiencies in disclosures related to the risks
flowing from modern financial innovation. With creation of the new system,
the morphology of public information spans parallel universes with divergent
ends and means, involving regulators with vast differences in resources and
fields of expertise. In this context, the traditional, dominant, role of the SEC
has ended and an effort to harmonize the roles of the two sets of regulators is
now essential. Boundary-setting and a degree of "informational neutrality"
across the two systems can be helpful in this respect. But these steps are interim
in nature. Ultimately, the divergent regulatory quests and differences in
resources and fields of expertise make the new morphology unsustainable.
Both disclosure systems largely rely on the descriptive mode.
"Information" is conceived as, if not equated to, intermediary depictions. If
financial innovation has posed formidable challenges to this traditional
approach to information, technological innovation now allows for promising
new approaches. An informational portfolio diversification is in order, one
consisting of significant regulatory stakes not only in the descriptive mode, but
also in the transfer mode and the hybrid mode. All three modes of information
deserve full consideration in the portfolio: this kind of "informational
neutrality" across modes is needed.
This Part begins with the multiplicity of modes. Section V.A discusses
possible changes in the implementation of the descriptive mode, especially with
respect to the SEC. The discussion will be brief since many of the changes flow
directly from the characteristics of the two disclosure systems analyzed in Parts
II and III, and from the structural roadblocks present with the descriptive mode
analyzed in Section IV. Sections V.B and V.C set forth the transfer mode and
the hybrid mode, respectively, and discuss each mode's potential and
limitations. Section V.D suggests the need for portfolio diversification.
This Part then turns to the multiplicity of disclosure universes. Section
V.E begins by showing the unsustainability of the current morphology of public
information and proceeds to the need for harmonization of the two disclosure
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systems and the use of boundary-setting and a modest degree of "informational
neutrality" across disclosure systems as harmonization strategies.
A. Modes of Information: Changes in the Implementation of the Descriptive
Mode
Bank regulators, like the SEC, primarily use the descriptive mode: the
business entity observes and analyzes objective reality and, relying on
depiction tools, crafts a description on which market participants rely.
However, the bank regulators' implementation of the descriptive mode is far
more sophisticated than the SEC's, resulting in more useful quantitative risk-
related information to investors.
This difference in sophistication can be framed in terms of the two
structural roadblocks to the descriptive mode, those flowing from the depiction
tools and those flowing from "true" or "functional" misunderstandings on the
part of the intermediary.
In terms of depiction tools, one key step that the bank regulators took was
to require more standardization as to how intermediaries undertake the observe-
analyze-describe process. With tighter constraints on the depiction tools, the
risk numbers become more comparable across firms.
As to market risk, for example, the SEC's Market Risk Rule gives the
intermediaries wide latitude as to the VaR models they use and the VaR
numbers they report. 297 Each intermediary is free to use any model,
assumptions, or parameters it wishes so long as it describes them. The SEC also
provides little guidance on the confidence level at which VaR numbers are
reported. The SEC provides merely that the confidence level must be 95% or
higher, absent "economic justification." As we have seen with the JPMorgan
Chase credit derivatives example, the particular model chosen can have a huge
impact on the reported VaR number. And, as noted, JPMorgan Chase reports
VaRs at a 95% confidence level while Bank of America reports at a 99%
confidence level.
In contrast, under the U.S. Basel 2.5 Rule, all intermediaries must report
the VaR numbers at a 99% confidence level (and for a ten-business-day holding
period). Moreover, every intermediary's models must not only meet specified
quality standards (such as taking into account the "nonlinear" price
characteristics of options positions) but must also be approved by the regulator.
Another key step the bank regulators took related to depiction tools was to
rely on a far wider set of risk metrics. In terms of market risk, for example, the
only sophisticated risk metric the SEC refers to is VaR. With the bank
regulators, market risk is gauged not only by a VaR-based measure, but also by,
among other things, a stressed VaR-based measure.
297. See supra Subsection II.B.2.iii.
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VaRs focus only on risks in relatively normal circumstances. Stress test
results are far more useful in addressing what happens in extreme
circumstances. The bank regulators have highly specific requirements for the
semi-annual public disclosures not only of the results of company-run stress
tests, but also of fulsome information on the characteristics of such tests. None
of the SEC's risk-related provisions require any regular disclosure of any stress
test results.
Differences in the two systems as to how much deference the regulators
pay to the modeling judgments of the intermediary relate to the
"misunderstanding" roadblock. If the intermediary does not understand, or acts
as if it does not understand, the objective reality, any depictions it offers are
necessarily flawed.
Under the U.S. Basel 2.5 Rule, apart from needing to have their models
approved by regulators, banks must offer ample evidence as to the quality of
their models. The specifics of this appear to reflect bank regulators having
considered weaknesses in the modeling development, validation, and adoption
process associated with the JPMorgan Chase credit derivatives debacle. A bank
must disclose "backtesting" results: a quantitative comparison of VaR-based
estimates with actual gains or losses experienced, along with an analysis of
important outliers. Moreover, the bank is required to describe the approaches it
used for validating and evaluating the accuracy of internal models and
modeling processes. The SEC does not vet any VaR models nor does it require
any such comparisons or descriptions.
Bank regulators took similar pains to provide information to market
participants with respect to the quality of the company-run stress testing results.
As an example, when the company's methodology relies on projections
"[w]here judgment is an essential part," the company must describe the
rationale and magnitude of the judgment and the process it used to ensure the
consistency of the projections with the circumstances associated with the
severely adverse scenario.298
Such SEC implementation problems stem in part from its having been the
pioneer in requiring public disclosure of market risk in 1997. Staff at the
Federal Reserve had long been cognizant of certain problems with the SEC's
Market Risk Rule. In 2000, the staff conducted a case study of the usefulness of
that rule in connection with the trading activities at ten financial institutions
during the financial market turmoil in the third quarter of 1998. They reached
two basic conclusions: the disclosures about market risk vary considerably
among institutions, and there appeared to be little connection between the
degree of risk suggested by the reported VaRs and their actual trading account
298. Dodd-Frank Act Mid-Cycle Stress Tests 2013: Summary Instructions, BD. OF
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performance.299 The staff suggested that the case study findings seemed in line
with their interviews of a range of financial institutions, ratings agencies, and
clearinghouses.300
When the Federal Reserve's market risk rule was adopted, there was
industry recognition that new, useful data would be generated. On adoption of
the U.S. Basel 2.5 Rule, Standard & Poor's wrote that the more complete
disclosures under the new framework "may lead [it] to revise [its] capital and
earnings scores-which are part of [its] stand-alone credit assessments-for
banks, which could result in downgrades in some cases."30 1
The SEC implementation problems also stem from inaction. Major
changes in risk measurement science and practices have occurred since 1997,
when the SEC adopted its Market Risk Rule, and, of course, even more since
1976, when it adopted its Bank Industry Guide. Major modeling and associated
reporting failures have become manifest as well, not only at JPM's Chief
Investment Office specifically, but throughout the global financial crisis. These
changes and the lessons to be gleaned from such failures helped inform the new
bank regulator system. In December 2013, staff at the SEC briefly
acknowledged the need to review its risk-related disclosures and Bank Industry
Guide but offered little sense as to the timing, substance, or magnitude of any
such review.302 The staff said it "could revisit" the SEC's Market Risk Rule. 303
B. Modes of Information: The Potential and Limitations of the Transfer Mode
1. Overview
The descriptive mode involves a business entity observing, analyzing, and
crafting a description of the pertinent aspects of that objective reality. While
market participants will each interpret the entity's description in their own way,
that description-the entity's version of objective reality-is the informational
coin of the realm.
299. STUDY GRP. ON DISCLOSURE - FED. RESERVE SYS., IMPROVING PUBLIC
DISCLOSURE IN BANKING (STAFF STUDY 173) 12 (March 2000).
300. Id. at 12-13. Not all observers are as skeptical of the SEC's market risk disclosure
efforts as the Federal Reserve staff was. See, e.g., Philippe Jorion, How Informative Are Value-at-Risk
Disclosures?, 77 ACCT. REV. 911 (2002) (noting how the VaR disclosures are informative in predicting
the variability of trading revenues).
301. For U.S. Banks, It's Finally Time for the Full Basel Rules, STANDARD & POOR'S
(June 18, 2012, 11:53 AM),
http://www.standardandpoors.com/ratings/articles/en/us/?articleType=HTML&assetID=1245335889763
302. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, REPORT ON REvIEW OF DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS IN
REGULATION S-K As REQUIRED BY SECTION 108 OF THE JUMPSTART OUR BUSINESS STARTUPS ACT -
DECEMBER 2013, at 99, 103 [hereinafter DECEMBER2013 SEC STAFF REPORT].
303. Id. The SEC release adopting the market risk rule in 1997 had gone further, stating
flatly that the rule would be reconsidered in view of subsequent developments in risk measurement. See
supra Subsection II.B.2.iii.
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The usefulness of the entity's description depends on, among other things,
the entity correctly understanding objective reality and the entity having
depiction tools refined enough to describe that understanding effectively and
fully. As we have seen, neither of these conditions may necessarily hold in the
face of the complex realities created by financial innovation.
If financial innovation has created fundamental informational challenges,
technological innovation in the form of revolutionary advances in web- and
computer-related technologies may contribute to a solution. A new approach to
information is now possible: the "transfer mode."
As shown in Figure 2, the entity is no longer standing between the
objective reality and market participants and is not engaged in the observe-
analyze-describe process. Instead of having to rely on an intermediary
depiction, the market participant can now download pure information reflective
of objective reality, in its full terabyte richness. If market participants are
incentivized and sophisticated enough to do so, they can bring their own
analytical skills to bear on what may come close to a downloaded version of
objective reality.
With this transfer mode, descriptions by the business entity are absent
and, concomitantly, the limitations of the depiction tool and the impact of entity
misunderstandings go away as well. Second, the information that market
participants receive with the transfer mode, while less structured in form, can
be richer and more granular. Third, with the public availability of this "big
data," "crowdsourcing" and other forms of cooperative behavior might
sometimes result in the efficient generation of fresh insights about the bank's
objective reality.
Web- and computer-related technologies make possible the transmission,
storage, and analysis of detailed information mimetic of the objective reality.
Between 1996 and 2011, Internet backbone traffic jumped more than 2,000-
fold.30 McKinsey recently estimated that the new data stored by enterprises
exceeded 7 exabytes of data globally in 2010 and that new data stored by
consumers around the world that year exceeded an additional 6 exabytes.305
The total of 13 exabytes is equivalent to filling more than 60,000 Libraries of
Congress, and 15 of 17 industry sectors in the U.S. have more data stored per
company than the Library of Congress.306
Computer-related technologies can now process huge amounts of
quantitative and qualitative data, and "crowdsourcing" as a method of
collaborative analysis has become possible. Apple's iPhone 5s, introduced in
late 2013, has a chip 40 times faster than the chip in the original iPhone
304. Minnesota Internet Traffic Studies (MINTS), UNIV. OF MINN.,
http://www.dtc.umn.edu/mints/home.php (last visited May 20, 2014).
305. McKINSEY GLOBAL INSTITUTE, MCKINSEY & COMPANY, BIG DATA: THE NEXT
FRONTIER FOR INNOVATION, COMPETITION, AND PRODUCTIVITY 15 (June 2011).
306. Id. at 3.
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introduced six years earlier.307 With "big data" as raw material and powerful
computers and sophisticated algorithms as tools to process both numerical and
verbal information, market participants could potentially detect the subtleties of
a banking entity's risk characteristics. With this mix of big data and computer-
related and web-related developments, there might even exist the potential of
"crowdsourcing" on the part of market participants. 308
2. Theoretical Limitations and Real World Evidence of Potential
Although the transfer mode avoids the problems with depiction tools and
entity misunderstandings of the descriptive mode and can offer investors far
more granular information, there are clearly some limitations. First, the task of
observing and analyzing objective reality never goes away. It is transferred
from the business entity obligated to undertake this difficult task, which has the
necessary expertise, to market participants who have no such obligation, many
of whom have neither sufficient incentive nor expertise to do so. Second,
market participants will not be on a level playing field, except to the extent that
market prices reflect the more informed purchases and sales by the more
diligent. Third, the granularity of the information provided and the absence of
business entity intermediation with the transfer mode can create the potential
for the inadvertent disclosure of confidential or proprietary information.
While any use of the transfer mode must be sensitive to these concerns,
these problems should not be exaggerated. In particular, the foregoing
discussion assumes that market participants have to undertake the task of
observing and analyzing substantial portions of the objective reality. Being able
to undertake the far more modest task of merely detecting a few interesting
patterns may be good enough.
In this respect, there is evidence to suggest that, with computer-related
advances, the transfer mode has real potential in the financial regulatory
context. In effect, financial regulators have already started using computers to
observe and analyze pure information and have found interesting patterns.
There is no reason that market participants cannot engage in a similar exercise.
Some market participants are far better resourced and more incentivized.
Consider just a few examples of this approach at the SEC since 2010:
Examinations. The SEC does not have the budget to examine all
investment advisers. Relying on sophisticated data analytics, experts at the
SEC's "think-tank," the Division of Risk, Strategy, and Financial Innovation
(now called the Division of Economic and Risk Analysis) have worked with the
307. Sean Hollister, The Apple A 7: New iPhone 5S Processor is 64-Bit and 40 Times
Faster than Original iPhone, THE VERGE (Sept. 10, 2013, 1:36 PM),
http://www.theverge.com/2013/9/10/4714872/apple-a7-new-iphone-processor.
308. For an early overview of crowdsourcing, see, for example, Daren C. Brabham,
Crowdsourcing as a Model for Problem Solving, 14 CONVERGENCE 75 (2008).
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Office of Compliance, Inspections, and Examinations in the targeting of
inspections of investment advisers.309
Review of Corporate Filings. The same Division developed, and the SEC
is using, an innovative computerized tool that would automatically trigger
alerts concerning suspicious accounting at publicly traded companies. 310 The
algorithm (now denominated the "Accounting Quality Model") looks for such
factors as a high proportion of off-balance-sheet transactions, frequent changes
in auditor, and anomalous accrual patterns.
Enforcement. During fiscal year 2011, the SEC's completely revamped
system for handling the huge volume of tips, complaints, and referrals (TCR)
that the SEC receives became fully operational." This new, highly-
computerized system includes search and tracking capabilities and a
comprehensive workflow system and can be accessed by authorized personnel
across the SEC.
Market Integrity. Because of regulatory changes and technological
advances, there has been a tremendous growth in trading volume in securities
markets and in the dispersion of trading across multiple trading systems and
derivatives markets. This makes it extremely difficult for the SEC to rely on
traditional methods to investigate potential insider trading or manipulation and
disruptions like the May 6, 2010 "flash crash." In 2010, the SEC proposed a
highly computerized and very expensive ($4 billion) "Consolidated Audit
Trail" system to track transactions. This system was adopted in 2012.
MIDAS. In 2013, the SEC launched an internal database, known as the
Market Information Data Analytics System (MIDAS), with data on almost
every displayed order on national exchanges.312 The SEC also established a
public website so that investors and other market participants can have access
to such detailed transactions-level data from MIDAS. I would venture that
members of the public may find interesting patterns that the SEC itself does not
see. This would be especially so if the vaunted advantages of crowdsourcing
occur.
3. Examples
With certain very simple business entities, such as certain exchange-
traded funds (ETFs), a transfer mode is already in place with respect to their
309. Alexander Campbell, Profile: The Fin Man, RISK, Jan. 2011, at 132; cf Hearing
before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkt. & Govt. Sponsored Enter. ofH. Comm. on Fin. Serv., 112th Cong.
62 (2012) (statement of Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n) [hereinafter Schapiro,
April 2012 Testimony] (stating that Risk Fin "continue[s] to develop and implement robust analytical
models to identify regulated entities with high-risk profiles").
310. Adam Jones, SEC to Roll Out 'RoboCop' Against Fraud, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 13,
2013, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/O/f446a8bc-75c9-1 I e2-9891-00144feabdcO.html#axzz2yVHyD I C3.
311. Schapiro, April 2012 Testimony, supra note 309, at 54.
312. James Langton, SEC Launches Market Structure Website, INVESTMENT
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assets. For instance, shares in the SPDR Gold Trust were created to correlate
nearly 100 percent with the prices of gold bullion (less the Trust's expenses).
Listed on the New York Stock Exchange, and trading the same way that
ordinary stocks do, an investor can buy or sell such shares continuously
throughout the trading day, without the transaction costs associated with the
purchase, storage, and insurance of physical gold.
The Trust indicates with whom it stores its gold and in which city the
value is located. The Trust posts on its website a daily list of all of the gold bars
held. As of November 14, 2013, the 1,244-page list set out the information on
each of the 69,572 individual bars that the Trust held, including the bar number,
refiner, bar gross weight, bar fine weight, and bar assay.313
This is not a description of reality. This is information directly mimetic of
the objective reality of the gold sitting in the Trust custodian's vaults. This is
pure information.
With a business entity like a bank, relying on pure information of a similar
sort would be a far different exercise. First, using a similarly straightforward
approach to information with respect to the entire entity would be impractical
and unwise. A bank, especially a major money center bank, has an
extraordinary variety of assets (and liabilities) on its books. A highly
customized OTC derivative contract is very different from a simple commodity
like a bar of gold, and is not as easily listed. Moreover, there would be
substantial costs related to the disclosure of proprietary data, both in terms of
particular positions the banks may have and in terms of *the informational
foundation it could provide to rival banks regarding how the bank makes
market valuation, pricing, and hedging decisions. Moreover, it is unclear how
many investors would have either the resources or the incentives to actually
make use of the massive amounts of information provided.
Second, and more important, abandoning the descriptive mode would
leave investors bereft of the benefits of the bank's efforts to analyze and distill
objective reality and incorporate the resulting insights into the bank's
description. The management of banks have expertise about the financial world
in general, and their institutions in particular, and investors are counting on
that.
Rather than abandoning the descriptive mode, I envision supplementing it
with the transfer and hybrid modes. The hybrid mode is more likely to be
fruitful than the transfer mode in the major bank context.
However, I next offer two possible examples in which the transfer mode
could be usefully deployed. The first example relates to the SEC's requirements
for the public disclosure of "material contracts." The second example relates to
the massive amounts of entity- and transaction-level data routinely provided to
a full spectrum of governmental bodies. It should be emphasized that, in both
313. HSBC, Client Gold Stock Holdings,
http://www.spdrgoldshares.com/assets/dynamic/GLD/file/barlist/Barlist.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2013).
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examples, reducing uncertainties as to when information will be kept
confidential as an administrative matter or pursuant to pertinent FOIA
exemptions would be one of the steps necessary to realize the full informational
potential of the transfer mode.
i. "Material Contracts" in the SEC Universe
Throughout this Article, I have said that the SEC has largely relied on the
descriptive mode since its creation. There is an exception, one that had always
been a legal and administrative backwater. Therein lies an opportunity.
The SEC's Form 10-K (annual report) and Form 10-Q (quarterly report)
require that certain exhibits be filed with the SEC.314 A corresponding
requirement applies with respect to certain Securities Act registration
statements. Among the required exhibits are all of the company's "material
contracts."3M "Material contracts," as defined, include all contracts "not made
in the ordinary course of business" which are material to the company.317
If market participants were to have the contracts filed with the SEC
available to them, in strict technical terms, they would not merely be receiving
pure information-i.e., information mimetic of objective reality. They would
be receiving part of objective reality itself: the contracts to which the company
is bound constitute a core part of company's objective reality. By reading the
contracts themselves, market participants need not rely on any entity's
descriptions of the terms of the contracts.
This pure information can be extremely useful to market participants.
Assume, for instance, a bank is party to a set of important transactions
involving highly customized derivatives with complex contingent payoff
structures. If the contracts are material enough to be filed with the SEC and
confidentiality and proprietary concerns are not at issue, market participants
can read the contracts and try to map out those payoff structures. Mere
descriptions of the payoff structures would not yield this kind of information.
The gap between the description of the payoff structure of a complex
financial product and the objective reality of that structure can be huge. In the
asset-backed securities context, it has proven extremely difficult for investors
to map the descriptions of the cash flows offered by the issuer in prospectuses
to the cash flows that the investors would encounter over the life of the
investment. 318
314. Form 10-K, SEC 1673 (01-12), at Items 15(a)(3) and 15(b); Form 10-Q, SEC 1296
(01-12), at Item 6; Form 8-K, SEC 873 (01-12), at Items 1.01 and 9.01(d).
315. See, e.g., Form S-1, SEC 870 (02-08), at Item 16.
316. See Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.601 Exhibit Table (2014) (showing all the
Securities Act and Exchange Act forms requiring the submission of material contracts).
317. Id. § 229.601(b)(10).
318. See Hu, Too Complex to Depict?, supra note 18, at 1640-41 (showing the gaps
between the prospectus and both the governing contractual provisions and the computer program
actually directing the cash flows). There could also be other gaps, including gaps between the governing
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The informational value of material contracts is illustrated by a
controversy involving the rescue of AIG during the global financial crisis. As
will be discussed in Subsection V.E. 1, the stakes were so high that a dispute
over whether a particular contract should be fully disclosed triggered
Congressional hearings at which the Treasury Secretary and the prior Treasury
Secretary testified and pursuant to which the New York Fed turned over
250,000 pages of documents. This was followed by a scathing Congressional
report accusing the Federal Reserve of a cover-up.
There are at least two problems limiting the potential of this approach, one
mechanical and the other more fundamental. The mechanical problem is that
locating a specific exhibit can be extremely difficult for registrants and
investors alike. The changes to the filing procedures recommended by a 1996
SEC task force were not implemented.320 In December 2013, the SEC staff
acknowledged that "some exhibit filings can be difficult to locate on the
[SEC]'s EDGAR system" and stated its belief that it would be beneficial to
321
review how exhibits are made publicly available on the SEC's website.
The more fundamental problem relates to uncertainties as to the SEC's
disposition of confidential treatment requests. I will leave aside the
longstanding, familiar issues of ambiguity as to the statutory FOIA exemptions
themselves.
According to the SEC, corporations are sometimes concerned that by
filing material contracts, such sensitive information as "pricing terms, technical
specifications, and milestone payments" would "adversely affect the
company's business and financial condition." 322 To address this potential
hardship (as well as the hardship that would likewise flow from descriptions
involving sensitive information), the SEC has a system that allows companies
to request confidential treatment of information filed under the Securities Act
and the Exchange Act.
Specifically, Rule 406 under the Securities Act and Rule 24b-2 under the
Exchange Act set forth the exclusive means for obtaining confidential treatment
of information that would be exempt from disclosure under FOIA.323 Because
FOIA requires all federal agencies to make specified information available to
the public, the material contracts filed as exhibits would be available for all to
see absent a pertinent FOIA exemption. As discussed in Subsection III.C.1,
most applicants seeking confidential treatment from the SEC rely on the
contractual provisions and the computer program. Id. at 1636-42 (discussing alternate conceptions of the
pertinent reality and the ability to map the intermediary's depictions to actual cash flows).
319. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON DISCLOSURE
SIMPLIFICATION § VIII(D) (March 1996).
320. DECEMBER 2013 SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 302, at 102
321. Id..
322. Div. of Corp. Fin., Staff Legal Bulletin No. I (with Addendum), SEC. & EXCH.
COMM. 2 (Feb. 28, 1997; Addendum Included: July 11, 2001),
http://www.sec.gov/interps/legal/slbcflr.htm [hereinafter StaffLegal Bulletin].
323. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.406, 240.24b-2 (2014).
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exemption for "trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained
from a person and privileged or confidential," the "(b)(4)" exemption. 32 4
As noted in Subsection II.C. 1, information that is either "material" or,
even if not material, is required by an applicable SEC requirement, is not
generally appropriate for confidential treatment. In "Staff Legal Bulletin No.
1," the staff of the Division of Corporation Finance stated as follows:
[C]onfidential treatment is generally not appropriate for information that is
material to investors. Depending on the facts and circumstances, examples of
material information could include the name of a key supplier, material
contingency clauses, indemnification clause, anti-assignability clause, take-or-
pay clauses, and financial covenants in material financing or credit agreements.
Materiality must be analyzed in the context of the issuer's business, financial
condition and financial results. Where there is any question about the materiality
of the information, the application [for confidential treatment] must address the
issue and provide factual support for the issuer's belief that the information is
325not material to investors.
There appears to be real uncertainty as to how any particular confidential
treatment request will turn out. First, this "Staff Legal Bulletin No. 1" does not
carry the status of law. The bulletin itself states that it "is not a rule, regulation
or statement" of the SEC and that the SEC "has neither approved nor
disapproved its content." 326
Second, the guide does not have the specificity and tightness one would
normally encounter in a formal rule. The bulletin uses terms like "generally not
appropriate" and empty phrases like the need to consider "facts and
circumstances" and the "issuer's business, financial condition and financial
results." 327
In 2010, the Director of the SEC's Division of Corporation Finance
characterized the bulletin as "not represent[ing] the substantive requirements"
that a corporation must meet in order to request confidential treatment, but
rejected a new rulemaking initiative.328 The bulletin was helpful as "public
guidance" that would "assist the public in understanding how the staff
interprets the Freedom of Information Act and [SEC] rules that apply to a
request for confidential treatment." 329
Guidance could flow from dissecting actual SEC confidential treatment
decisions. However, at least as of 2010, this would not have been an especially
fruitful exercise. According to a study by the SEC's Office of Inspector
324. StaffLegal Bulletin, supra note 322, at § II.A.
325. Id. at § II.B.
326. Id. at "Supplementary Information."
327. Id.
328. See Office of Inspector Gen., Assessment of Corporation Finance's Confidential
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General, over 90% of confidential treatment requests were not subject to a
thorough review and examination for compliance with all aspects of the
confidential treatment request rules.330 The majority of confidential treatment
requests received were seeking redactions of provisions of material contracts.33 1
A clearer and more definitive SEC position on the confidential treatment
of material contracts, along with vigorous and careful enforcement of the
position, are needed. This would be worthwhile even absent any statutory
changes to clarify existing FOIA exemptions. Depending on the particulars of
the position, material contracts can provide valuable information to market
participants without perceptible harm to the banks.
ii. Entity- and Transactions-Level Data Provided or Available to
Governmental Bodies
Massive amounts of data relating to banks and individual financial
transactions are available to a spectrum of governmental bodies. In particular,
bank regulators and the newly-created Financial Stability Oversight Council
routinely receive or have access to massive amounts of information from bank
holding companies. At the financial transactions level, the SEC is deploying
sophisticated computer-based approaches to identify anomalous patterns from
mounds of "pure information" on securities trades.332 And a new generation of
"pure information" directly pertinent to derivatives, including credit
derivatives, is soon to become available. The Dodd-Frank Act now mandates
that the vast bulk of OTC derivatives transactions become subject to
clearinghouse arrangements and provides that the SEC and the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) are to oversee such arrangements.
On the one hand, many of the reports provided by the bank holding
companies have pure information that could potentially be helpful to market
participants in assessing the companies' risk characteristics. Similarly, pure
information in the form of transactions-level data, especially in relation to
derivatives, could be helpful to market participants in assessing the trading-
related risk profiles of banks. On the other hand, much of the pure information
may be confidential, proprietary, or otherwise not appropriate for public
disclosure.
Existing uncertainties as to when such pure information would be
available to the public make difficult the full deployment of a transfer mode
strategy in these contexts. Clarification of ambiguities flowing from
administrative procedures and the underlying FOIA statutory exemptions could
be helpful both to those seeking pure information as well as to banks seeking to
keep information confidential for legitimate reasons.
330. Id.
331. Id. at 7.
332. See Subsection V.B.2.
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Consider, for instance, administrative issues pertaining to the reports
provided by bank holding companies to the Federal Reserve. The Federal
Reserve set out a listing of 20 periodic reports that bank holding companies
may have to file. 333 The forms vary widely in terms of their designated
availability to investors and other market participants. Some are confidential,
some are public, some are public upon request, some are partially confidential,
and some are public but subject to confidential treatment requests. 334
The contours of what is publicly available can be unclear even when
considered in the context of any single report. Consider, for instance, the
confidentiality notice set out in the instructions for preparation of Form FR Y-
9C, Consolidated Financial Statements for Holding Companies.3 35  The
instructions state that the completed version of the report "generally is available
to the public" upon request, with specified exceptions.336 However, the bank
holding company may request confidential treatment for the form if it is of the
opinion that disclosure of specific commercial or financial information in the
report "would likely result in substantial harm to its competitive position" or
would result in "unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." 337 Even a Federal
Reserve determination that certain information is confidential does not put the
matter to rest. The Federal Reserve may subsequently decide to release the
333. See Bank Holding Company (BHC) Financial and Structure Reports, FED. RES.
BANK SERVICES,
https://www.frbservices.org/files/reporting/pdf/bhc-financialandstructure reports.pdf (last visited
Feb. 18, 2014).
334. The instruction forms for the each of the 20 reports contained in the listing as well
as for two additional reports (FR Y-15 and FR Y-20) are available at:
FR Y-8: http://www.federalreserve.gov/reportforms/forms/FR Y-820130331_i.pdf
FR Y-9C: http://www.federalreserve.gov/reportforms/forms/FR Y-9C20130630 i.pdf
FR Y-9LP: http://www.federalreserve.gov/reportforms/forms/FR Y-9LP20130630-i.pdf
FR Y-9SP: http://www.federalreserve.gov/reportforms/forms/FRY-9SP20130630_i.pdf
FR Y-9ES: http://www.federalreserve.gov/reportforms/forms/FRY-9ES20121231 i.pdf
FR Y-i1: http://www.federalreserve.gov/reportforms/forms/FRY-1 1--FRY-1 lS20130630 i.pdf
FR Y-1 Is: http://www.federalreserve.gov/reportforms/forms/FRY-l 1--FRY-1 1S20130630 i.pdf
FR Y-12: http://www.federalreserve.gov/reportforms/forms/FRY-1220130331 i.pdf




FR Y-6: http://www.federalreserve.gov/reportforms/forms/FRY-62012123 1i.pdf
FR Y-10: http://www.federalreserve.gov/reportforms/forms/FR Y-1020121201 i.pdf
FFIEC 101: http://www.ffiec.gov/pdf/FFIECforms/FFIEC101 201306_i.pdf
FFIEC 009: http://www.ffiec.gov/PDF/FFIEC_forms/FFIEC09 201103_i.pdf
FFIEC 009a: http://www.ffiec.gov/pdf/FFIECforms/FFIEC009a200906 i.pdf
FR Y-15: http://www.federalreserve.gov/reportforms/forms/FRY-1520121231_i.pdf
FR Y-20: http://www.federalreserve.gov/reportforms/forms/FRY-2020050630 i.pdf
335. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., INSTRUCTIONS FOR PREPARATION
OF CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR HOLDING COMPANIES: REPORTING FORM FR Y-9C, at
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information if the Board of Governors determines that the disclosure "is in the
public interest." 338
The Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) has access to
substantially more information than the Federal Reserve does. Created under
the Dodd-Frank Act, FSOC's mission is to identify risks to financial stability
from the activities of bank holding companies, promoting market discipline,
and responding to emerging threats to stability.339 Member agencies include the
Federal Reserve and other bank regulators (the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency), the SEC and
the CFTC, and the Treasury Department.340
FSOC's current listing of data collected solely from FSOC agencies
consists of over 300 different forms and, using what appears to be 3-point font,
runs 21 pages.34' In addition, FSOC is authorized to gather information not
only from all of its member agencies but also from other federal and state
financial regulators 342
The Office of Financial Research (OFR), also created pursuant to the
Dodd-Frank Act, has a mandate to assess risks to financial stability and to
monitor, investigate, and report to FSOC and Congress on changes to those
risks. 343 In its most recent annual report, it stated its data goals as follows:
Comprehensive, timely, and granular data are essential to the Office's ability to
conduct the financial stability monitoring, analysis, and research described in
this report. To ensure sufficient data are available, the Office pursues its agenda
through the following process: (1) identify the data needed for financial stability
analysis; (2) analyze existing and available data, and determine gaps, and (3)
identify the cause of the Aps, prioritize the needs and feasibility of collecting
the data, and fill the gaps.
In other words, the basic thrust seems to be that OFR is interested in all
data that could affect financial stability. The OFR has direct authority to seek
this information from financial institutions.345 It is not entirely clear which
economic or financial data are not subject to OFR analysis.
338. Id.
339. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. I1l-
203, § lll(a), § I12(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1903-04 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
U.S.C. (2006 & Supp. IV 2011)).
340. Id. at § 111(b)(1).
341. Office of Fin. Research, Inventory of Collected Data from FSOC Agencies, U.S.
DEP'T OF TREASURY (current as of January 13, 2014), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/ofr/data/Pages/InteragencyDatalnventory.aspx.
342. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 112(a)(2)(A).





345. Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act §1 12(d)(1).
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With OFR, as with the SEC and the Federal Reserve, there are serious
ambiguity and predictability issues as to which data, including data provided by
banks, can be kept confidential and which must be made publicly available.
These issues flow in part from the specific statutory language in the Dodd-
Frank Act governing the confidentiality of information at the OFR as well as
the overarching problems associated with FOIA exemptions.346 The lack of
predictability stems as well from policy decisions: FSOC's release adopting
rules implementing FOIA states that:
Even though a FOIA exemption set forth in 5 U.S.C. 552(b) may apply to the
record requested, [FSOC] may, if not precluded by law, elect under the
circumstances of that request not to apply the exemption. The fact that an
exemption is not applied by the [FSOC] in response to a particular request shall
have no precedential significance in processing other requests. This policy does
not create any right enforceable in court.347
In short, massive amounts of pure information at both the bank level and
at the transaction level are now potentially available to market participants. The
realization of the full promise of the transfer mode, while fully insulating
information that should not be publicly disclosed, depends on a systematic
reconsideration of existing administrative practices and the underlying statutory
regime.
C. Modes ofInformation: The Potential and Limitations of the Hybrid Mode
1. Overview
The "hybrid mode" draws on elements of both the descriptive mode and
the transfer mode. With the hybrid mode, in contrast to the descriptive mode
but like the transfer mode, the business entity does not author a description of
objective reality for which the entity is responsible. In contrast to the transfer
mode but like the descriptive mode, there is no transmittal of pure information
to market participants. The product of the hybrid mode might be termed
"moderately pure" information.
Figure 3 illustrates one example involving the hybrid mode. Here, we can
re-characterize the essence of Figure 3 in a way that is more general than in
Section I.B. Market participants are offered the quantitative results flowing
from the application of a completely mechanical, fully-observable, set of rules
prescribed by a regulator or other outside body for the "processing" of
346. As to these OFR-related issues, see generally Annette L. Nazareth & Margaret E.
Tahyar, Transparency and Confidentiality in the Post Financial Crisis World: Where to Strike the
Balance?, 1 HARv. Bus. L. REv. 146 (2011).
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objective reality. This set of rules-this "machine"-is solely the responsibility
of the outside body. The business entity is not involved in the design of the
machine and thus not responsible for the efficacy of the machine. The business
entity's involvement is essentially limited to the data corresponding to
objective reality that needs to be input into the machine. Because the machine
is entirely mechanical and all its components are publicly observable, market
participants can, if they wish, attempt to "reverse engineer" the output to reach
what are at least muffled versions of objective reality.
No descriptions are involved. Thus, the true and functional
misunderstandings of objective reality on the part of the business entity cannot
taint the information reaching the market participants. And this example of the
hybrid mode is less demanding of resources and expertise on the part of market
participants than the transfer mode. The machine produces numbers that, if the
machine is to be believed, capture some pertinent aspects of the objective
reality in easily digestible form. Moreover, the confidential and proprietary
information concerns omnipresent with the transfer mode are reduced. The
primary limitations of this example of the hybrid mode flow from the efficacy
of the machines themselves. The regulator or other outside body must design
machines that generate information about objective reality that is accurate
enough for market participants to rely on.
2. Examples and New Developments
In Too Complex to Depict?, I discussed two examples of the approach to
information that I am calling the "hybrid mode" in this Article. The first
example involves generating moderately pure information about a bank's assets
and exposures that would not otherwise be publicly available. This would, at
least indirectly, help investors protect themselves from possible problems with
a bank's models. The second example involves generating moderately pure
information about the characteristics and quality of the models a bank uses-
without the bank having even to describe these models, much less share them
with investors.
The core concepts underlying the two examples are mirror images of each
other. The first example involves using a single set of models industry-wide for
the particular assets of each bank. This I called the "common bank models"
approach. The second example involves using a single set of hypothetical assets
industry-wide to serve as the inputs for the specific models actually used by
each bank. This I called the "common bank assets" approach.348
348. As noted in Too Complex to Depict?, in a Financial Times op-ed published a few
months earlier, Vikram Pandit, then the CEO of Citicorp, advanced the idea of a "benchmark portfolio"
for the purpose of helping the public better compare the capital ratios reported by banks, as
distinguished from better informing the public on the nature of the bank's models. See Hu, Too Complex
to Depict?, supra note 18, at 1664; Vikram Pandit, Apples v Apples-A New Way to Measure Risk, FIN.
TIMEs, Jan. 10, 2012, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/90bb724a-3afc-l lel-b7ba-
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I will here offer a very brief outline both of these examples, adding some
new developments, and refer the reader to the discussion in the 2012 work.349
The common bank models approach is intended to lead to moderately pure
information about banks' assets and risk exposure. It involves modifying
existing government programs. As discussed in Subsection III.C.2, one aspect
of the Federal Reserve's CCAR program has been bank supervisory stress tests.
With bank supervisory stress tests, the models to be used are largely developed
and used by the Federal Reserve, not the individual banks. Highly granular
information provided by the bank on its specific trading and derivatives
positions, private equity holdings, and so on is put into the Federal Reserve's
models. The Federal Reserve's models would then estimate how that bank
would fare under each stress test scenario and confirm whether the bank meets
various regulatory minimum capital levels.
The public sees the capital adequacy results flowing from the Federal
Reserve's models, but does not see the models themselves. The Federal
Reserve was concerned that giving access to the models would allow banks to
game the system and perhaps deter banks from developing their own models.
This is moderately pure information. The investor gets a sense about the
objective reality without a bank-generated description and thus receives
information that is free of bank misunderstandings of objective reality. And it is
not fully pure information either: the investor receives a models-based
representation of objective reality, but that representation is based on the
Federal Reserve's models, not the bank's. The investor is subject to the
possibility of mistakes on the part of the Federal Reserve. 350
I suggested that the usefulness of this moderately pure information could
be improved by, among other things, providing the Federal Reserve's models to
investors and that both the benefits and costs of this should be carefully
studied.351 First, with the Federal Reserve models in hand, the investor is in a
better position to assess the reliability of the Federal Reserve-generated
description. If the investor disagrees with the models, he can either discount the
results or try tweaking the Federal Reserve's models. Second, with the models
in hand, the investor may be in a position to "reverse engineer" the loss results
into at least muffled versions of the highly granular data the bank provided as
inputs to the Federal Reserve.
Two promising developments related to the common bank models
approach have occurred subsequent to the publication of Too Complex to
Depict? First, the Federal Reserve now appears to be willing to be somewhat
00144feabdcO.html#axzzlrqPDOaPg. Irrespective of purpose, the common bank assets approach and the
benchmark portfolio idea both contemplate the use of a single hypothetical set of assets.
349. See Hu, Too Complex to Depict?, supra note 18, at 1658-63 (common bank
models approach), 1663-65 (common bank assets approach).
350. Such mistakes have occurred. See id. at 1661 (describing errors in the 2012 stress
tests for Citigroup).
351. Id. at 1661-63.
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more open about its models. In the October 2012 adopting release for the
Dodd-Frank Act's stress tests, the Federal Reserve noted that it had received
numerous comments requesting greater clarity about its models. The Federal
Reserve stated that it "is currently considering how to provide more
transparency . . . while not reducing incentives on the part of Covered
Companies to develop better internal stress test models . . . and to consider the
results of such models in their capital planning process." 352 In addition, "[a]t a
minimum, the [Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve] plans to publish an
overview of its stress testing methodologies each year."353 As of November 1,
2013, when the Federal Reserve issued the summary instructions for the CCAR
2014, there was indication that that the Federal Reserve would be releasing the
models themselves. 354
Second, results from company-run stress tests must now be publicly
disclosed by major financial institutions. As discussed in Subsection III.C.2,
such disclosures must be accompanied by information on the models used by
the company to generate these numbers. Market participants can now compare
the results of company-run stress tests under a bank-specified "severely
adverse" scenario with the results from supervisory stress tests in a Federal
Reserve-specified "severely adverse" scenario. Comparisons of the two sets of
numbers in broadly similar hypothetical scenarios could allow sophisticated
market participants to make inferences as to the true characteristics of each
bank's assets. Of course, here too, full disclosure of the Federal Reserve's
models would be helpful to market participants in their analysis.
The common bank assets approach leads to hybrid information regarding
the bank's risk models. Every bank is mandated to assume a single hypothetical
portfolio of assets. Each bank, however, applies the actual models it uses to that
common portfolio, and generates VaR calculations and stress test numbers.
Each bank would thereby be giving a sense of how their models behave in a
variety of contexts. The regular reporting of such VaR and stress test numbers
should help investors assess the quality of the bank's models. Moreover, cross-
bank comparisons of bank models are possible: the VaR and stress test numbers
generated will differ from bank to bank, and such differences would allow for
inferences about each bank's models. Behaviorally, this may create some
incentives for banks to converge in terms of modeling since having an "outlier"
model may attract market participant skepticism. On the other hand, incentives
can run the other way as well: having "outlier" models may signal to some
market participants that the bank is ahead of the curve in modeling,
This is moderately pure information. The bank is not giving a description
in the normal sense. That is, with the common bank assets approach, the
numbers generated will not gauge the true exposure of the bank: after all, the
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. See FED. RESERVE BD., COMPREHENSIVE CAPITAL ANALYSIS AND REV. 2014:
SUMMARY INSTRUCTIONS AND GUIDANCE (2013).
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benchmark portfolio is completely hypothetical. However, the numbers will
give investors insights into the bank's models, something that may allow them
to detect the effects of true and functional misunderstandings of the
institution's descriptions.
In terms of new developments, perhaps the most interesting is the fact that
international bank regulators have engaged in an exercise to determine how
variable numbers generated by various models and stress tests would be with a
common portfolio of assets. A total of 15 internationally active banks with
significant trading assets were asked to use a hypothetical test portfolio to see
the level of variability of risk-weighted assets based on the market risk
framework. The regulators found that the test portfolio exercise "provided clear
evidence that differences in modeling choices can be very important drivers of
variability across banks."355
D. Modes of Information: Portfolio Diversification and "Informational
Neutrality" Across Modes
Each of the three modes of information, which together help define a
spectrum of possible types of information, has virtues and faults. But the
virtues and faults of each mode are different. This lack of "correlation" among
the three modes calls to mind the advantages of portfolio diversification in
making investments.356 I believe that the path forward lies in an eclectic,
comprehensive conception of "information," one that involves the triangulation
of objective reality based on a diversified portfolio of informational sources
using all three modes and thereby taking advantage of the full spectrum.
Thus far regulators have largely staked their public disclosure
requirements in the descriptive mode. This is so especially at the SEC, where
the intermediary depictions play a near-exclusive role in conveying information
to market participants. Bank regulators have, in effect, a somewhat more
diversified portfolio. The Federal Reserve's efforts with respect to stress tests,
both supervisory and company-run, allow market participants to obtain what
comes within the ballpark of the moderately pure information generated by a
common bank models approach. The Federal Reserve's efforts with respect to
market risk, if broadly conceived, arguably come within the ballpark of
moderately pure information as well. That is, the necessity of regulator
approval of models a bank uses, the detailed specification of the types of
market risk metrics that a company must provide, and tight constraints on how
those metrics are calculated all impose a high degree of commonality as to
bank modeling and reporting. Moreover, through studying the impact of models
355. Regulatory Consistency Assessment Programme (RCAP): Analysis of Risk-
Weighted Assets for Market Risk, BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION 10 (Jan. 2013, rev. Feb
2013), https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs240.pdf.
356. See, e.g, RICHARD A. BREALEY, STEWART C. MYERS & FRANKLIN ALLEN,
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 168-70 (10th ed. 2011) (discussing how portfolio diversification
reduces risk in securities investment context).
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on hypothetical assets, bank regulators appear to be nibbling at the edges of a
common bank assets approach.
There needs to be a studied effort to adopt properly diversified portfolio of
modes of information and to address roadblocks. This Article has suggested
that the transfer mode holds genuine promise in meeting the informational
challenges posed by major banks. As we have seen, bank regulators, the SEC,
FSOC, OFR and other governmental bodies collectively have ready access to
stunning amounts of pure information related to banks on a regular basis. It is
essential that the full potential of pure information be realized from the
standpoint of market participants, while ensuring that banks can count on their
confidential or proprietary information being kept from public view.
Ambiguities in the pertinent statutes, including the FOIA exemptions and
the Dodd-Frank provisions relating to confidentiality of information at OFR,
constitute one major roadblock. But the prospects for statutory changes are
dim, at least in the short term.
Another roadblock, more immediately surmountable, is on the
administrative side. All three modes of information deserve equal consideration
for the informational portfolio, even if regulators continue to invest most
heavily in the descriptive mode. "Informational neutrality" across modes of
information in this sense of equal consideration is needed.
Currently, this type of modal informational neutrality is far from a reality.
In the context of public disclosure, the transfer mode appears to have been an
administrative backwater. The SEC's "Staff Legal Bulletin" as to confidential
treatment requests, a critical element to understanding access to transfer mode
information (such as material contracts), has no legal effect and departs from
the specificity and definitiveness that would be seen in a formal rule.357 It
would be difficult to imagine that a similarly critical element to understanding
what would be required in SEC intermediary depictions would be handled in
the same informal way. On the Federal Reserve side, the contrast could not be
more dramatic between the specificity of descriptive mode in its market risk
and stress testing public disclosure rules and, for instance, the unpredictability
flowing from the statements relating to public access set out in the instructions
of Form Y-9C.358
E. Parallel Universes
1. Unsustainability: Duplication and the Impact of Conflicting Regulatory
Ends
Two sets of regulators with widely divergent ends now explicitly have full
authority over the same informational territory as a formal matter. As a
357. See supra Subsection V.B.3.i.
358. See supra Subsection V.B.3.ii.
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practical matter, they are each exercising that authority. Both disclosure
systems cover, for instance, the quantitative aspects of market risk: the SEC's
Market Risk Rule and the U.S. Basel 2.5 Rule. The bank regulator universe
addresses bank performance during times of stressed financial conditions
directly through public disclosure requirements for company-run stress tests,
while the SEC universe arguably addresses the issue in a more diffuse,
qualitative way through MD&A requirements.
When bank regulators put into effect the public disclosure requirements
associated with the Basel III capital rules and the new Basel liquidity mandates,
the bank regulator universe will cover market risk, performance under stressed
conditions, credit risk, and liquidity risk-i.e., all the major risks that banks
face. The SEC's MD&A already covers all these matters as well, albeit
indirectly and with a more qualitative focus. But the MD&A is increasingly
being used to mandate the disclosure of quantitative information. Also, the
extraordinary resource demands associated with implementing the Dodd-Frank
Act have diminished. SEC staff has recently indicated that there is a possibility
that it would revisit the Bank Industry Guide, the Market Risk Rule, and risk-
related disclosures generally. 359
One immediate question is whether this duality is sustainable. Conflicts
between the two universes are least likely where their disclosure requirements
are complementary. Thus, if an SEC requirement as to a particular topic
mandates qualitative information while the bank regulator mandates
quantitative information, different niches are involved. The SEC's key risk-
related requirement, the MD&A, has traditionally had a qualitative focus. The
bank regulator disclosure requirements have tended to have a quantitative
focus. As a result, roughly speaking, the two universes occupy different niches.
Where, however, both universes cover the same topic and require the
same type of information (e.g. qualitative or quantitative), the analysis is
different. Consider, for instance, the fact that both the SEC Market Risk Rule
and the U.S. Basel 2.5 Rule require VaR-related reporting. The bank regulator
version requires far more VaR and related market risk information than does
the SEC version. This is not a conflict: the bank regulator universe in effect
"wins" because banks will provide the more complete public disclosure the
bank regulator universe requires. Indeed, as a general matter, if both universes
are in a single niche, whichever universe requires more complete disclosure
will seemingly always "win" -absent pressure to back off from the "losing"
universe.
The bank would be the loser: presenting information of the same type on
the same subject matter under two alternate regimes will be costly, and may not
necessarily provide any value to market participants. Indeed, this consideration
helped cause the SEC to begin the "integration" of the Securities Act and the
359. DECEMBER 2013 SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 302, at 99, 103.
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Exchange Act disclosure systems in 1977, when it adopted Regulation S-K as a
single standard set of instructions for disclosure.360
But this single niche discussion assumes that the regulatory ends of both
universes are congruent. If they are not, even greater conflicts between
regulators may arise. Assume that the SEC decides to promulgate a general rule
that all business entities must disclose "X" in order to protect investors and
promote market efficiency, but the Federal Reserve believes that for major
banks to do so would jeopardize both the stability of individual banks and the
overall financial system.
The existing public disclosure rules of the two systems reflect this
possible conflict. As discussed in Subsection II.C.1, the general quantum of
information required in the SEC system differs materially from that required in
the bank regulator system. That is, "materiality" in the SEC system is focused
more on the needs of investors and market efficiency than is the case in the
bank regulator system. The way in which confidential treatment requests are
handled by bank regulators also reflects more deference to the interests of
banks.361
There are at least two incidents that suggest that the conflicts between the
parallel universes could actually occur. First, the Federal Reserve has already
leaned on the SEC to take actions that are inconsistent with the SEC's interests
in market efficiency and more consistent with the Federal Reserve's interests in
financial stability. On September 18, 2008, at the height of the global financial
crisis, the SEC issued an emergency order banning all short sales in the
securities of "financial" firms. 362 This was extraordinary: the last time short
selling was banned in the United States was in 1931-before the SEC was even
created. And it was inconsistent with both the SEC's modem trend of relaxing
short-selling limitations and its longstanding belief that markets should
generally be left to set prices. Shortly before he left the SEC, then-Chairman
Christopher Cox said that the ban was the "biggest mistake" of his tenure. He
stated that he had been under intense pressure from Federal Reserve Chairman
Ben Bernanke and Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson to take this action, and did
so only reluctantly. 363
Second, prior to the emergence of the bank regulator system, an important
incident involving the impact of conflicting regulatory ends on public
disclosure occurred in November 2008, about two months after the Federal
Reserve bailed out AIG at the height of the global financial crisis. Because the
incident is directly concerned with public disclosure and because it also
360. See COFFEE & SALE, supra note 51, at 140.
361. See Subsection III.CI.
362. See Hu, EMH and the Law, supra note 1, at 205; Hu, Too Complex to Depict?,
supra note 18, at 1688-1701.
363. Anit R. Paley & David S. Hilzenrath, SEC Chair Defends His Restraint During
Financial Crisis, WASH. POST, Dec. 24, 2008, at A4.
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happens to illustrate the potential value of the transfer mode, the discussion of
this example will be more detailed.
On November 28, 2008, AIG entered into a contract involving Maiden
Lane III (ML3) (an entity created and majority-owned by the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York) and was required to file this contract in a Form 8-K with
the SEC within four business days.364 AIG sent a draft version of the Form 8-K
to the New York Fed's counsel, including as exhibits copies of agreements that
it signed with the New York Fed and ML3. 3 The agreement between AIG and
ML3 was particularly sensitive because "Schedule A" to the agreement
disclosed, among other things, the names of all of AIG's counterparties and the
prices at which ML3 was purchasing assets-what the House Oversight
Committee characterized as a "backdoor" bailout of AIG's counterparties. In
the Form 8-K that AIG actually filed on December 2 (as well as one filed on
December 24), the contracts were included as exhibits, but Schedule A was
omitted.16 1
At the end of 2008, the SEC wrote to the CEO of AIG saying that AIG
needed to provide Schedule A for the key agreement in its December 2 and 24
filings, stating, "You are required to file the entire agreement, including all
exhibits, schedules, appendices and any document which is incorporated in the
agreement." On January 14, 2009, AIG submitted Schedule A but redacted
the table listing the names of banks and other bank-specific information. At the
369same time, AIG sought confidential treatment for the redacted portions.
AIG apparently used the word "redacted" more than 1,000 times in its
regulatory filings.370 Pressure built in Congress for the release of the names of
the AIG counterparties. On January 19, the New York Fed, in its "Statement
Regarding Public Disclosures of AIG Concerning Maiden Lane III LLC,"
stated that it was that day providing to the House Oversight Committee over
250,000 pages of documents that relate to, among other things, ML3 and the
public disclosures made by AIG in December 2008. 37 On January 27, the
House Oversight Committee held a hearing regarding the bailout of AIG at
364. The Federal Bailout of AIG: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and
Gov't Reform, 111th Cong. (2010), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-1 I lhhrg63136/html/CHRG-
11 hhrg63136.htm (statement of Thomas C. Baxter, Jr., Executive Vice President and General Counsel,
Fed. Reserve Bank of New York) [hereinafter Baxter Testimony].
365. STAFF OF H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND GOV'T REFORM, II lITH CONG., PUBLIC
DISCLOSURE AS A LAST RESORT: How THE FEDERAL RESERVE FOUGHT TO COVER UP THE DETAILS OF
THE AIG COUNTERPARTIES BAILOUT FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, 5-6 (Jan. 25, 2010) [hereinafter
HOUSE OVERSIGHT REPORT]
366. Id. at 3, 6.
367. Michael J. Moore, AIG, New York Fed Pay Banks in Full, Limit Disclosure:




369. HOUSE OVERSIGHT REPORT, supra note 365, at 7.
370. Moore, Timeline, supra note 367.
371. Baxter Testimony, supra note 364.
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which, among others, Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, former Treasury
Secretary Henry Paulson, and Thomas Baxter, the General Counsel of the New
372York Fed, testified. In his testimony, Baxter denied that the New York Fed
sought to prevent AIG from disclosing certain information, but stated that
information such as the identities of AIG counterparties would have had the
"effect of harming the taxpayer's investment in AIG by reducing the public's
interest in doing business with AIG."
On March 16, 2009, AIG amended its December 2 and December 24,
2008, 8-K filings to include a list of derivative transactions counterparties but
redacted other information. Each of the Schedule A documents included the
word "redacted" more than 800 times, and AIG filed an amended confidential
treatment request.374 In May of 2009, the SEC granted AIG's amended
treatment request.
On January 25, 2010, the House Oversight Committee issued a highly
granular report whose title reflects its claims: Public Disclosure As a Last
Resort: How the Federal Reserve Fought to Cover Up the Details of the AIG
376
Counterparties Bailout From the American People.
I need not, and do not, take a position on the validity of the House
Oversight Committee's claims as to what the Federal Reserve did or did not do
to influence AIG with respect to its Form 8-K filings. And I certainly do not
criticize the SEC in any way with respect to its key December 2008 decision to
refuse to accept AIG's omission of the Schedule A.
Two points about this AIG disclosure controversy can be made within
these constraints. First, material contracts-a key example of "pure
information" already possible in the SEC universe-can be important sources
of clean and rich data.
Second, the divergent regulatory ends of the SEC and the Federal Reserve
appear to explain their contrasting views on confidentiality. The SEC's
December action insisting that AIG provide the Schedule A unless a
confidential treatment request was submitted and approved reflects its
disclosure philosophy and its longstanding focus on investor protection and
market efficiency. Whether or not it actually influenced or pressured AIG not
to provide Schedule A, the Federal Reserve clearly preferred non-disclosure
and rooted this in its contrasting focus on the soundness of financial
institutions.
372. The Federal Bailout of AIG: Hearing before the Committee on Oversight and
Gov't Reform, Illth Cong., at "Contents" (2010), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
111hhrg63136/html/CHRG-11 1hhrg63136.htm.
373. Baxter Testimony, supra note 364.
374. HOUSE OVERSIGHT REPORT, supra note 365, at 8; Moore, Timeline, supra note
367.
375. HOUSE OVERSIGHT REPORT, supra note 365, at 9.
376. See id.
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In short, the existence of two independently operating disclosure systems
that occupy the same informational turf itself causes problems, most
particularly that of duplication and waste. These problems might be
manageable.
What makes the current morphology of public information ultimately
unsustainable is not that there are parallel universes, but that these universes
have divergent regulatory ends. The traditional differences between the
regulatory ends of the SEC and those of bank regulators had already resulted in
sharp conflict prior to the emergence of the bank regulator disclosure system.
2. The SEC's Role, Boundary-Setting and "Informational Neutrality"
Across Parallel Universes
The SEC's long-term role with respect to the key disclosures of major
banks is now far from clear. The SEC has not taken a serious look at its risk-
related disclosures for many years. In the areas of market risk and stress-
testing, the new bank regulator disclosure system is strikingly sophisticated and
granular. The new system is generating far more useful information than any
corresponding requirements on the part of the SEC. One can expect similar
sophistication and granularity as the bank regulator disclosure system expands
over the next several years to also cover credit risk, liquidity risk, and other
major risk-related areas.
If this longstanding pattern of SEC inaction with respect to risk-related
matters continues, the prospect looms that the bank regulator disclosure system
will be the primary source of mandatory information as to risk characteristics of
major banks. If this scenario comes to pass, the ends and means of the bank
regulator system would, in effect, come to dominate public disclosure in this
context.
Bank and system stability, not investor protection and market efficiency,
would take pride of place. Information that would be considered "material"
under traditional understandings may not be similarly considered under the
bank regulator's standards. Some traditional securities lawyers might view this
as effectively adding bank well-being and financial stability exceptions to the
general requirement that all material information be disclosed.
On the enforcement side, it is unlikely that private causes of action will be
allowed with respect to violations of bank regulator disclosure rules.377
Independent of the merits of government-only enforcement,37 8 there is the
prospect of bizarre enforcement regimes. As to SEC disclosure rules applicable
to banks, class actions may be possible, but as to bank regulator disclosure
rules, class actions would not be.
377. See supra Subsection III.C. I.
378. See supra Subsection II.B.1 (discussing Halliburton).
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In other words, an alien form of public disclosure system would
effectively be in place for major banks. At a minimum, a perception of industry
favoritism could arise. Would it be fair for the banking industry alone to be
entitled to a different materiality standard and to be free from the usual threat of
class actions?
If, on the other hand, the SEC does finally look seriously at risk-related
disclosures and decides to vigorously promote new rules that it believes to be
essential to investor protection and market efficiency, direct confrontations
with bank regulators may ensue. At best, there will be incoherence in terms of
the overall morphology of public information if the two regulatory systems
simultaneously advance inconsistent disclosure mandates. But the Federal
Reserve is far more powerful than the SEC and has far more expertise,
experience, and resources as to risk- and banking-related matters. The SEC
faces an uphill fight in case of conflict. At worst-at least from the standpoint
of the SEC and the traditional goals of public disclosure-the SEC might even
be legally ousted from any role as to the risk-related disclosures of major
banks.
A fundamental question is at the root of basic incoherence of the new
morphology of public information. To what extent should the interests of
investor protection and market efficiency be balanced against the interests of
bank and system stability? The question was not considered in the creation of
the new bank regulator disclosure system. There is a pressing need to do so
soon.
Pending resolution of the fundamental question, some interim steps could
help both the SEC and bank regulators muddle through. They fall into two
areas, boundary-setting and a modest "informational neutrality" across the
parallel universes.
Boundary-setting, resulting in a division of labor between the SEC and the
bank regulators based on relative expertise, could help reduce conflict. The
SEC has a comparative, perhaps even absolute, advantage with respect to
information of a qualitative nature related to risk. The SEC disclosure system
has a crown jewel in its MD&A requirements, requirements that have been
fine-tuned over a generation. While primarily narrative in form, the MD&A is
essential reading for anyone interested in the overarching risk characteristics of
any entity. The bank regulators have no similar experience at structuring public
disclosure requirements geared to capturing the trends and uncertainties at the
heart of the MD&A.
The Federal Reserve has an absolute advantage with respect to
quantitative information related to risk. There is no comparison between the
market risk provisions of the two disclosure universes in terms of financial
sophistication or granularity. In terms of stress testing, bank regulators have
extensive substantive experience with supervisory stress tests and company-run
stress tests. The SEC has none.
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U.S. bank regulators have worked closely with both banks and bank
regulators worldwide on the quantitative aspects of derivatives and other
financial innovations since the 1980s. Indeed, these efforts helped foster the
development of many risk-related models and techniques for the evaluation of
such models. The SEC has not engaged in such efforts. Bank regulators have
not only far more extensive resources in general, but far more employees with
Ph.D.s in economics and finance than does the SEC. They have many staff
members who are effectively officed at major banks. The SEC has had little
reason to do so.
Moreover, bank regulators are responsible for the substantive regulation
of banks, and there is a highly interwoven relationship between the disclosure
side and the substantive side. How this relationship could affect risk-related
reporting is sharply illustrated in JPM's most recent Form 10-K, filed in
February 2014. In this Form 10-K, JPM stated that, using a new approach for
VaR backtesting-one that excluded such items as gains and losses from
intraday trading-JPM posted gains on 177 of the 260 trading days in calendar
year 2013.379 Had JPM used the previous approach for reporting purposes (one
which did not exclude intraday gains or losses), JPM would literally have had
posted gains on all 260 trading days. This reporting change was totally
voluntary on the part of JPM. Nothing in the SEC Form 10-K requirements
mandated this reporting change. This disclosure change appears to be entirely
attributable to a substantive requirement that, as a matter of sound risk
management, a bank must engage in VaR backtesting that, among other things,
excludes intraday gains and losses. While JPM did not say so, JPM appears to
have made the perfectly sensible decision to adopt the same backtesting
approach for purposes of both the SEC reporting requirements and the
substantive bank regulator rules.
As to the key area of model risk, federal bank regulators have taken
significant steps to develop and validate their own modeling of bank risks as
well as steps in assessing the quality of the modeling and the modeling process
at individual banks.380 The SEC does not regulate banks and there has not been
a reason for the SEC to develop models for assessing bank risks or to assess
modeling at individual banks.
Given these differences between the SEC and the bank regulators, one
possible interim strategy for a synergistic relationship between the bank
regulator universe and the SEC universe would be to have the bank regulator
universe direct most of its efforts to quantitative disclosures while the SEC
disclosure universe focuses more on qualitative ones.
Another interim step would be to attempt some modest "informational
neutrality" across the universes. For instance, the SEC and the bank regulators
are subject to far different judicial oversight with respect to the promulgation of
379. JPMorgan Chasse & Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 146 (Feb. 19, 2014).
380. See Subsection III.C.2.
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disclosure requirements. In recent years, the SEC has routinely lost on rule-
making challenges in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. If more
flexibility could be accorded to the SEC in rulemaking, even if not quite as
much flexibility as enjoyed by bank regulators, the certainty this would provide
could lead to more effective cooperation in rule-making between the two sets of
regulators.
That is, even if the SEC should wish to do so, the SEC may not have the
authority in its rulemaking to sacrifice investor protection and market
efficiency ends in favor of bank well-being and financial stability. After
repeated losses over rulemaking at the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit, the SEC adopted a formal policy of cost-benefit analysis expressly
contemplating the efficiency-related goals imposed on it by law.s38 Adopted in
March 2012, the policy explicitly reflects statutory provisions added by the
National Securities Market Improvement Act of 1996 and the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act of 1999 to federal securities statutes which require the SEC to
consider "efficiency, competition, and capital formation" and which call for
consideration of variety of issues in addition to investor protection.382 The
policy, framed in the form of a memo from the Division of Risk, Strategy, and
Financial Innovation383 and the Office of the General Counsel, states that when
a rule is being proposed for enhanced disclosure, the cost-benefit justification
should generally include the following concepts:
[T]he likely benefits to be derived from the rule presumably would include
better informed investment decisions. This, in turn, could result in better
alignment of investors' objectives and investments, greater investor trust in the
markets, lower risk premiums, and, ultimately, better allocation of capital.
3 84
The memo also points to other benefits from such disclosure
enhancements, including gains in economic efficiency from, among other
things, "reduced incentive misalignment/reduced monitoring costs," reduced
transaction costs, and the better allocation of capital due to better information
sharing. 385 The focus is on investor protection and market efficiency.
The Federal Reserve is not subject to this kind of efficiency focus in its
rule-making. In the federal bank regulators' release adopting U.S. Basel 2.5, the
381. See Div. OF RISK, STRATEGY, & FIN. INNOVATION & OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL,
SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, MEMORANDUM TO STAFF OF THE RULEWRITING DIVISIONS AND OFFICES RE:
CURRENT GUIDANCE ON ECONOMIC ANALYSIS IN SEC RULEMAKINGS (2012) [hereinafter RISK
FIN/OGC MEMO].
382. As to the pertinent statutes and the repeated rejections of SEC rules at the D.C.
Circuit on cost-benefit-related grounds, see, for example, James D. Cox & Benjamin J.C. Baucom, The
Emperor Has No Clothes: Confronting the D.C. Circuit's Usurpation of SEC Rulemaking Authority, 90
TEX. L. REV. 1811 (2012); Bruce Kraus & Connor Raso, Rational Boundaries for SEC Cost-Benefit
Analysis, 30 YALE J. ON REG. 289 (2013); RISK FIN/OGC MEMO, supra note 381, at 2-3 (2013).
383. This Division is now called the Division of Economic and Risk Analysis.
384. RISK FIN/OGC MEMO, supra note 381, at 10.
385. Id.at10-11.
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cost-benefit section nowhere explicitly mentions how the enhanced disclosure
may affect either the interests of investors or market efficiency. 3 This section
refers only to "increases [in] transparency through enhanced market
disclosures."387 This statement presumably is intended to reflect the "sound risk
management practices" and "fostering financial stability" ends set out in the
main text of the adopting release. The cost-benefit section is brief, consisting
of roughly one page.
More generally, under the statutes related to the Federal Reserve Board's
rulemaking authority, the Board is not generally required to provide economic
analysis in connection with its rulemaking. 389 Neither the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation nor the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the
other federal bank regulators who joined in the Basel 2.5 Rule, appear subject
to a requirement to consider investor protection or market efficiency grounds in
any cost-benefit analysis. 390
Outside of rulemaking, the SEC not only has leeway to work with the
Federal Reserve in considering financial stability, but may have an obligation
to do so. Among other things, one of the three primary purposes of the FSOC is
to "respond to emerging threats to the stability of the U.S. financial system."3 9 1
FSOC's voting members include the Treasury Secretary, the chairman of the
Federal Reserve, and the chairman of the SEC. As a statutory matter, FSOC
must "monitor the financial services marketplace in order to identify potential
threats to the financial stability of the United States. 392
The creation of FSOC has already had an impact on stability-related
matters unquestionably within the SEC's jurisdiction: the regulation of money
market funds. Faced with the prospect of SEC inaction as to structural reforms,
Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner wrote to FSOC members urging that
FSOC step in. In November of 2012, the FSOC recommended to the SEC
structural reforms as to money market funds pursuant to the FSOC's powers
under Section 120 of the Dodd-Frank Act.394 Such FSOC actions reportedly
caused the SEC to make certain money market fund proposals.395
386. U.S. Basel 2.5 Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 53,095-96.
387. Id. at 53,095.
388. Id. at 53,092.
389. CURTIS W. COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., COST-BENEFIT AND OTHER
ANALYSIS REQUIREMENTS IN THE RULEMAKING PROCESS 16 (2011).
390. See id. at 18, 20.
391. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, §§ Ill(b)(1)(A)-(J), 112(a)(1)(C), 124 Stat. 1376, 1395 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of U.S.C. (2006 & Supp. IV 2011)).
392. Id. at § 112(a)(2)(C).
393. See Letter from Timothy F. Geithner, Secretary, Department of the Treasury to
Members of the Financial Stability Oversight Council, Sept. 27, 2012.
394. Stephen A. Keen, Money Market Reform: The Next Crossroads, REED SMITH LLP
(Oct. 14, 2013), http://www.reedsmith.comlen-US/Money-Market-Fund-Reform-The-Next-Crossroads-
10-14-2013/.
395. See FSOC Turns Up the Heat on Money Market Reform, BINGHAM MCCUTCHEN
LLP (Nov. 21, 2012), http://www.bingham.com/Alerts/2012/11I/FSOC-Tums-Up-the-Heat-on-Money-
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The boundary-setting and the modest type of informational neutrality in
terms of rulemaking may help in synchronizing the regulatory efforts in the
short run. Ultimately, however, fundamental questions relating to the overall
morphology of public information need to be resolved.
VI. Conclusion
Major banks used to exist in a simple world. Their products were simple:
loans were easy to value and their risks relatively easy to assess. These banks
were subject to a single mandatory disclosure system, one with widely-
understood, longstanding ends and means.
Today's financial world is vastly more complicated. Like the banks
themselves, financial products and strategies have become so complex that they
are sometimes not understood even by their key decision-makers. As much as
they try to describe to investors and other market participants the risks that they
face, the picture is often far from clear.
Technological innovation is making it possible to go beyond these
attempts, to go beyond the descriptive mode of information and toward the
transfer and hybrid modes. "Information" can and must now consist of a
properly diversified portfolio of informational modes, which draws from the
entire spectrum of possibilities.
In 2013, the banks became subject to public disclosure rules of two
different sets of regulators, with divergent ends and means. The morphology of
public information has changed in this vital context. As the traditional
dominance of the SEC has ended, a daunting new task has arisen: harmonizing
the SEC's role with that of other regulators who are animated by different ends
and have more sophisticated rules for risk-related disclosures. Classical
understandings as to the primacy of investor protection and market efficiency
in guiding public disclosure are giving way, as are longstanding concepts of
"materiality" and the availability of both private and public enforcement.
Securities lawyers and regulators, long ensconced in the world of the English
language, graphs, and accounting numbers as the means of communication, are
now in a less familiar, more mathematical world.
Constantly-evolving mathematical models have become essential to
assessing the risks of major banks. A nuanced appreciation of such models as
well as the vigorous and creative use of all three modes to communicate model-
based information have become essential.
Multiplicity abounds. Multiple products of financial innovation generate
multiple, often subtle and complex, risks for banks that are themselves
complex. The banks are subject to multiple disclosure universes, with divergent
regulatory quests. Multiple modes of information must be deployed.
Market-Fund-Reform; Ronald D. Orol, SEC unveils proposal to reform money-market funds,
MARKETWATCH (June 5, 2013, 4:41 PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/sec-unveils-proposals-to-
reform-money-market-funds-2013-06-05.
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Fundamental principles are at stake, as are the interests of banks,
investors, and countries. The informational challenges posed by this new world
must be met. An understanding of its multiplicity would be a start.
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